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ABSTRACT 
Modern education reform in the U.S. was trending toward privatization and 
centralization of public education as part of a search for a policy solution that would 
significantly improve student achievement. This study examined MAST (Merit 
Accountability System for Teachers) from its inception in 2005 through 2011, the related 
policy rhetoric, its impact on student achievement, and its implementation in local school 
districts using ideal typology and grounded theory analysis. The five major findings of 
the study were: (a) the financial starvation of local school districts fostered a greater 
willingness to try new initiatives if there was money attached to them; (b) MAST failed 
as a pre-fabricated solution to improve student achievement by altering teacher 
compensation, but did prove to be a promising professional development model; (c) 
CSDE attempted to manipulate the MAST legislation to promote the Governor’s agenda 
regarding teacher compensation; (d) the rhetoric used by CSDE regarding MAST shifted 
over time; and (e) local district leadership was important to effective MAST 
implementation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study explored how one state implemented the national education policy 
movement toward private governance of education through its attempt to transform 
teacher compensation. I studied the rhetoric related to Central State’s Merit 
Accountability System for Teachers (MAST) Policy and its implementation in local 
school districts. This study follows the path of this performance-based pay initiative for 
teachers from its initial legislation in 2005 to the program as implemented by public 
school districts in Central State through 2011. 
When I began this study, I was uncertain about the feasibility of MAST, but the 
concept of compensation based on performance resonated with my experience with 
compensation methods in the business sector. I worked in the private sector for 10 years 
in a marketing and middle management capacity. Performance-based compensation 
seemed to be an effective tool for retaining quality employees and encouraging weaker 
ones to voluntarily seek employment elsewhere. As a teacher, in addition to many other 
hard-working and effective teachers, I saw some teachers working their contractual duty 
day, taking no work home. I saw those same teachers knitting and passing notes in 
faculty meetings. I did not understand how they could behave that way and keep their 
jobs, other than that they must have performed differently until they achieved tenure. 
Intellectually, I understood the reason for tenure—the protection of academic 
freedom and the protection from dismissal solely because a teacher had climbed too high 
on the compensation schedule and could be replaced by a newer, cheaper teacher. 
However, I have seen too many district administrators keep poor-performing, tenured 
teachers because the process to remove a tenured teacher was time consuming and costly, 
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and at the end of the process, the district may have been forced to keep the teacher 
anyway. I have also seen too many new, talented teachers forced out of their job because 
of seniority rules, while poor-performing, veteran teachers comfortably keep theirs. 
When I taught, I thought I did a good job and welcomed the idea of being paid 
based on my performance. I never joined the teachers’ union and resented the “fair share” 
portion of union dues being taken out of every paycheck. I would have been happy to 
negotiate my own compensation and from time to time saw union rules and politics get in 
the way of educating students. There was definitely a time in my work as an educator 
when I would have fully supported a de-unionized, non-tenured faculty that was 
compensated based on their performance as educators. However, as I have learned more 
about public education practices in Central State and merit-based compensation plans 
both in my work as an educator and through the research conducted for this study, I 
increasingly had more doubts about the effectiveness of performance-based 
compensation as an effective tool to increase student achievement in the public school 
setting. 
I believed that the drive to align teacher compensation practices with those of the 
business sector was part of a larger push to open the public education market sector to 
private enterprise. At the time of this research, public education was a $712 billion 
industry and was a largely untapped market. However, that was changing. The marketing 
materials I used to receive at school were occasional mailings from textbook companies 
and professional organizations. By the time this study occurred, I received multiple e-
mails, phone calls, catalogs, and brochures promoting the latest product or program to 
increase student achievement and raise test scores on a daily basis. These materials 
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sounded a lot like ads for weight loss products—“with just six weeks of using this 
product in your classroom, all of your students will be achieving at or above grade level.” 
These new companies capitalized on educators’ fears of students not achieving adequate 
yearly progress like the diet pill pushers capitalized on our fears of being overweight. 
Weight loss industry products have about a one percent success rate, and from what I had 
seen, the student achievement gimmicks worked about as well, but desperate educators, 
like desperate dieters, were willing to try just about anything for success. 
These new education product and consulting companies and their programs were 
not regulated or tested. There was no endorsement of efficacy other than from the 
companies themselves. I believed the greater motivator for these companies was profit. 
While working at a large medical device company, I learned the profit lesson first-hand. 
The company’s rhetoric was all about developing products to improve patients’ quality of 
life, and employees heard this on a daily basis. It was also a part of the company’s 
mission statement. Through researching potential new markets for the company, I 
discovered a disease that could be palliated by one of our existing products, resulting in 
improved quality of life. The incidence rate (the number of people who would contract 
the disease each year) for this disease was about 13,000 patients per year in the U.S. 
When I presented this potential new market to upper management, I was told that because 
the incidence rate was so low, there was not enough money in it to pursue getting FDA 
approval and marketing the device for this purpose. I was young, naïve, and had to ask 
about the mission statement and how the company could turn its back on 13,000 people a 
year that could be helped by a product we already had. I was told that the company’s first 
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loyalty was to the shareholders and that it only cared about improving a patient’s quality 
of life if there was a big enough market to turn a sizeable profit for investors. 
Over the years that I worked in a corporate setting, I experienced many things that 
would not be palatable in educating students. These things included giving physicians 
more company stock to encourage them to provide favorable research results and not to 
publish unfavorable results and not pursuing cures for diseases that not enough of the 
“right people” had, and making the “right donations” to open market doors. I believed 
that these types of practices, if implemented in the education sector, would have a 
negative effect on student achievement, especially for those students who need more 
support in order to learn. 
It was also essential to note that private sector companies were continuously 
searching for easy-entry, untapped markets. That was exactly the kind of market they 
hoped education would be, and many private sector companies were lobbying hard and 
making the right donations to open the education market for their wares. However, based 
on my experience in the private industry sector and the research gathered for this study, I 
believed that increased student achievement was likely secondary to the profits gained 
from being able to access this previously untapped market. It was difficult for me to 
otherwise explain why companies would invest so much time and money to open the 
market when there were so many decades of failed education policies that promised to 
significantly improve student achievement. Additionally, research data that showed that 
any educational program or methodology significantly increased student achievement did 
not exist. In fact, there was data that showed that the most significant factor in 
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determining student achievement was the mother’s socio-economic status and that 
schools had very little ability to overcome that influence in any significant way. 
Although it seemed like a relatively new phenomenon, performance-based pay for 
teachers was in existence since at least the mid 1800s and performance-based plans have 
come and gone ever since. In 1862 England established the "Payment by Results" teacher 
compensation system (Nelson, 2001). Payment by results was abolished in1897, but as 
“Payment by Results” was dying in England, performance-based pay for teachers was 
gaining popularity in the United States (Nelson, 2001). By 1918 almost half of the school 
districts in the U.S. were using a performance-based pay system for teachers, but within 
10 years 30% of those districts had abandoned their performance-based compensation 
systems (Harris, 2007). Interest in merit pay in the U.S. increased after the 1957 launch 
of the Russian satellite, Sputnik, and again in the 1980s after “A Nation at Risk,” a report 
that was highly critical of public education, was published (Harris, 2007). 
I studied MAST in order to determine what, if any, relationship existed between 
MAST, de-unionization of public workers, and the increased number of private sector 
organizations providing educational services. I analyzed communication disseminated 
through formal communication channels by federal, state, and local policy makers and 
conducted interviews of teachers, administrators, school officials, and school board 
members in Central State. Despite the early rhetoric of MAST being a significant tool to 
reform teacher compensation and increase student achievement, it seemed to have 
accomplished little in terms of teacher compensation reform; however, it did appear to 
serve as a promising model for effective professional development for educators. 
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At the time of this research, most school districts in Central State were struggling 
financially to maintain the kind of educational programs that would result in a high 
quality educational experience for students. Because of the financial pressures, teachers’ 
take home salaries have been relatively flat with any compensation increases going to pay 
skyrocketing health care insurance premiums. As a result, I was somewhat surprised that 
more districts did not implement MAST. I believed this was due to the early MAST 
rhetoric that really pushed the “pay-for-performance” aspect of MAST and the Central 
State Department of Education’s insistence that the traditional steps and lanes salary 
schedule be completely eliminated. Those were two huge culture changes for unions to 
accept. 
The most important things I learned from conducting this research were: (a) how 
the political process really worked in Central State, (b) how political appointees served to 
advance political agendas, (c) how political rhetoric influenced the perception of 
programs and (d) how school district leadership impacted the implementation of 
programs locally.  Each of these things helped to shape my view of public policy 
implementation and leadership in Central State. 
The first thing I learned was how the political process really worked in Central 
State. At first when I was watching legislative sessions, I was appalled that legislators 
were debating components of MAST and neither side had the facts correct. As I spent 
more time at the State Capitol, I began to understand how that happened and that it 
happened frequently. Legislators had mountains of reading to do regarding the many bills 
that were brought before them. Additionally, Legislators not only had to read and analyze 
the bills themselves but also the background information related to the bills on a variety 
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of subjects, most of which were unfamiliar to law makers. Legislators had research 
assistants to help, but the amount of information to be processed was overwhelming at 
times.  
On top of the voluminous reading required, as bills went through the House and 
Senate, compromises were made and the bills were changed. This happened to MAST. 
As MAST legislation travelled through the legislative bodies, many compromises were 
made that softened the bill’s original pay-for-performance stance. If legislators did not 
keep up with their reading and did not remember what they read, they were not prepared 
to accurately debate legislation on the floors of their respective houses. This taught me to 
follow the pieces of legislation that are important to me throughout the legislative process 
and to make sure that my representatives were as knowledgeable about them as possible, 
but also educated me on the political nature of the process and that this lobbying would 
likely have a minimal impact. In general, I was appalled that conditions existed that 
enabled laws to be made this way. 
The second thing I learned was that political appointees could hold significant 
power to shape the implementation of laws passed by the Legislature. The final language 
of the MAST bill was vague enough so that parts of the bill could be interpreted much the 
same as the bill was initially introduced. One specific example of this that was important 
in this research was the definition of “reform” as it applied to the traditional step and lane 
compensation used by the majority of teachers’ unions and school districts throughout 
Central State. The Central State Commissioner of Education, Lydia Mahoney, was 
appointed by the Governor and led the Central State Department of Education (CSDE). 
CSDE’s definition of “reform” was that the traditional step and lane compensation had to 
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be eliminated and replaced with a different compensation model. However, many local 
school districts defined “reform” as that the traditional step and lane compensation had to 
be changed, but could still exist in some form. Since CSDE approved MAST 
applications, in most cases, CSDE’s definition of reform prevailed. Options for appealing 
CSDE’s decisions on local school districts’ application were limited, and included suing 
CSDE. This was a time consuming and expensive option for financially strapped school 
districts, so largely CSDE had the power to prevail over local school districts. 
The third thing I learned was that the rhetoric used to promote an initiative could 
have a significant impact on its implementation. The hard-charging “pay-for-
performance” rhetoric of the Governor and CSDE cast the teachers’ unions as the villains 
and the cause of inadequate student achievement in Central State. This was generally 
well-received by the public who largely worked in the business sector, but not by 
teachers. Since teachers’ unions had the power to vote for or against MAST participation 
locally, the rhetoric needed to resonate with them as well. The Governor’s and CSDE’s 
inability to court the teachers’ unions led to limited local school district participation in 
MAST. 
Eventually, CSDE and, to a lesser extent, the Governor changed the focus of their 
rhetoric from the pay-for-performance to the professional development aspects of MAST. 
However, this realization came too late. The teachers’ unions were already cast as the 
villains and were generally reluctant to participate in a program that was designed to 
weaken them. 
The fourth thing I learned was that local leaders really did have the ability to 
positively influence program implementation at the local level, provided that they 
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understood the political nature and rhetoric of the program they hoped to implement. 
Leaders of local school districts who were able to see MAST from the point of view of 
the teachers’ union and “translate” the pay-for-performance rhetoric of CSDE and the 
Governor into the rewarding teachers and professional development rhetoric that was 
accepted by teachers’ unions were more likely to have successful MAST programs in 
their school districts. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE HISTORY OF U.S. TEACHER COMPENSATION MODELS 
 
In order to understand the current rhetoric regarding what I call “MAST” in this 
research and how it fits within the broader scope of education reform, we must first 
understand the history of teacher compensation and relevant education reforms that have 
set the stage for this most current debate on teacher compensation and student 
achievement. 
 
Compensation Level 
 In colonial America, compensation and social status for teachers was structured 
with college teachers receiving the highest pay and status, secondary teachers receiving 
the middle pay and status, and elementary teachers receiving the lowest pay and status 
(Butts & Cremin, 1953). Teacher salaries needed to be supplemented so that teachers 
could survive, and many teachers gained additional income from farming, shepherding, 
tavern keeping, and skilled trades (Butts & Cremin, 1953). As a result, teaching was 
viewed as something to do until a teacher could find a better job (Butts & Cremin, 1953). 
 In the 1800s a connection was made between low teacher salaries and the 
competency level of teachers (Butts & Cremin, 1953). Similarly to today’s rhetoric, calls 
for increasing teacher salaries to attract more competent individuals to the profession 
were made repeatedly, but salaries remained low until the 1920s (Butts & Cremin, 1953). 
Teacher salaries peaked around 1930, declined to their lowest level by 1935, and nearly 
regained their 1930 level by 1940 (Butts & Cremin, 1953). In 1951-1952 average teacher 
salaries reached an all-time high of $3,300 per year (adjusted for inflation) (Butts & 
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Cremin, 1953). Teacher salaries increased an average of 84% between 1925 and 1949, 
but the earnings of production workers in industry rose 125%, and increases in dollar 
salaries for teachers were virtually wiped out by the rise in the cost of living and tax 
increases (Butts & Cremin, 1953).  
 In the early 1980s, the Carnegie Forum recommended that teachers be paid higher 
salaries in general to attract more competent teachers and that teacher compensation be 
linked to performance and National Board certification and that teachers should have 
more responsibilities (Chubb & Moe, 1986, June 24). At the time of this research, there 
was still an abundance of rhetoric surrounding the idea of paying teachers more if they 
taught in troubled schools or in areas where teacher shortages existed. To implement this 
type of compensation model would have necessitated a change in the traditional step and 
lane method of teacher compensation that had all teachers earning the same amount of 
money based on education level and years of experience regardless of which subject the 
teacher taught or which school within a district a teacher worked. 
 However, at the time of this research, in terms of general compensation levels, the 
debate continued about whether or not teachers were paid fairly relative to other 
professions. Recent data regarding the equity of teacher compensation was mixed. 
According to the Census Bureau (2004) and National Education Association (NEA), in 
2002 salaries for lawyers were $77,100, $72,400 for engineers, $52,300 for accountants, 
and $41,800 for teachers (Cameron, 2005). In some states the beginning salary for 
teachers was only $23,000 (Cameron, 2005). The poverty threshold for a two-person 
household in 2002 was $12,047 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). However, data from the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics found that the average public school teacher was paid 
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36% more than the average white-collar worker in 2005 (Honawar, 2007, April 18). 
Teacher union leaders strongly opposed this data because it did not take into account the 
extra hours a teacher worked outside of the school day (Honawar, 2007, April 18). 
However, based on my experience, the same argument could have been made for salaried 
workers. In the companies I worked for, employees’ salaries were based on a 40-hour 
work week with no extra compensation for additional time spent working. However, 
employees were responsible for performing all duties for which they were responsible. 
This often took more than the 40 hours for which the employees were compensated. 
Despite the rhetoric that MAST would modernize teacher salaries and increase teacher 
performance, this brief history shows that the educational debate regarding teacher 
compensation and competency had changed little in 200 years. 
 
Uniform Salary Schedule 
 One of the methods of teacher compensation was the uniform salary schedule. 
The uniform salary schedule was a compensation system that compensated teachers 
based on their education level and years of service. It was developed in the early 1920s 
and gained widespread appeal in the 1950s as a way of creating equity in compensation 
rates between largely female elementary teachers and largely male high school teachers 
and was currently used by nearly all school districts in the U.S. (Koppich, 2005). Teacher 
performance was not a factor in determining teacher compensation in traditional uniform 
salary schedule plans.  
 There were a number of advantages to using a uniform salary schedule. 
Advantages included: (a) freedom for teachers to teach how and what they wanted within 
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district guidelines, (b) provided a predictable budget for school districts, (c) promoted 
positive relationships among teachers, (d) promoted the perception of objectivity, and (e) 
required minimal administrative costs (Harris, 2007). With a uniform salary schedule 
teachers could experiment and learn new, ultimately more effective, techniques without 
worrying about a temporary dip in student achievement (Harris, 2007). In districts where 
there were significant social needs or a transient population, a willingness for teachers to 
learn new techniques to reach these students was extremely important (Harris, 2007). A 
uniform salary schedule allowed school districts to accurately budget personnel costs. 
District administrators could easily look at the previous year’s compensation levels, add 
the appropriate dollars for step and lane changes, and make basic assumptions regarding 
retirees and new hires to determine a reasonably accurate estimate of projected 
compensation costs. Since there was no ranking of teacher performance on a uniform 
salary schedule, teachers had no incentive to undermine the performance of others and 
were more likely to help each other succeed (Harris, 2007). Teachers also believed that 
the uniform salary schedule was objective and minimized favoritism (Viadero, 2007). 
Because there were minimal costs associated with implementing a uniform salary 
schedule, this compensation method also saved districts money (Harris, 2007). 
 However, critics of uniform salary schedules have noted potential disadvantages. 
These included: (a) discouraging good teachers, (b) negatively impacting teacher 
recruitment and retention (especially in poor districts), (c) failing to provide incentives 
for teachers to work to their potential, and (d) providing inappropriate rewards (Ritter & 
Lucas, 2005). Good teachers could become discouraged because their hard work went 
unrewarded financially. Teachers who worked extra hours improving their skill and 
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instruction were paid at the same rate as those who put forth a minimal effort, so there 
was little to no financial incentive to learn and implement new best-practice strategies 
(Hershberg & Lea-Kruger, 2007). Performance was not rewarded in a uniform salary 
schedule, and as a result, performance-driven candidates who would be excellent teachers 
may have been discouraged from entering into the profession (Vigdor, 2008). Instead, the 
uniform salary schedule may have actually dissuaded many potential teachers due to 
teachers’ low starting salaries (Vigdor, 2008). Because pay was not linked to 
performance in the uniform salary schedule model, there was no financial incentive for 
teachers to work hard or implement best-practice strategies (Vigdor, 2008), thus 
eliminating a potentially effective method of teacher motivation. 
 The uniform salary schedule rewarded teachers for longevity in their teaching 
career and attainment of advanced education; however, these were not necessarily 
characteristics of high-performing teachers (Vigdor, 2008). There was evidence that 
experience positively impacted teaching during the first few years, but had little impact 
thereafter (Vigdor, 2008). Likewise, advanced degrees have been shown to have little 
impact on teacher effectiveness in the classroom (Vigdor, 2008).  
 
History of Merit-based Models 
A second teacher compensation method was pay-for-performance or merit-based 
models. Although merit-based models were often touted as innovative and modern, pay-
for-performance teacher compensation models were found as early as 1862 when, in 
England, the Payment by Results teacher compensation model was established (Nelson, 
2001). Payment by Results compensated teachers based on student attendance and exam 
Pay-for-Performance Page 24 of 299 
scores (Nelson, 2001). Payment by Results lasted for 35 years but ended when school 
inspectors who initiated the program retired and criticized it, and teachers unionized and 
gained power over their working environment (Nelson, 2001). 
Similar to criticisms of modern merit-based compensation models, criticisms of 
Payment by Results included skepticism that a test could accurately measure everything 
that was important about education, inability to account for normal fluctuations in student 
population outside of a teacher’s control, incentives for teachers to cheat and/or focus 
only on the tested material, inconsistency of the test and testing environment, and 
incentives for teachers to move to wealthier schools where there were fewer perceived 
social problems that would negatively impact test scores and attendance (Nelson, 2001). 
Over time, there was more evidence gathered that indicated that Payment by Results 
encouraged negative teacher behaviors that did not promote quality teaching rather than 
its intended result of encouraging teachers to perform at higher levels (Nelson, 2001). As 
a result, teacher autonomy became the newly recommended standard in England after 
Payment by Results ended (Nelson, 2001). 
As Payment by Results was failing in England, interest in merit-based models 
grew in the U.S. By 1918 almost half of the school districts in the U.S. were using a 
merit-based teacher compensation model (Gratz, 2005). These models were generally 
short-lived. For example, in 1917, when the St. Paul, MN School District attempted to 
introduce merit pay, it created extreme tension between teachers, their unions, 
administrators, and civic associations (Harris, 2007). The District was polarized on the 
issue of merit pay for teachers, and after 14 teachers and principals were fired for voicing 
opposition to the plan, the pro-merit pay superintendent resigned to accept a higher 
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paying position in another school district, and the merit pay plan was abandoned (Harris, 
2007). Finding that merit pay plans did more harm than good regarding teacher morale 
and raising similar concerns to the Payment by Results program, the number of school 
districts using a merit pay plan in the U.S. dropped to fewer than 18% by 1928 and 
further decreased to 4% by the early 1950s (Gratz, 2005). 
 Then, in 1957, Sputnik's launch renewed concerns about public education and 
raised interest in merit-based compensation programs. In 1957 approximately 10% of 
U.S. school districts adopted merit-based compensation plans for teachers (Gratz, 2005). 
However, only 4% of school districts had a merit-based teacher compensation plan in 
place in 1969 (Gratz, 2005). 
 In 1978, an Education Research Service survey found that 183 school districts had 
implemented merit-based compensation plans for an average of six years, and one third 
of the plans survived two years or less (Harris, 2007). The most common reasons districts 
cited for discontinuing their merit-based compensation programs included difficulty 
conducting evaluations, administrative issues, teacher resistance, lack of funding, and 
inadequate measurement tools (Harris, 2007). 
After “A Nation at Risk” was published in 1983 interest in merit-based 
compensation plans rose again (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). By 1985, 25 states had 
mandated merit-based compensation programs for teachers (Harris, 2007). One of these 
was Houston's Second Mile Plan. Under this plan teachers were given financial 
incentives for low absenteeism, high student test scores, and teaching in geographic and 
subject shortage areas (Harris, 2007). Evaluators found conflicting results about the 
success of this program, and by the early 1990s Houston's program and many others 
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ended (Harris, 2007). When a survey similar to the Education Research Service survey 
was administered in 1983 the reasons districts gave for discontinuing their merit-based 
compensation plans were similar to those given in the Education Research Service survey 
(Harris, 2007). A 1993 follow-up study found that 75% of the plans studied in 1983 were 
discontinued (Viadero, 2007). This meant that the longevity of these plans was 10 years 
or less. Like the debate about teacher compensation in general, the discussion regarding 
merit pay had not changed much in 150 years. 
 
Modern Teacher Compensation Models 
 
Merit-based Models 
At the time of this research, there were two main merit-based teacher 
compensation models (Odden, 2009). The first was an outcome-based model that linked 
teacher compensation to the students’ performance (Harris, 2007). The second was a 
performance-based model that linked teacher compensation to the teacher's performance 
(Harris, 2007). 
Advantages of these merit-based teacher compensation models included providing 
incentives for teachers to work hard, improving teacher recruitment and retention, and 
gaining political support for education (Odden, 2009). The logic was that hard-working, 
performance-driven teachers may be more attracted to the teaching profession if they 
believed they would be rewarded for their hard work and strong performance (Odden, 
2009). This was similar to the piece rate method of compensation used in manufacturing 
where employees were paid based on the amount of goods they produced (Smith, 1982). 
At the time of this research, there was strong political support for merit-based 
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compensation models. Districts and states that implemented merit-based compensation 
models found that legislators were more willing to approve funding increases for public 
education if they felt those increases would reward high-performing teachers (Podgursky 
& Springer, 2007). 
Disadvantages of merit-based compensation models included a lack of long-term 
commitment to funding and support, teachers' insensitivity to financial rewards, an 
imperfect understanding of what merit-based compensation models were, and a lack of 
support for improvement (Harris, 2007).  
 Since the inception of Payment by Results in 1862, many merit-based 
compensation models have come and gone. Historically, the biggest problem with merit-
based compensation models was that school districts could not or would not pay the merit 
compensation to teachers as promised (Cameron, 2005). Most merit-based compensation 
plans failed because of inadequate funding, and every time a merit-based compensation 
plan failed, teacher morale decreased and union cynicism increased (Cameron, 2005). 
School districts and state departments of education often found themselves unable to 
honor commitments when the Legislature cut their budgets (Harris, 2007). For example, 
California promised teachers performance bonuses in 1999 as part of its merit-based 
compensation model, but the state found itself in a budget shortfall and never paid the 
bonuses (Harris, 2007). Similarly, voters and school districts could freeze or rollback 
property taxes, leaving district officials unable to honor the financial commitments of 
their merit-based compensation plan (Harris, 2007). When districts were forced to cut 
their budgets, merit-based compensation plans were often the first programs to be cut 
(Olson, 2007, October 3). 
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 Support for merit-based compensation plans was dependent upon political and 
district leaders’ views on teacher compensation. As elected officials and district leaders 
came and went, so did support for merit-based compensation (Harris, 2007). At the time 
of this research, the average tenure for school superintendents was seven and a half years, 
while the election cycle for most elected officials ranged between four and six years 
(Harris, 2007). These tenures were significantly shorter than a teaching career, and may 
have impacted teachers' willingness to adopt new plans (Harris, 2007). 
 Merit-based compensation models were based on the assumption that teachers 
would work harder and improve their performance for monetary rewards. However, 
teachers tended to de-emphasize monetary rewards in favor of developing relationships 
with people, thus making them somewhat less sensitive to monetary rewards than people 
in other professions (Harris, 2007). Seventy-five percent of new teachers believed they 
were seriously underpaid, making it unlikely that they became teachers for the money 
(Harris, 2007). Additionally, normative pressure on new teachers may have further de-
emphasized the importance of monetary rewards in the teaching profession. Zhijuan, 
Verstegen, and Kim (2008) found that monetary rewards were of even less importance to 
teachers early and late in their careers. 
 For example, in a study of novice teachers, given the choice between working in a 
district with higher pay or one with highly motivated and effective teachers, 75% of the 
teachers studied chose the district with highly motivated and effective teachers (Harris, 
2007). In a second study, when novice and veteran teachers were asked about a merit-
based compensation plan, they responded that they were motivated by gains in student 
achievement, positive recognition, and fear of sanctions, but that additional compensation 
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was not particularly motivating (Harris, 2007). This may have been because the monetary 
rewards in merit-based compensation plans tended to be small and may have been too 
small to provide teachers the incentive to change their behavior or improve performance 
(Harris, 2007).  
 However in a study of merit-based compensation plans in Kentucky, when given 
the choice to designate rewards for student achievement to either compensate students or 
teachers, 98% of teachers voted to designate the rewards for teacher compensation 
(Harris, 2007). This data corresponded to a 2008 study by Zhijuan, et al.(2008) that found 
teachers' job satisfaction was most strongly related to school climate, with teacher 
compensation being the second most important factor. 
 Most merit-based compensation models were complex and implementation plans 
varied from district to district, and teachers may not have understood what they needed to 
do to receive the merit-based compensation (Harris, 2007). This confusion could have led 
to undesired behaviors and teachers becoming frustrated with the plan and discontinuing 
their support for it (Harris, 2007). 
 Some teachers may have worked harder and improved their teaching skills in a 
merit-based compensation plan; however, others may have wanted to improve their 
teaching but did not know how to do it (Harris, 2007). Merit-based compensation 
assumed that teachers knew how to perform, but were choosing not to due to a lack of 
motivation. Additionally, merit-based compensation models created incentives for 
teachers to hide their weaknesses rather than share them and work to improve them 
(Harris, 2007). 
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 Evidence relating merit-based teacher compensation to increased student 
achievement was inconclusive. Some studies linked merit-based teacher compensation to 
increased student achievement, but it was unknown whether school districts that choose 
to implement merit-based compensation already had systems in place that promoted 
student achievement, developed systems to improve student achievement concurrently 
with the implementation of merit-based pay, or if the merit-based compensation was the 
cause of increased student achievement (Harris, 2007). However, researchers like 
Hanushek and Lindseth (2009) believed that none of the teacher compensation models 
that had been tried led to significant gains in student achievement. Many researchers felt 
that more data was needed. For example, according to Matthew Springer, Director of the 
National Center on Performance Incentives at Vanderbilt University, "We don't know if 
pay-for-performance is an effective policy. We don't know how it should be designed. 
We know more research is needed. It is critical that a program of this magnitude is 
rigorously and independently evaluated" (Honawar, 2007, October 24, p. 6). 
 
Performance-based Models 
 Performance-based compensation models were a subset of merit-based models 
that provided teachers financial incentives to improve their teaching in relation to specific 
pedagogical methodology and content-based criteria (Harris, 2007). Advantages of this 
model included being able to reward teachers without having to account for complicated 
factors such as students’ backgrounds, providing teachers with concrete feedback on how 
to improve their performance, and understanding the plans and what teachers had to do to 
receive the additional compensation was relatively easy (Harris, 2007). However, most of 
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the indicators of quality teaching were difficult to measure (Podgursky & Springer, 
2007). 
 In large part, this difficulty was due to the fact that there was no single set of best-
practice teaching methods. In addition, administrator preference and skill may have 
influenced assessments (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). For example, sometimes 
administrators used low benchmarks to try to build a team or inflate teacher performance 
scores in hopes that teachers would live up to them (Harris, 2007). Additionally, 
administrators may have faced pressure to minimize the amount of money spent on 
rewards, or to keep average ratings at or below a certain level due to budgetary 
constraints (Harris, 2007).  
 Evaluators needed to be trained in identifying and measuring indicators of quality 
teaching, and more frequent teacher observations were necessary (Podgursky & Springer, 
2007). Additional time had to be spent observing and documenting compensation 
decisions (Rothstein, 2005). These factors made performance-based models more 
expensive to administer. 
 In addition, it was possible for teachers to abuse performance-based compensation 
models by focusing their efforts only on those items that were measured and ignoring 
items that were equally as important, but not measured (Harris, 2007). This behavior was 
observed in studies of NFL quarterbacks and computer programmers receiving 
performance-based compensation (Harris, 2007). 
 Thus, there were several unintended consequences of performance-based 
compensation that would potentially arise. These models included incentives for 
undesirable teacher behavior (Harris, 2007). Teachers may have attempted to influence 
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higher-achieving students to join their classrooms and to encourage lower-achieving 
students to transfer to a different teacher or school (Harris, 2007). Teachers who excelled 
at working with challenging students may have been discouraged from doing so (Harris, 
2007). Additionally, districts had a financial incentive to limit professional development 
opportunities because having more effective teachers would place an increased financial 
burden on school districts (Harris, 2007). 
 
Outcome-based Models 
 Whereas merit- and performance-based compensation models were concerned 
with teacher behavior, outcome-based compensation models were a type of merit-based 
compensation model that focused on student achievement (Harris, 2007). Outcome-based 
compensation was based on student achievement results measured by a set of 
standardized criteria. This was typically measured by a standardized test that all students 
in a particular grade level throughout a district or state took to measure their proficiency 
on the tested material. Advantages of outcome-based compensation models were that (a) 
they were purportedly objective, (b) teachers were free to use their own desired methods 
to achieve results, and (c) teachers were encouraged to strengthen areas of weakness 
(Harris, 2007). 
 Disadvantages of outcome-based compensation models include: (a) teachers being 
unwilling to base their compensation on factors that were outside of their control, (b) the 
plans were more complex, (c) they were expensive to administer, (d) they promoted a 
short-term and one-dimensional vision of student achievement typically measured by 
standardized tests, and (e) the ability to cheat on those tests (Harris, 2007). National 
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teacher unions were opposed to merit-based teacher compensation, especially outcome-
based models (Honawar, 2007, October 24). This opposition could make implementation 
difficult. 
 In addition to the above disadvantages, student test scores were reflective of more 
than teacher performance. Items such as parental support, socio-economic status, 
language barriers, and disability affected students’ test scores but were outside of a 
teacher’s control (Harris, 2007). Teachers were generally unwilling to support plans that 
tied their compensation to factors outside of their control (Harris, 2007). Additionally, 
this provided an unintended incentive for teachers to avoid working in schools where 
students had many social problems or for teachers to encourage students with social 
problems or low ability to transfer to other classrooms or schools (Harris, 2007).  
 Measuring student achievement through standardized testing was also problematic 
due to the one-dimensional aspect of the tests. Standardized tests typically focused on 
reading and math because districts were required to measure student achievement in these 
areas as part of No Child Left Behind legislation. Not every teacher taught math or 
reading. Some districts allowed groups of teachers, for example, all music teachers, to 
develop a common standardized assessment that would be used district-wide; however, 
that still did not address the factors mentioned above that were simply out of a teacher’s 
control. Additionally, school social workers and counselors typically were part of the 
teachers’ union and were compensated under the district’s and teachers’ union’s master 
agreement. They did not teach content that could even be measured one-dimensionally 
through a standardized test. 
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 To combat some of the problems with standardized testing as a measure of 
student learning, school districts devised value-added compensation plans that tried to 
measure the teachers’ contributions to student learning (Harris, 2007). These were also 
referred to as “growth models.” Under this type of model, the student’s previous 
standardized test score was recorded, then a standardized rate of growth was calculated 
and added to the student’s previous test score to determine the student’s new “target” 
score. Meeting the new target score would mean that the student learned an appropriate 
amount of material as determined by the standardized test. One drawback of value-added 
compensation plans was that they may have reinforced low student expectations because 
student growth was based on past performance (Harris, 2007). 
 Value-added compensation plans were more complex than other outcome-based 
pay systems and teachers were often unwilling to endorse plans they did not understand 
(Harris, 2007). Both straightforward outcome based compensation models and value-
added compensation models assumed that a teacher’s impact on student learning was 
easily measurable. This was often deliberated among educators. Moreover, in subject 
areas where students were not tested in a standardized manner, this was exceedingly 
difficult (Harris, 2007). Teachers in art, physical education, music, special education, and 
other specialty areas such as counselors and social workers had concerns about how they 
would be measured (Harris, 2007). 
 Determining a teacher’s impact on student learning could be difficult and required 
a significant amount of observation and documentation of compensation decisions, 
making outcome-based compensation models expensive to administer (Harris, 2007). The 
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expense required for administering this type of model left school districts with less 
money to pay teachers (Harris, 2007). 
 There were also a few negative unintended consequences of outcome-based 
compensation. One unintended consequence of outcome-based compensation models was 
that they provided teachers with incentives to take a short-term approach to student 
achievement. Traditionally, students were often exposed to concepts numerous times in 
increasing complexity several years before the concept was tested in a standardized 
manner (Harris, 2007). In outcome-based models, teachers had an incentive to focus only 
on material that was being tested in the current school year (Harris, 2007). Thus teachers 
may not have introduced and taught students material that would be tested in future years 
and that they needed to be successful in following years thus limiting students' long-term 
academic achievement (Harris, 2007). Another unintended consequence of outcome-
based compensation models was that they provided teachers incentives to cheat on tests 
(Harris, 2007). 
 Outcome-based models were also a boon to private industry, creating a relatively 
new and much expanded economic sector. Supplemental education service providers, 
such as those that provided additional instruction and support for students who lacked 
educational proficiency, benefitted from outcome-based compensation. This type of in-
person, on-site support came with the highest cost of private providers of education 
services. Online providers also provided additional instruction and support, but at a 
reduced cost compared to in-person providers. Online providers tailored their support to 
student needs based on student performance on online assessments administered by the 
provider. Student lessons were then generated through a database of lessons and selected 
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to provide more practice in areas where students scored poorly. In my experience, these 
companies appeared to benefit from the fears of school personnel, students, and their 
families that their students were in some way deficient and would be “left behind” 
without some type of intervention beyond what the regular classroom could provide. In 
my experience, there were also companies that appeared to benefit from teachers’ fears of 
inadequate student test scores by promising to teach the teacher how to raise his/her 
students’ test scores through teacher professional development.  
 
Individual, Group, and Hybrid Merit-based Rewards 
 In addition to being performance- or outcome-based, merit-based compensation 
models could be based on individual, group, or a combination of individual and group 
rewards. The following paragraphs describe the similarities and differences of each of 
these models.  
 Individual rewards encouraged high-performing teachers to remain in education 
and lower performing teachers to leave the profession (Harris, 2007). However individual 
rewards provided no incentives for teachers to help each other or perform non-measured 
tasks, such as student supervision, that help a school run smoothly (Harris, 2007). 
Additionally, determining which part of a student success an individual teacher was 
responsible for was difficult to do simply and fairly (Harris, 2007). 
 Group rewards could be either outcome- or performance-based; however, they 
tended to be outcome-based and generally focused on student achievement (Odden, 
2000). Group rewards tended to be easier to measure and less costly to administer 
(Harris, 2007). They also provided incentives for teachers to engage in tasks that helped 
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the school run smoothly (Harris, 2007). However group rewards did not ensure that all 
teachers were working together to achieve school district goals. Some may not have 
believed that their work was significant enough to impact the results of the school or 
district as a whole (Odden, 2000). Friction could arise between teachers who were 
working hard and those who received a "free ride" based on the work of others (Harris, 
2007). Additionally teachers may have had incentives to avoid working at low-
performing schools (Harris, 2007). Teachers naturally had a preference toward schools 
where there were high achieving students, and group incentives may have strengthened 
this tendency (Harris, 2007). Group reward models did little to provide incentives to high 
achieving teachers because the impact of their work was diluted, but low-quality teachers 
had incentives to remain in the profession because high-quality teachers’ work helped 
increase their compensation (Harris, 2007). Hybrid rewards combined some individual 
rewards with some group rewards. 
 
Piece-rate Rewards 
 Piece rate reward models compensated teachers for achieving a predetermined, 
fixed goal or outcome (Harris, 2007). In this model, there was no incentive to undermine 
the work of others to improve one's ranking because there was no limit to the number of 
teachers who could receive the reward; however, this made budgeting difficult for school 
districts (Harris, 2007). One study found that 17% of school districts eliminated their 
piece-rate, merit-based compensation models because they were too expensive to 
maintain (Harris, 2007). In this model teachers may have worked together to refuse to 
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meet the standard in an attempt to try to lower the standard (Harris, 2007). This behavior 
was a common problem in the factory setting (Harris, 2007). 
 
Relative Ranking or Tournament Rewards 
 Relative ranking or tournament reward models established a percentage of 
teachers who would receive rewards and teachers received those rewards based on their 
relative ranking among other teachers in the district, thus making it easier for districts to 
remain within their budget (Harris, 2007). In this model, teachers had the unintended 
incentive to undermine the work of others to improve their ranking (Harris, 2007). 
Relative rankings tended to attract people who were competitive and did not like to work 
as a team (Harris, 2007). 
 
Relevant Current Merit-based Compensation Models 
 
Teacher Advancement Program 
 The Milken Family Foundation created and funded the Teacher Advancement 
Program (TAP) founded in 1999 (Milken Family Foundation, 2008). This was a hybrid of 
performance- and outcome-based models with individual piece-rate rewards. The TAP 
program included additional income for teachers based on student achievement and 
teacher performance (Honawar, 2006, November 1). TAP combined bonuses based on 
classroom observation and student test score increases, provided leadership roles for 
teachers, and professional development opportunities (Milken Family Foundation, 2008). 
Under this program, effective, experienced teachers were assigned a role as master 
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teachers who served as mentors to work with inexperienced teachers to help them work 
on improving their teaching (Honawar, 2006, November 1).  
TAP also provided financial incentives for teachers who taught math or science 
(Honawar, 2006, November 1). Douglas County, Colorado has had a teacher pay-for-
performance model since 1984 and was the first district to implement TAP (Dobbs, 
2003). TAP was the merit-based compensation model that most closely resembled 
MAST. In fact, MAST was developed based on TAP. 
 
Teacher Incentive Fund 
A signature program of the George W. Bush administration, the Federal 
Department of Education created the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) to help schools that 
served at least 30% poor and minority students to hire, develop, and retain effective 
teachers and administrators (Keller, 2006, November 6; Viadero, 2007, March 21). The 
federal government allocated up to $99 million in awards for 2006, and allocated 16 
grants worth $42 million (Olson, 2007). Additional funds were awarded to districts that 
could show that their teachers and communities supported their plans (Honawar, 2006, 
November 1). Under TIF, school districts could develop their own merit-based pay 
model, pending Federal Department of Education approval of their grant application. 
More than 60 Grant applications were submitted, but most were rejected because they 
"needed improvement" (Honawar, 2006, November 1). Whether or not the grantees 
received their allotted funds depended upon the grantees’ performance and the federal 
budget (Keller, 2006, November 6). 
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The Columbus, Ohio School District received the first TIF award of $5.5 million, 
with the state of Ohio to receive $20 million over five years (Honawar, 2006, November 
1). The Columbus District planned to use the TIF award to expand its TAP program that 
was already implemented in some of the schools in the District (Honawar, 2006, 
November 1). 
 The future of TIF was in doubt in 2007 when Congress reduced funding its 
funding from $99 million to $200,000 for FY 2007 (Olson, 2007). However, in 2007, no 
TIF grants were awarded (U.S. Department of Education, 2012). TIF funding was re-
established in FY 2008, and in September 2009, a bill to include TIF in a revision of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was introduced in Congress 
(Govtrack.us, 2012). The bill was referred to the House Committee on Education and the 
Workforce where it died (Govtrack.us, 2012). Since then, TIF funding peaked at $400 
million in FY 2010 and had declined to $299 million in FY 2012 (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2012). 
 
Merit Accountability System for Teachers (MAST) 
 The Merit Accountability System for Teachers (MAST) was a hybrid 
performance- and outcome-based model like TAP with individual piece-rate rewards for 
performance-based measures. However, MAST allowed individual school districts to 
determine if the outcome-based rewards would be awarded by individual, group, or 
hybrid. At the beginning of this research, three states had statewide merit-based teacher 
compensation plans (Honawar, 2007, August 1). In 2005, Central State launched MAST, 
the first statewide pay-for-performance model and the basis for this research. Central 
Pay-for-Performance Page 41 of 299 
State's MAST plan was based on TAP (Honawar, 2007, January 17). Required 
components of MAST included professional development, a teacher evaluation system 
that included three annual observations, performance-based pay, an alternative salary 
schedule to the traditional steps and lanes, teacher mentor programs to evaluate pedagogy 
and best practices, and goals for improving student performance (Honawar, 2007, 
January 17). District participation was voluntary but funds were allocated on a first-
come-first-served basis (Honawar, 2007, January 17). Specific implementation plans 
were developed at the local school district level and were not able to financially penalize 
teachers who failed to meet the new performance standards (Lopez, 2005, August 18). 
MAST was a voluntary program that gave school districts financial incentives to 
create and submit their own plan (Lopez, 2005; Mathur, 2005). Moving toward a free-
market model of education, MAST awarded teachers raises based on their performance 
and student achievement instead of the length of their teaching career (Draper, 2005). 
Teachers and local school districts were required to vote on whether or not to participate 
in MAST each year that they participated in MAST. If the teachers and local school 
district decided to participate in MAST, changes necessary to the master agreements 
between districts and teachers’ unions were typically addressed through memoranda of 
understanding. MAST provided up to an additional $260 per student that could be used 
for teacher salaries, performance awards, staff development, and hiring master teachers 
and specialists (Lopez, 2005, August 18). The Central State budget did not allocate 
enough money to fund every district in the state, so it allocated the money on a first-
come, first-served basis (Mathur, 2005). 
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This plan had the potential to create competition among teachers and districts for 
limited dollars. However, while the state allocated $86 million in the first biennium of 
implementation to fund districts’ participation in MAST, the Central State Department of 
Education (CSDE) expected to spend only $51.4 million, because school districts were 
slow to adopt the program (Honawar, 2007, January 17). A year and a half after MAST 
was unveiled only 34 of Central State's 339 school districts were participating (Honawar, 
2007, January 17). As of the time of this research, 44 of the state’s 338 school districts 
had implemented MAST or were approved to implement it (CSDE, 2010). This amounted 
to approximately 13% of the school districts in the state. However, since a few of the 
largest school districts in the state participate in MAST, CSDE preferred to cite the 
participation rates in terms of students impacted, which was just over 30% in 2010 
(CSDE, 2010).  
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CHAPTER TWO: RECENT POLICY AND RHETORIC ON PUBLIC EDUCATION 
REFORM 
 
Recent, Related Educational Reforms 
 Every president elected since 1983 has passed broad education plans including “A 
Nation at Risk,” America 2000, Goals 2000, No Child Left Behind (NCLB), and most 
recently, Race to the Top. These education programs have focused on short-term results 
to satisfy policymakers and voters rather than the 15 to 20 years it would likely take to 
achieve true and meaningful education reform (Seashore-Louis, 1988). 
 
No Child Left Behind 
The most significant catalyst in modern education reform occurred in 1983 during 
the Reagan administration when the National Commission on Excellence in Education 
released “A Nation at Risk,” a scathing report on public education that called for broad 
and significant reform (Chubb & Moe, 1990; National Education, 1994). “A Nation at 
Risk” had little hard data or analysis, but was successfully written for the public and 
designed to create public opinion that would demand education reform (Viteritti, 2004). 
Some of the reform initiatives that spawned from “A Nation at Risk” included school 
choice, state and national standards and assessments, site-based management, and NCLB 
(Viteritti, 2004). These reforms marked a critical period of questioning public sector 
governance and increased regulation of public schools. 
 Through standardized testing, NCLB promoted a national curriculum (Apple, 
1996). Apple (1996) believed that the creation of a national curriculum may be the first 
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step in privatizing public education. A national curriculum along with standardized 
testing would make it easier for parents to compare schools enabling them to be more 
informed when making the decision of where to educate their children (Apple, 1996). 
National standardized testing would also enable colleges and employers to more 
effectively choose which students to enroll or hire (Apple, 1996). 
 More recently, in June 2007, Senators Norm Coleman (Republican, Minnesota), 
Mary Landrieu (Democrat, Louisiana), and Joseph Lieberman (Independent, 
Connecticut) proposed adding incentives for states to look at merit-based teacher 
compensation programs to attract teachers to under-performing schools as part of the 
reauthorization of the NCLB Act (Honawar, 2007, August 1). The Coleman-Landrieu-
Lieberman Bill, the All Students Can Achieve Act of 2007, proposed to require states to 
create data systems to track students’ academic progress and link student achievement 
data to teachers, allowing states to measure teacher effectiveness (Honawar, 2007, 
August 1). This bill would have also awarded grants for programs that changed teacher 
compensation from a uniform salary schedule to a compensation model that could include 
better pay for more effective teachers and incentives for the best teachers to teach in 
high-need schools (Honawar, 2007, August 1). According to Senator Landrieu’s 
spokeswoman, Stephanie Allen, "We are not trying to set up a merit pay system. We are 
trying to give states an option" (Honawar, 2007, August 1, p. 20). However, the similarity 
of components between the plan and similar merit-based compensation plans and the 
political discourse surrounding the bill indicated otherwise. Ultimately, Congress 
deferred action on reauthorization of the NCLB Act, which was scheduled to expire in 
2014. 
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Race to the Top 
 Race to the Top was a national program that was highly supported by President 
Barack Obama. Race to the Top was the latest plan to promote performance-based pay 
and centralized educational control (CSDE, 2009h). It was a federal program that was 
initially awarded via competitive grant process to 13 out of the 48 states that applied for 
the grant (NASSP, personal communication, December 7, 2009). Central State was 
among the states that applied for the grant, but its application was not accepted for 
funding in the initial round. According to correspondence sent from CSDE to Central 
State school district administrators, Governor King planned to apply for the second round 
of funding in the summer of 2010, but did not have the support of the Central State 
Legislature to make the statutory changes necessary to fulfill the Federal requirements for 
Race to the Top grant approval, and ultimately, Central State did not submit a second 
application (Fox News, 2010). 
 Initially, Central State was optimistic about its chances to be a first round 
recipient of Race to the Top funding. CSDE (2009h) believed it was doing many of the 
things necessary to secure the grant and that the grant may have been an incentive for 
statewide MAST implementation (CSDE, 2009h). Having a performance-based 
compensation plan for teachers and principals was one of the requirements of Race to the 
Top (CSDE, 2009h).  However, at a regional informational meeting, school leaders were 
not enthusiastic about the program that featured national standardized testing, state-wide 
curriculum development, a state-wide teacher and principal evaluation system, state-
involved student data analysis, and performance-based pay for teachers (CSDE, 2009h). 
Despite these objections, the majority of these school leaders indicated that they would 
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pursue locally implementing the Race to the Top Program in order to receive the funding 
because if Central State was awarded Federal Race to the Top Grant funding, Central 
State planned to require all districts statewide to implement many of the components. 
However, only districts that signed on in support of Central State’s grant application 
would receive any funding to implement these components (CSDE, 2009h). Districts 
receiving Race to the Top funding would also be required to implement additional 
programs, with the main one being MAST (CSDE, 2009h). 
  
Familiar Rhetoric 
 
Desegregation 
 Although desegregation was not directly related to MAST in terms of policy, it 
was directly related to MAST in terms of policy rhetoric. In 1973, Central State had a 
statewide policy for implementing desegregation in public schools that was based on a 
quota system to achieve racial balance (Lavorato, 2007). In the mid 1990s, the policy was 
revised due to changing demographics, changing case law, legislative mandate, and the 
effects of the former desegregation policy on students (Lavorato, 2007). The rhetoric 
regarding desegregation was that it was going to close the achievement gap between 
White and minority students; however, the program failed at closing that gap, and the 
achievement gap still existed at the time of this research. 
To conclude that any and all types of racial imbalance caused harm and must be 
remedied through racial quotas was premised on erroneous legal and sociological 
theories. Moreover, this interpretation has lead to negative educational 
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consequences. As a result of dramatic changes in demographics, the current rule’s 
emphasis on a particular degree of racial balance has resulted in the loss of 
flexibility for districts struggling to maintain a certain racial balance that is not 
required by the Constitution and that is questionable as an educational goal. It has 
meant that students of color have been turned away from enhanced magnet 
programs specifically designed to serve them. It has also lead to considerably less 
student and parental choice for the students who most need assistance (Lavorato, 
2007). 
 
 Despite the implementation of policies aimed to lessen the racial achievement gap 
for more than 35 years, the gap still existed at the time of this research. In Central State, 
according to statewide Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) data, in 2011, 62.7% of White 
students scored as proficient in math compared to only 28.5% of Black students (CSDE, 
2012b). In reading, 80.3% of White students scored as proficient compared to only 52.1% 
of Black students in 2011 (CSDE, 2012b). Additionally, according to Ikpa (2003), it was 
found that 8% of White 17 year-old students can read and interpret technical data 
compared to 1% of Black students. Additionally only 30% of Black students could solve 
fractional computations versus 70% of White students (Ipka, 2003). In short, Ipka (2003) 
found an achievement gap so large that, by the time they completed high school, Black 
students had comparable skills in reading and math to those of eighth grade White 
students, and that White students were twice as likely to complete a bachelor’s degree 
than Black students. Clearly, the policies implemented to close the racial achievement 
gap were not effective. 
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  Although many schools may have been more racially balanced at the time of this 
research than before defacto segregation, the promised parity in educational achievement 
has not been realized and the debate has shifted from establishing a racial balance in 
schools to increasing standards and expectations for minority students. Guthrie and 
Springer (2004) proposed that the focus on closing the achievement gap between races 
should shift away from mandated busing and focus instead on increasing standards and 
achievement expectations and developing an effective method of accountability for 
schools and students, as well as increasing educational funding. Other studies (Klein, 
2002) also promoted smaller class sizes as a way of closing the racial achievement gap. 
 
Vouchers 
 Voucher programs also have a strikingly similar rhetorical pattern to that of 
MAST. Educational vouchers, simply put, allowed parents to divert the portion, or part of 
the portion, of their tax dollars that would normally go to their local public school district 
to the public or private school of their choice. The rhetoric of voucher programs was 
framed in discussions of neighborhood schools versus school choice and a free market 
approach to education—two topics that will be discussed in more detail later in this 
paper. 
 From the standpoint of using a free-market approach to improve educational 
effectiveness and maximize student achievement, researchers have argued that public 
schools have no incentives to use resources efficiently and, therefore, do not use them 
wisely (Finn, Jr., Hentges, Petrilli, & Winkler, 2009). To support their claims, researchers 
have cited the minimal improvements in student achievement when compared with large 
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increases in education spending (Belfield, 2005). Critics challenged that changing student 
demographics and increased school responsibilities to provide services beyond the 
fundamentals of education were the causes of the increased costs (Belfield, 2005). 
 Most economists believed that the free-market approach was superior to the 
government-sponsored approach to public education because the free-market approach 
would create a market that would make schools compete for students and, as a result, 
would provide incentives for schools to outperform other schools (Finn, Jr., et al., 2009). 
Critics of this approach argued that while it may hold true for goods and services 
markets, it was not effective in markets such as education that yielded important social 
benefits that extended beyond the individuals who received that education (Bracey, 
2008). Although no studies have found that voucher programs negatively impacted 
student achievement, the data was mixed on whether or not vouchers had a positive 
impact. Study results ranged from non-voucher students performing slightly better than 
their voucher counterparts to the opposite result (Lewis, December 2008). Even the 
Friedman Foundation, a firm supporter of vouchers, reported being uncertain of 
vouchers’ impact on student achievement (Lewis, December 2008). 
 In the voucher debate, there were four main goals that stakeholders tried to 
achieve: freedom of choice, efficiency, equity, and social cohesion (Belfield, 2005). 
Freedom of choice emphasized the private benefits of education and helped families 
choose schools that had philosophies most closely aligned with their preferences 
(Belfield, 2005). Efficiency promised the largest educational impact for the fewest 
resources. Equity was a goal of achieving fairness in educational opportunities so that all 
students could have their educational needs adequately met (Belfield, 2005). Social 
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cohesion provided for a common educational experience that would orient all students 
into being productive participants in the social, political, and economic responsibilities of 
a democratic society (Belfield, 2005). 
 Social and fiscal conservative groups favored school choice as an educational 
model. Groups that held the goals of freedom of choice and efficiency at the top of their 
educational values included the Milken, Broad, and Friedman foundations. The rhetoric 
of these groups strongly promoted choice and efficiency, but was largely silent on equity 
and social cohesion (Belfield, 2005). Additionally, their practices were reported as 
potentially unethical. The Friedman foundation was accused of using questionable 
research claims to promote the use of vouchers (Bracey, 2008) and donated $200,000 to 
advance voucher legislation in Utah that would have been the most comprehensive 
voucher program in the U.S. (Lewis, February 2008). Ultimately, Utah voters rejected the 
position of their governor and Legislature and defeated the voucher proposal (Schneider, 
2008). 
 Groups such as the NEA, AFT, the National School Boards Association (NSBA), 
People for the American Way, and most civil rights groups such as the Urban League and 
the NAACP focused their rhetoric most heavily on the goals of equity and social 
cohesion (Belfield, 2005). They believed that the goals of freedom of choice and 
efficiency undermined equity and social cohesion (Belfield, 2005).  
 Despite a lack of evidence regarding a significant positive impact of vouchers on 
student achievement, the rhetoric used by the groups promoting choice and efficiency 
seemed to resonate best with the general public. According to Belfield (2005) a major 
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public opinion poll found that approximately 80% of respondents supported voucher 
programs, but two thirds did not possess an even basic knowledge of what vouchers were. 
 It seemed reasonable to ask the question, “Why, if there was no evidence that 
vouchers were achieving the desired outcome of increased student achievement, were 
people so strongly supportive of the program?” One significant reason was that vouchers 
had the potential to allow private businesses to gain entry into the public education 
market. Since the Reagan administration opened the door for private firms to carry out 
government duties, businesses saw an opportunity to capitalize on the virtually untapped 
education market. Private and supplemental education providers had an opportunity to 
access government education dollars in addition to the private sector funds from parents 
they were already accessing, and lobbied legislators to gain that access. In my experience 
as a local school district administrator in Central State, I encountered various 
representatives for these companies waiting to speak with legislators I was waiting for 
while visiting the Central State Capitol. In March of 2011, I observed two representatives 
from Teach for America present information about their company and the services they 
could provide to the Senate Education and Finance Committee. 
 In the context of MAST, it was also important to note that to date, like MAST, 
voucher programs had been implemented on a relatively small scale. With the rise of 
Race to the Top and its required component of districts having a performance-based pay 
system for teachers, it was important to note that small-scale programs could serve as 
stepping-stones to large-scale programs. However, the costs and outcomes of a national 
program may differ greatly from that of a small-scale program (Belfield, 2005). 
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Un- and Underfunded Mandates 
 According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (2004), the 1995 
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act’s (UMRA) threshold for defining a mandate as unfunded 
was an unfunded cost of $50 million for intergovernmental and $100 million for private 
sector mandates in any of the first five fiscal years of the mandate. In 2001 and 2002, 28 
of 420 federal statutes and 161 of 187 federal rules were at or above these thresholds 
(GAO, 2004). However, if a mandate exceeded the threshold, there were exemptions that 
prevented federal statutes and rules from being labeled as unfunded mandates. These 
exemptions included any legislation that related to national security or ones for which it 
was not feasible to estimate the cost of implementation (GAO, 2004). For comparative 
purposes, I will briefly demonstrate how the UMRA assessed government mandate status 
for a number of education-related programs. 
 
NCLB 
One of the mandates reviewed, but not classified, by the GAO (2004) as an 
unfunded mandate was 2001 version of NCLB still in effect at the time of this research. 
There were requirements associated with NCLB, including the requirement for state 
standardized testing (GAO, 2004). However, the GAO (2004) found that NCLB did not 
meet the criteria for an unfunded mandate because participation was not required. 
Districts were only required to participate in standardized testing to receive federal 
dollars connected to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), of which 
NCLB was a part. Districts were not required to accept federal dollars. This position was 
upheld by an 8-8 decision in a 2009 Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals case to dismiss 
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school districts’ claims to abolish NCLB because of a lack of funding to implement its 
objectives (Walsh, 2009). The ruling to retain NCLB was based on the provision of the 
statute that stated that nothing in the act shall be construed to mandate that states or 
school districts spend any money to implement NCLB beyond what was provided by 
federal funding (Walsh, 2009). 
This decision ignored the current status of state and federal funding for public 
education that has no strings attached. Increasingly, public school districts were hard put 
not to sign up for whatever additional money they could attract, regardless of how much 
merit they saw in the associated programs. Technically, states and local school districts 
could elect to forfeit their federal ESEA-related funding and opt out of standardized 
testing. In Central State, the reality was that the districts’ funding for the testing came 
from CSDE’s budget and the funding the local school districts received through ESEA-
related programs was enough that its loss would cause significant cuts in educational 
programs for at-risk students at the district level. In the district where I worked, these 
funds were approximately four percent of our operating budget (CSDE, 2012a). In the 
school district where I worked, multiple teaching and teaching support positions would 
have to be eliminated if we lost this funding source, so we felt that we had to participate 
in the testing, even though technically, we did not. 
 
Special Education and Response to Intervention (RtI) 
 Local school districts were required to provide special education services to 
students who required them. Based on my personal experience as a school and district 
administrator, special education was an underfunded mandate, yet it was not officially 
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labeled as such. At the time of this research, school districts in Central State received 
both federal and state funding to help meet the needs of special education students. At the 
time of this research, the federal government promised to reimburse school districts for 
40% of approved special education expenditures, but the actual reimbursement was closer 
to 17% (Arc of Central State, 2011). Additionally, Central State was also supposed to 
allocate special education funds to cover the cost of educating students with special 
needs; however, Central State set aside approximately $530 million, but the funding 
districts needed from the state to cover their cost was approximately $632 million (Arc of 
Central State, 2011).  In my six years as an administrator and in attending numerous 
meetings throughout Central State, I had never encountered a district representative who 
stated that his/her district did not have to subsidize its special education funding with its 
general fund dollars. Despite the pledge to fully fund the Individuals with Disabilities Act 
when it was passed in 1975, special education programs were actually funded by the 
federal government at a rate of closer to 50% (“Bush Budget,” 2004). 
 Response to Intervention (RtI) was an early intervention program that districts 
were required to use in order to try to implement effective interventions for individual 
students that would enable them to be successful in the mainstream classroom without 
special education support (Samuels, 2008). RtI could include educational interventions 
such as students having tests read aloud to them or being able to provide oral responses, 
having modified assignments, and being provided with lecture notes. Each intervention 
took time on the part of educational staff to adapt or modify the curriculum as was 
appropriate for each student. Legislation allowed school districts to use up to 15% of 
their special education funding to fund RtI programs; however, with special education 
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funding already in short supply, districts supplemented their RtI programs with general 
education revenue (Samuels, 2008).  
Despite these sizeable loopholes in how unfunded mandates were classified, the 
GAO (2004) touted the UMRA legislation as a success. The GAO (2004, p. 19) claimed 
that this legislation changed the way other legislation was written, “This [the UMRA 
legislation] is like a shoal out in the water. You know it is there, so you steer clear of it.” 
In practice it most likely had changed the way legislation was written. Legislators did 
seem to know that the UMRA legislation existed, and, in my opinion, seemed to have 
been careful to ensure that legislation drafted conformed to one of the many loopholes in 
the UMRA legislation. 
 
Budget Cuts for Effective Programming 
 In addition to the expense of complying with new government mandates, at the 
time of this research most public school districts faced cuts to effective programs. 
Although these programs were not legislatively mandated, they had been effective and 
their reduction or elimination also hurt school districts and, ultimately, students. For 
example, in 1987, the Central State Legislature eliminated funding for summer school 
(House Research Department, 2009). Educators understood the benefit of extended time 
programs such as summer school and extended day programs. These programs were the 
educational equivalent to batting practice and shooting extra free throws. As batting and 
free throw practice enhanced specific athletic skills, summer school and extended day 
programs promised to enhance specific academic skills and helped to fill gaps in learning 
according to the many emails and brochures I received during my tenure as a school 
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district administrator. This was especially true for poor children who may have 
experienced little or no intellectual challenge throughout the summer. School districts 
fought to keep programs that were beneficial to students, so when the Legislature cut 
funding to summer school, many school districts began using the learning year program 
as a method to fund summer school until the Legislature closed that loophole in 2003 
(House Research Department, 2009). 
 Additionally, due to the economic conditions that existed at the time of this 
research, many states cut funding to K-12 education in general and in specific programs 
like technology (Klein, 2009). This prompted school districts to eliminate or reduce 
programming in libraries, social services, counseling, extra-curriculars, and electives, and 
in addition prompted them to increase class sizes. There were also federal cuts to the 
Head Start program, a program designed to help at-risk preschoolers get ready for 
kindergarten (Lewis, March 2008). 
 
Privatization of Public Education 
 
Neighborhood Schools versus School Choice 
 Historically, students attended schools based on geography, attending the school 
that was closest to his/her home, thus the term, “neighborhood school.” Due to a variety 
of factors, there was an inequity between neighborhood schools in terms of resources and 
needs for those resources. It was reasonable to believe that, if given the opportunity, a 
parent of a student in a neighborhood school where needs were high and resources were 
scarce would choose to send their students to a school where needs were low and 
resources were plentiful. 
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In being able to choose a school based on criteria other than proximity was a 
relatively new phenomenon. Proponents of school choice relied heavily on Adam Smith’s 
and Milton Friedman’s theories to promote their position that students should have 
expanded options beyond their neighborhood public school. Smith believed that people 
could judge their own needs and determine local information about their schools and 
make choices about what would be best for them better than politicians (Muller, 1993). 
To encourage people to become educated, Smith recommended that the government pay 
and award students who did well in school and required entrance exams for some 
occupations, but required that students find the means to achieve these goals, because 
they would do it most efficiently (Muller, 1993). Proponents of school choice believed 
that the over-governance of education denied parental control directly through choosing 
and paying for schools their children attend and indirectly through local political activity 
(Friedman & Friedman, 1980). They also believed that increasing centralization 
benefitted teachers, administrators, and union representatives, but it diminished parental 
choice and that schools would improve when parents had greater control (Friedman & 
Friedman, 1980).  
However, public school choice was becoming reality for many. Central State 
pioneered “open enrollment and charter schools” (King, 2006, August 16). Open 
enrollment was a program that allowed families to choose the schools to which they 
would send their children. Charter schools were schools that were public schools by 
definition; however, they were exempt from many of the legislative rules that applied to 
regular public schools. Charter schools were seen as schools that catered to the needs of a 
specific population of students. In the 1998-1999 school year, Central State had 347 
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school districts (CSDE, 2005). By the 2008-2009 school year, the number of school 
districts in the state decreased to 339 (CSDE, 2009i). By comparison, the number of 
charter schools in Central State grew from 40 in 1998 (CSDE, 2005) to 155 in 2008 
(CSDE, 2009i). 
There was also considerable movement nationally on this issue. One provision of 
NCLB allowed parents of children in failing schools to choose to send their children 
elsewhere to receive what they perceived as a higher-quality education (Dobbs, 2003, 
September 15). Although the legislation did not pass, Reagan's tax credits and school 
choice vouchers were a Friedman-type market mechanism designed to eliminate failing 
schools through competition (Viteritti, 2004). It was argued that a free-market approach 
provided parents with more information to be good consumers of education options for 
their children (Paige, 2006). School choice was a key component of NCLB and was seen 
as the ultimate step in accountability (Paige, 2006).  
  
Free Market Approach to Education 
A popular belief was that if schools had to compete for resources and students, 
they would be more effective. Privatization was seen as an effective way to break the 
government's monopoly on educating students. In the 1980s, the Carnegie Forum 
reported that the cost of meaningful public education reforms (reforms that would 
significantly increase student achievement) were approximately $47 billion and included 
raising teacher salaries to attract better teachers (Chubb & Moe, 1986). This was far more 
than the funding for any of the educational reforms to date, and since taxpayers were 
already dissatisfied with the growing cost of public education, the more likely position 
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legislators would take was that quality of education depended more on learning 
environment than teacher compensation (Chubb & Moe, 1986). In a survey of 11,000 
teachers and principals at 500 public and private schools, Chubb & Moe (1986) found 
that private and parochial schools made the greatest achievement gains, but paid their 
teachers the least (Chubb & Moe, 1986). They also found that public school teachers 
were constrained by rules, bureaucracies, confused over purpose, alienated from 
colleagues, and compromised in the classroom, but private and parochial school teachers 
experienced less of this (Chubb & Moe, 1986). Promoters of a free market approach to 
education used these results to support paying teachers less and privatizing education. 
 Rod Paige (2006), former National Secretary of Education, believed that 
monopolies did not work in business or in schools and that reform in public education 
would not happen until the monopolistic status of public education was removed. 
Proponents of privatizing public education believed that a privatized education system 
would provide a better education at a lower cost through competition and minimal 
regulation (Shaker & Heilman, 2004, July). Beliefs such as these spawned an increasing 
number of private organizations and brain trusts that attempted to shape public education 
through reform efforts and tied school funding to initiatives developed by these 
organizations. Some of the more prominent private organizations hoping to influence 
public education included: the Milken Foundation, the Broad Foundation, the 
Comprehensive School Reform Department, the Center for Teaching Quality, the 
Carnegie Foundation and Forum, the New American Schools Development Corporation, 
and the Teacher Union Reform Network. 
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For example, the Chartwell Education Group, Milken Foundation, Broad 
Foundation, Friedman Foundation, and the National Council on Economic Education’s 
Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce (NCEECSAW) were conservative 
networks that stood to benefit significantly from having the $712 billion in education 
funding available to the private sector. The Friedman Foundation benefitted from 
donations from education.com, Parent Further, and partnered with Stanford University to 
provide on-line learning opportunities for students as young as kindergarten (Friedman 
Foundation, 2011). The NCEECSAW sold its own curriculum, promoted its own 
motivational speakers, and sold examinations to ensure fidelity to its curriculum 
(NCEECSAW, 2011). It was also supported by four like-minded foundations, including 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (NCEECSAW, 2011). Additionally, Michael 
Milken, one of the founders of the Milken Foundation, helped to start Knowledge 
Universe, a company that owned several other education-related consulting and 
manufacturing companies, including the company that makes the LeapPad (Phelps & 
Lehman, 2005), a popular at-home learning tool marketed to parents at the time of this 
research that made Time Magazine’s list of the 15 smartest toys of 2011 (Townsend, 
2011). 
As an example of the magnitude of the importance of these connections, consider 
the following example. As a result of NCLB testing requirements, Pearson Educational 
Measurement Solutions was the sole contractor of the United States Department of 
Education to deliver and score the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), 
more commonly known as the Nation's Report Card since 1989 and was awarded a five-
year contract extension in 2007 (Pearson, 2007, October 29). Nationwide, Pearson 
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employed 14,045 people and had annual revenues of $1.6 billion (Indeed, 2008). In 
Central State, Pearson operated facilities in three cities (Pearson, 2006, March 7). The 
organization’s responsibility for providing testing related services in Central State was 
nothing short of a monopoly (CSDE, 2008a).  
As a result of the educational reforms and changes advocated for by the powerful 
groups advocating for privatization, Pearson gained access into the education market and 
captured $1.6 billion that might have otherwise gone to educating students. Its revenue 
stream also enabled it to support foundations that supported its agenda and helped it gain 
further access to the education market. In fact, this had already happened. During the 
period of this research, Pearson began selling curriculum to help students perform better 
on the tests they created (Pearson, 2012). 
Rod Paige (2006), former U.S. Secretary of Education in the George W. Bush 
administration (2001-2005), cofounder of the Chartwell Education Group, and member of 
the Broad Foundation and the NCEECSAW, defined public education as a crisis because 
standardized test scores “rank[ed] near the bottom in science and math among the 
industrialized nations of the world” (back cover). Paige (2006, inside front jacket) offered 
a simple solution conveniently located on the inside front jacket of his book dramatically 
entitled, The War Against Hope: How Teachers’ Unions Hurt Children, Hinder Teachers, 
and Endanger Public Education—“accountability, transparency, and choice are the keys 
to excellence in education.” Additionally, Paige (2006) named teachers’ unions as the 
greatest obstacle to education reform, clearly labeling the National Education Association 
as the villain. Paige (2006) stated that there were many special interest groups, such as 
teachers’ unions, that would not benefit if our current system of education was reformed, 
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but failed to acknowledge how the organizations with which he was affiliated would 
benefit from his proposed solution.  
 
Central State K-12 Education Finance History as an Illustrative Case 
 Prior to 1956 education funding in Central State came primarily from local 
property taxes; however, in 1957 foundation aid, state funding paid to school districts on 
a per student basis, began (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). At this time, the per-pupil 
formula allowance accounted for 84% of school district funding (Thorson & Anderson, 
2006). However, this funding did not grow fast enough to keep up with inflation and 
increasing costs, and as a result the percentage of costs covered by the state funding 
formula dropped to below 43% in 1970 (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). The lack of 
adequate state funding caused increased costs to local taxpayers and cuts in educational 
programming in virtually all school districts in the state. 
 
Central State Salvation Education Funding Plan 
 Because the increased portion of public education was funded by local school 
districts that had great differences in property wealth and thus the amount of money that 
could be raised from property taxes to fund local school districts, there was a significant 
disparity in the funds available to school districts across the state. In October 1971 a 
federal district court judge ruled that the Central State school finance system was 
unconstitutional, finding that the level of spending for students’ education must rely on 
the wealth of the state as a whole rather than on the wealth of individuals or individual 
school districts (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). As a result, in 1971 the Central State 
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Legislature passed an omnibus tax bill that became known informally as the “Central 
State Salvation” in response to the legal challenge and in an effort to reduce property 
taxes (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). 
 The Central State Salvation bill shifted the main source of education funding onto 
the state and off of local property tax payers. This increased the state's share of school 
funding to 93% in 1972 (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). Despite the shift of funding to the 
state, wealthy districts were still able to levy local taxpayer dollars to improve their 
school districts, thus still leaving school districts in Central State with a funding gap 
between wealthy and poor districts. 
 
The Great Equalization 
 In 1991, Central State passed a referendum equalization initiative that was 
designed to reduce the effects of discrepancies in property values between districts and to 
provide property tax relief to residents of poorer districts (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). 
However, the equalization aid from the state was tied to the ability of the local district 
pass a local levy as the state would match a portion of the local levy (Thorson & 
Anderson, 2006). If school districts were not able to pass the local levy, they were not 
able to receive state equalization aid.  
 In 2001, subsequent legislation was passed that effectively reduced each school 
districts’ voter-approved referendums by $415 per student (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). 
This legislation required the state to pay up to $415 per student to school districts and 
reduce the amount levied on the local taxpayer by the same amount. Under this plan, the 
funding to school districts did not increase, but the burden on local property tax payers 
Pay-for-Performance Page 64 of 299 
was reduced. In FY 2003, on the state funding formula it appeared that state aid increased 
from $4068-$4601 per student (a 13.1% increase); however, without the local $415 per 
student that was subtracted by statute, the actual funding increase was only $186 per 
student (a 2.9% increase) (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). 
 Beginning in FY 2003 the state purportedly planned to pay the entire amount of 
the general education formula allowance to districts without any contribution from local 
taxpayers. However, it did not have enough funding to accomplish that goal. The result 
was an even larger funding gap between wealthy and poor districts (Thorson & 
Anderson, 2006). After 2001, the Central State economy slowed and the state in turn 
slowed education spending. From 2003 to 2007, there was a total of an 8% increase on 
the Central State education funding formula (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). While overall 
inflation increased a little more than 6% during this period, the cost of employee health 
care and fuel, two major expenses for school districts, rose even more (Thorson & 
Anderson, 2006). In the school district where I worked, employee health care increased 
160% and fuel costs increased 35% between FY 2000 and FY 2010 according to district 
budget documentation. 
 During the same period more than 75% of school districts lost some of their 
student enrollment due to population shifts and student loss to private and charter 
schools, with the most severe decreases occurring in the smallest districts in the state 
(Thorson & Anderson, 2006). In order to help struggling school districts, the state 
increased the local levy amounts that would be eligible for equalization. After enacting 
the $415 per student roll-in 2001, the amount decreased to $126 per student in 2002 
through 2004 before it began increasing again, thereby creating incentives for schools to 
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once again fund themselves locally (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). Sixteen years after its 
inception, the great equalization initiative was essentially eliminated, and the funding gap 
between rich and poor districts worsened (Thorson & Anderson, 2006).  
 
After the Great Equalization 
 Between FY 2008 and FY 2010, Central State’s contribution to education funding 
remained fairly flat, increasing a total of $150 per student (3%) (House Research 
Department, 2009). The gap between net funding and inflation increased from $62 per 
student in FY 1993 to $1,161 in FY 2011 (AMSD, 2009). One of the major reasons for 
this funding failure could have been that Central State took on the responsibility of 
funding public education without identifying a revenue stream to fund it, thus leaving 
public education in a state of structural under-funding (Thorson & Anderson, 2006). This 
lack of dedicated funding was also one of the main reasons why performance-based 
compensation historically failed (Cameron, 2005). 
 
Liberalist Ideology 
It was argued that the interest in changing how teachers were paid was political in 
nature. Liberalism, neoliberalism, and neoconservatism were three competing political 
ideologies that impacted public education and are described here. Amin (2004) stated that 
a “liberalist ideology” was developed in conjunction with capitalism and equated social 
effectiveness with economic success; however, there was a conflict between social and 
market interests. He argued that liberals believed expansion of capital meant 
development; however, expanded capital did not necessarily improve or develop society 
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(Amin, 2004). As capital expanded, it was accompanied by political force (Amin, 2004). 
That political force was felt in the guise of education reform aimed at serving the needs 
of capital and appeared to be the case in Central State. An expanding chasm between 
haves and have-nots was a necessary result of global liberalization (Amin, 2004). 
Similarly an influx of revenue from the business sector and the malfunction of Central 
State’s education funding was reinforcing a system of wealthy and pauperized schools 
based on capitalist ideals.  
Consequences of global liberalization included pauperization and what Amin 
termed “low-intensity” democracy. Low intensity democracy is a democracy that no 
longer has any restriction or controls over the market (Amin, 2004). According to Amin 
(2004), the decisions in our low-intensity democracy were made in the market. This 
meant that U.S. democratic practices have been reduced to harmless rituals, because the 
American liberal ideology served the interests of capital (Amin, 2004). As capitalists 
became increasingly more involved in public education, the shift from government-
controlled public education to capitalist-controlled education was becoming more 
apparent. 
At the time of this research, the definition of neoliberalism was evolving with 
some disagreement among theorists regarding a specific definition and even the spelling 
of the word. Based on the work of Amin, “neoliberalism” in the context of this research 
refers to the doctrine that emphasizes a free market economy with limited government 
involvement as well as personal choice and freedom. However, it also promotes making 
progress on social issues such as education through an increase in government regulation. 
Regarding the spelling of “neoliberalism,” the more recent research seems to favor 
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dropping the hyphen (neo-liberalism). Therefore, I have chosen to use the non-
hyphenated spelling in this work. The same spelling issue also applies to 
“neoconservatism” in this work as well. 
 
Neoliberalism and Education 
Privatizing public education was a goal of neoliberal policy makers for some 
time. At the time of this research, people still had common access to public education, but 
that may not always be true. In England, enclosing land once considered to be public 
space served to benefit the capitalists and was detrimental to the common and poor 
people (Shiva, 2005). Without too much imagination, one could extend Shiva’s concept 
of enclosures to the enclosing, or privatizing, of public education, thereby excluding non-
dominant groups from accessing the same level of education as those of the dominant 
group. For example, if parents who lived in neighborhoods that had high needs and few 
resources had the means to transport their children to schools that had many resources 
and few needs, they would. However, the students whose parents did not have the means 
to transport their children to a different school would have to attend the high-need, low-
resource neighborhood school. Essentially this would create or reinforce a segregated 
school system according to socio-economic status. Although school choice programs 
were designed to alleviate this problem, attending a school other than the student’s 
neighborhood school still relied on someone other than the school district being able to 
provide transportation for the student to the school of their choice. 
 As public education has become privatized and nationalized, some have argued 
that only the voices and histories of the dominant group would be heard (Apple, 1996). 
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The United Kingdom had a national curriculum and national testing that was introduced 
by the Thatcher administration (Apple, 1996). In the U.K., the national curriculum 
legitimized long-standing forms of structural inequality and disempowered and deskilled 
teachers (Apple, 1996). At the time of this research, there already was a sort of national 
curriculum in the U.S. through textbook adoption states like California and Texas that 
controlled 20 to 30% of the textbook market (Apple, 1996). It could be argued that in the 
U.S., the move toward a national curriculum was likely to have the same effect of 
legitimizing inequality and deskilling teachers as it had in the U.K. 
In addition to a movement to privatize and nationalize education, neoliberals also 
favored non-unionized labor. President Reagan was widely touted as representing an anti-
government stance during his presidency and it was argued that his successful attempt to 
weaken the air traffic controllers’ union impacted the stance of neoliberals and 
neoconservatives regarding organized labor. During the “anti-government” Regan era, 
the number of government employees in the United States rose from 16.2 million in 1980 
to 18.4 million in 1990 (Barr, 2004; Cohen & Eimicke, 2000). While the size of the 
federal government shrank during Reagan’s first term, the size of government overall 
(including states, counties, etc.) grew with local and state governments and government 
contracts with private and nonprofit organizations picking up some of the work 
previously done by the federal government (Barr, 2004; Cohen & Eimicke, 2000). In 
part, the state government growth was a result of the increased capacity needed to make 
up for the federal down-sizing, but also because of the need to coordinate with private 
sector businesses and non-profit organizations working for the public sector. The 
increased collaboration between the public and private sectors was a result of the belief 
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that public policy would be implemented more effectively if some governmental 
functions were privatized (Cohen & Eimicke, 2000).  
One roadblock to this functional shift was the unionization of governmental 
employees. Reagan diminished the strength of federal labor unions when he fired 13,000 
striking air traffic controllers (Barr, 2004). Within his first nine months in office, the 
Reagan administration laid off approximately 15,000 other federal employees and 
another 75,000 positions were cut between 1981 and 1985 (Barr, 2004). This action not 
only reduced the strength of unions in the public sector, but in the private sector as well 
(Barr, 2004). Minimizing the strength of the unions was important because unionized 
workers had a greater likelihood of earning higher wages and having more job security 
than their non-union counterparts (Perrucci & Wysong, 1999). Higher wages reduced the 
generative capital available to the elite so that they could grow their own wealth and 
power (Perrucci & Wysong, 1999). 
The Reagan era also marked a critical period in the shift in what we defined as 
civil and individual rights. The increase in governmental size was accompanied by a 
reduction in individual rights and a redefinition of what was included in those rights for 
some groups (Bradford, 2004; Paul, 1987). Reagan was deeply connected to economic 
policy, so much so that his version of capitalism was given its own name—Reaganomics. 
His devotion to capitalism through the advice of Milton Friedman helped to popularize 
the belief that economic freedom or laissez-faire capitalism was a right (Bradford, 2004; 
Paul, 1987). This position was also commonly linked to neoliberalism. 
 The neoliberal position centered on the relationship between government and the 
economy and focused almost entirely on the latter. It promoted the idea that the 
Pay-for-Performance Page 70 of 299 
expansion of capital meant development and progress (Amin, 2004). Like Reagan, 
neoliberals believed the state must be minimized, reducing all politics to economics 
(Apple et al., 2003). Neoliberals also favored tying education to economic needs (Apple, 
1996) and equated social effectiveness with economic success (Amin, 2004).  
 Therefore, neoliberals thought that government sponsorship of education reduced 
its quality and diversity, increased educational bureaucracy, and rendered schools 
ineffective places to learn (Friedman & Friedman, 1980). Conversely, they believed that 
if schools competed for resources, they would have incentive to move toward more 
efficient and effective organizational systems (Chubb & Moe, 1986). Neoliberals blamed 
public schools for failing to produce a labor force that was skilled, adaptable, and flexible 
enough to meet corporate needs (Apple, 1996). They also believed that education should 
be privatized and marketized, favoring the efficiency and democracy of Smith’s invisible 
hand approach (Apple, 1996; Apple et al., 2003). Additionally, neoliberals thought that 
teachers’ methods were out of date and that substantial reforms were necessary to 
effectively educate students (Fermoyle, 2005). 
 
Neoconservatism and Education 
Neoconservatives, many of whom also identified strongly with the Reagan 
administration’s policy and rhetoric, believed that schools should teach conservative 
values, norms, and pedagogies (Apple, 1996; Apple et al., 2003). They also believed that 
schools should have strong accountability measures through a free market system (Finn, 
et al., 2009). According to former Education Secretary during the Regan administration, 
William Bennett (1994), who succeeded Terrel Bell, was a neoconservative leader who 
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believed that all students should know certain cultural and national ideals in order to re-
establish a common culture in the U.S. Neoconservatives promoted the idea that schools 
should have much greater accountability through marketization (Bennett was also a 
proponent of school vouchers) and that parents should be able to choose the school to 
which they send their children. Bennett (1994) also stated that education belongs to the 
public and that the public should be making educational decisions instead of teachers’ 
unions. State or nationwide standardized testing would help parents be informed enough 
to be able to make good decisions and hold schools accountable for properly and 
effectively educating students (Bennett, 1994). Like neoliberals, neoconservatives wanted 
public education to teach only the basics and leave the rest of educating children to 
families, communities, and the private sector; (Montani, 2005, August).  
 
Conservative Modernization 
According to Apple (1996) policies of “conservative modernization” were a 
compromise between neoconservative and neoliberal policies. Conservative 
modernization freed individuals for economic purposes and controlled them for social 
purposes (Apple, 1996). This means the wealthy would be loosely controlled, but the 
poor would be tightly controlled (Apple, 1996). In conservative modernization, 
combining marketization and a strong state removed education policy from public debate, 
left choice to parents, and allowed the unintended consequences of the invisible hand to 
take care of the rest (Apple, 1996). A conservative modernist approach to education 
reform also included a state or national curriculum and testing and school choice (Apple, 
1996). 
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Similarly, Kumashiro (2008) described the government as a “strict father.” In this 
analogy, the father figure led his family in an authoritarian manner and promoted 
“traditional” values while encouraging his children to be self-sufficient. It could be 
argued that education reforms such as pay-for-performance compensation and NCLB fit 
within this philosophy. Additionally, Kumashiro (2008) also suggested that the political 
differences of neoconservatives and neoliberals often coexist well within the right-wing 
politics in the U.S. 
 
The Single Most Significant Factor in Determining Student Achievement 
With more than 150 years of failed educational policies aimed at improving 
student achievement (mostly by attempting to link it to merit pay for teachers), one has to 
ask why all of these policies failed, and what chance MAST had to succeed. The first 
question will be addressed here and the latter will be addressed in the analysis section of 
this work. 
Throughout decades of studies on student achievement, the single-most important 
indicator of student success was repeatedly identified as socio-economic status. Holland 
(2007) reported that the influence of social class on determining student achievement was 
likely to be so powerful that even with the best educational programs and most highly 
trained teachers, schools could not overcome it. Holland (2007) also noted that, despite 
this evidence, schools were doing what they could to close the achievement gap and were 
making modest gains. 
Lee and Burkham (2002) also supported this position. They reported that students 
entering kindergarten already had significant differences in achievement based on factors 
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associated with socio-economic status (Lee & Burkam, 2002). They also reported that 
students with lower socio-economic status entered into poorer performing schools that 
exacerbated the problem of the achievement gap (Lee & Burkham, 2002). Given the 
consistency of student achievement data related to socio-economic status, I personally 
wondered if these lower-performing schools performed lower as a result of their student 
demographics more than as a result of the quality of their academic programs and teacher 
quality. 
Despite this evidence, at least one study did find a correlation between teacher 
effort and student achievement for French-Canadian high school students. Bergeron, 
Chouinard, and Janosz (2011) found that when students had strong, positive beliefs in 
their competency and a strong relationship with their teacher, they were less likely to 
drop out of high school. However, when controlled for socio-economic status, they found 
that the likelihood of dropping out of high school for students with high socio-economic 
status decreased significantly when they held positive beliefs in their competency and a 
strong relationship with their teacher; however, when students in the same scenario but 
with low socio-economic status became more likely to drop out although not by a 
significant amount (Bergeron et al., 2011). 
 
Pay-for-Performance Rhetoric  
 Despite what the research showed about socio-economic status and educational 
reforms, various stakeholders had their own ideas of what educational objectives were 
important and how public education should function. All of these various stakeholders 
used some form of rhetoric to establish and promote their views on how public schools 
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should operate. Philanthropists, politicians, unions, and educators all established their 
positions on merit-based pay, largely through the use of the media. This section reviews 
the position of each of these main players in the teacher compensation debate. 
 
Philanthropies’ Involvement in Public Education 
 Philanthropists were those who desired to benefit humanity through the 
improvement of social systems like public education. Some of these philanthropists 
declared that public education was obsolete and did a poor job of educating students. 
They used their wealth and influence to spread their message by sponsoring research, 
funding scholarships, creating curricula, starting education-related companies, and other 
activities to legitimate their policy agenda and implement change (Colvin, 2005). 
Philanthropies were the organizations founded by philanthropists to help carry out the 
work of the philanthropists. The range of the involvement of these Philanthropies varied 
greatly. Some foundations simply promoted staff development as their pet project, while 
others tried to overhaul the education system in general (Colvin, 2005). Because 
foundations received little oversight and few, if any, external evaluations, it was difficult 
to measure the validity of their claims (Colvin, 2005). 
 
Milken Family Foundation 
 The Milken Institute was founded as a part of the Milken Family Foundation that, 
according to the Milken Institute home page (2008) “is a publicly supported, nonpartisan 
economic think tank whose work makes a difference in the lives of people worldwide by 
helping create a more democratic and efficient global economy. This Institute’s scholars 
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use capital-market principles and financial innovations to address social and economic 
challenges, from energy independence to poverty, here in the United States and around 
the world.” Michael Milken, Chairman of the Milken Institute and Co-founder of the 
Milken Family Foundation, was not only known as a philanthropist, but also as a 
financier nicknamed the “Junk Bond King” who, in 1990, was charged with racketeering 
and securities fraud including bribery, insider trading, and stock manipulation resulting in 
a $600 million fine, a 10-year prison sentence, and permanent prohibition from engaging 
in securities business (Phelps & Lehman, 2005). 
The Milken Family Foundation website (2008) promoted its TAP program as 
being in “high demand.” In terms of real numbers, high demand in this case means 220 
schools encompassing 6,200 teachers and 72,000 students nationwide (Milken, 2008). To 
put those numbers in perspective, in 2008 Central State, the case site of this research, 
employed nearly 53,000 teachers (CSDE, 2009j) and educated more than 82,000 students 
(CSDE, 2009k). When using real numbers, the “high demand” claim seemed to be 
exaggerated. According to Blair (2000), TAP was implemented in eight states, 
representing approximately 30% of K-12 students in the U.S. However, how the 30% 
figure was calculated was not disclosed. It is possible that in 2000 that many students 
attended schools that participated in TAP, but that many of those schools had dropped 
their TAP programs by 2008. That would align with other research that showed the lack 
of longevity for teacher pay-for-performance compensation programs (Viadero, 2007). 
As a result of TAP’s “high demand,” Lowell Milken established the National 
Institute for Excellence in Teaching (NIET) as a separate charity in order to ensure TAP’s 
effectiveness and sustainability (Milken, 2008). NIET established partnerships with 
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federal, state, and local governments as well as other foundations and corporations 
(Milken, 2008). In 2005, the Milken Family Foundation (2005) launched TAP as a 
separate 501(c)(3) non-profit organization. The TAP organization received grants and 
appropriations from the federal government “to sustain and expand TAP as a well-
documented teacher quality reform” (Milken Family Foundation, 2005). The 
establishment of NIET and TAP as separate entities from the Milken Family Foundation 
obscured the link between TAP and the organization created to promote it. This in turn 
promoted the illusion that TAP was supported by multiple independent organizations that 
were dedicated to “excellence in teaching.” 
 
Broad Foundation 
 In 1999 Eli Broad, Founder and Chairman of AIG Retirement Services and KB 
Home, and his wife, Edythe, started The Broad Foundation (2008). The Broad 
Foundation’s (2008) mission was to “dramatically improve urban public education 
through better governance, management, and labor relations.” The Broad Foundation 
Brochure outlined the steps toward achieving this mission quite simply on its cover—
“Public education needs: (a) more money, (b) better teachers, (c) privatization” (Broad 
Foundation, 2008). The Foundation also claimed that “public education is the key civil 
rights issue of the 21st century” (Broad Foundation, 2008, p. 4). 
 The Broad Foundation had three main initiatives to help accomplish its mission. 
First, it awarded one urban school district a half-million dollar grant for having the 
greatest gains in academic achievement while reducing the achievement gap (Broad 
Foundation, 2008). Second, it established a national training and support program for 
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new urban school board members (Broad Foundation, 2008). It also had a leadership 
center for superintendents (Broad Foundation, 2008). 
 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
 Perhaps the most widely known foundation with a hand in education reform in the 
early twenty-first century was the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. It was the largest 
contributor to education causes and allocated billions of dollars toward education through 
a range of specific reforms (Colvin, 2005). While the Foundation did not focus on teacher 
compensation, it was responsible for creating thousands of new high schools and dividing 
hundreds of large high schools into smaller schools and increasing the number of college 
courses offered in high schools for both high school and college credit (Colvin, 2005). 
Should the Gates Foundation choose to pursue teacher compensation as a cause, I believe 
that the influence of this foundation could significantly affect a change in teacher 
compensation. 
 
Presidents 
 
President George W. Bush 
 During his presidency, and like many other Republicans, George W. Bush was a 
supporter of merit-based pay for teachers and for school choice (Honawar, August 2007). 
Bush proposed spending $50 million on the Choice Incentive Fund, a fund that provided 
states with funding to start or expand voucher programs so that students could attend 
charter, private, or a public school rather than their neighborhood school (“Bush Budget,” 
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2004). He also proposed spending $500 million on the Teacher Incentive Fund; however, 
this amount was significantly reduced by the time the bill was passed (Keller, 2005). 
Bush’s plan for teacher merit-based pay was to link teachers’ compensation to students’ 
performances on standardized tests (Phillips, 2005). 
 
President Barack Obama 
 President Obama was also a supporter of merit-based pay for teachers (Honawar, 
November 2007). This was important because previously, most notable supporters of 
merit-based pay were Republicans (Honawar, November 2007). As a senator, Obama 
introduced two bills that incorporated merit-based pay models for teachers (Hoff, 2008). 
While campaigning for President, he proposed a plan that would allow districts to 
implement a merit pay plan without the input or consent of the teachers’ unions (Hoff, 
2008). 
 President Obama also supported school choice through the development of charter 
schools (Aarons, 2009). He made increasing the number of charter schools in a state as 
well as merit-based pay required components of Race to the Top funding for states and 
local school districts (Aarons, 2009). Through the Race to the Top program, Obama also 
supported centralization of public education in keeping with neoconservative ideals. 
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Unions 
 
National Education Association (NEA) 
 Joel Packer, the chief NCLB lobbyist for the NEA, said that the union was firmly 
opposed to the federal government getting involved in merit pay, even with proposals that 
made participation voluntary for states or districts (Honawar, 2007 August 1). Packer 
noted that even models that tracked student growth over a period of years and were based 
on growth on test scores did not account for differences between individual students, and 
that one or two test scores based on NCLB test requirements were not a comprehensive 
or a fair way to evaluate teachers (Honawar, 2007 August 1). The NEA would rather the 
federal government focused on providing hard-to-staff schools with a variety of tools and 
resources to improve student achievement and working conditions in those schools 
(Honawar, 2007 August 1). 
 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) 
 In 2001, the AFT believed the first priority of teacher compensation should be 
adequate compensation levels aligned with what professionals in other professions make. 
The AFT came out in support of merit-based systems as an augmentation of the 
traditional salary schedule in order to increase teacher compensation (American 
Federation of Teachers, 2001). However, by 2007, the position of the AFT changed. 
Edward J. McElroy, the President of the AFT, said that the Association no longer 
supported systems that used student test scores or where principals decided which 
teachers were rewarded (Honawar, 2007 August 1). In 2008, the AFT supported U.S. 
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Presidential Candidate, Hillary Clinton, largely because she opposed reauthorization of 
NCLB and merit pay for teachers (Hoff, 2008). 
 
Analytic Theory 
 
The Rise of Global Capitalism 
 Global capitalism was usually defined as the expansion of a market economy 
around the world (Amin, 2004). It was argued that the economic theories and policies that 
had strong influence over it were the theories advanced by Adam Smith, Milton 
Friedman, and Fredrich Taylor. Smith (1982) believed that free trade had a better long-
term effect on society than monopolies because monopolies could control supply and 
limit output, thus increasing demand. Another reason Smith (1982) favored an open 
market was that people tended to do things that would maximize their own benefit.  In 
doing so, people more frequently promoted a greater benefit to society than when they 
intentionally tried to promote it, and their drive to achieve their own benefit and fulfill 
their ambition served to fuel individuals to work harder than they would otherwise 
(Smith, 1982). Smith also believed that, "In every profession, the exertion of the greater 
part of those who exercise it is always in proportion to the necessity they are under of 
making that exertion" (Muller, 1993, p. 152). In other words, merit pay models, to at least 
some extent, increased the necessity of making a greater exertion in one’s work.  
 Because people tend to seek what would benefit them, Smith (1982) also believed 
that people could determine their own needs better than politicians attempting to do that 
for them. His “invisible hand” was a metaphor for the negative unintended outcomes 
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from the perspective of the individual that were positive from the perspective of society 
(Smith, 1982). It was believed that this argument was the basis for much of the drive to 
privatize public education. 
 Proponents of privatizing public education were also able to use Smith’s theories 
to explain why teachers’ unions were so strongly opposed to a free market approach to 
education. Smith (1982) believed that the self-interests of individuals inherently opposed 
a free market. In other words, they wanted to protect their turf. Those who wanted to 
privatize education believed that teachers did not want to give up the job security and 
control they had in their monopoly over public education and did not want to face the 
accountability that the open market would demand. 
 Despite Smith’s (1982) preference toward an invisible hand to guide the 
economy, he also believed that sometimes creating preconditions for a market to exist 
and compensating for negative effects required government intervention. However, as the 
world increasingly embraced capitalistic ideals, it was argued that the government 
initiated and regulated monopoly of the U.S. public education system remained at the 
center of the cultural and economic tapestry of the nation—a situation most difficult for 
laissez-faire capitalists to accept. 
 Milton Friedman shared the view that the U.S. public education system was 
troubling to the nation’s pursuit of free market capitalism. He labeled the public schools 
as “Socialist” and held that they violated the premise of the free market and voluntary 
exchange (Friedman 1980). Because Friedman’s political and economic theories that 
were strongly advanced during the Reagan administration greatly resembled the theories 
of Adam Smith, Friedman’s theories were also used to drive the push toward a free, 
Pay-for-Performance Page 82 of 299 
capitalist economy and privatized education system. Although Friedman used the term 
“economic freedom” in his 1962 book, Capitalism and Freedom, the concept was only 
widely popularized during the Reagan administration after Friedman was appointed to 
Reagan’s Economic Policy Advisory Board in 1980. Friedman (1962, 1980) advocated a 
laissez-faire economy with a minimalist government in order to advance economic and 
political freedom. Similar to Smith, as his theories applied to education, Friedman (1980) 
believed that increasing centralization benefitted teachers, administrators, and union 
representatives, but diminished parental choice and that schools would only improve 
when parents had greater control. 
 Frederick Taylor’s principles of scientific management were also important to the 
rise of global capitalism. Taylor’s work in this area was focused on manufacturing; 
however, over the years since the first publication of The Principles of Scientific 
Management in 1911, principles of scientific management have been applied to the 
service sector as well. One of the main guiding principles of scientific management was 
the objective of maximizing profit for both the employer and the employee (Taylor, 
2004). In order to achieve this, employers needed to create external pressure to ensure 
that employees would put forth their best effort and work hard, otherwise workers would 
slow to the pace of the worker who was the slowest and least efficient (Taylor, 2004). In 
scientific management, managers were charged with scientifically determining and 
recording the best, most efficient way to work, training workers how to do that, and 
supervising the work to ensure that it was being done in the manner prescribed (Taylor, 
2004). After it was determined what needed to be done to achieve maximum effort and 
efficiency from employees, Taylor (2004) recommended managers focus on the benefit 
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the employees would receive, such as higher wages, rather than the hard work they had to 
do to receive the benefit. He found that when workers could work in an “every person for 
themselves” environment and not be subjected to the peer pressure of conforming to a 
lower output, workers worked harder and more efficiently (Taylor, 2004). 
 This theory of scientific management was also applied to public schools through 
the implementation of pay-for-performance models and piece-rate rewards; however, 
teachers were not successfully insulated from the peer pressure to conform—one of the 
critical components of achieving maximum effort and efficiency under this theory 
(Taylor, 2004; Harris, 2007). Under a privatized education system, reformers believed 
that efficiencies such as those used in scientific management would be used to improve 
education as a result of competition. The latest merit pay models were touted as a simple, 
fair, and revolutionary idea. Reward good teachers, keeping the best and brightest in the 
profession and encourage the others to work in other sectors (Paige, 2006). However, it 
was argued that the idea stemmed from the work of Taylor, Friedman, and Smith.  
On a more global scale, as part of his Cold War strategy in his speech to the 
House of Commons, Reagan (1982), relying on the economic theories of Friedman, set 
out to create capitalist economies in multiple countries where the threat of communism 
was thought to exist. Reagan believed that if people lived in capitalist economies, they 
would choose a democratic form of government (Friedman, 1962; Reagan, 1982). Given 
the relatively high wages of workers in the U.S., a world economy had the potential to be 
problematic for the U.S. economy. “A Nation at Risk” threatened that Japan and other 
countries would pass the U.S. economically and served to persuade the public that public 
education in the U.S. was in crisis (Shaker & Heilman, 2004; Viteritti, 2004). However, 
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the global economy created an economic challenge for the U.S. because workers in 
developing countries worked for far less money than workers in the U.S. (King, 2006).  
 
Deskilling Teachers 
As a result of the rise of a global economy, public education was tasked with 
preparing workers and itself for this new reality. Therefore, most recent educational 
innovations were consistent with the dominant paradigm of accountability, cost-
effectiveness, and meeting industrial needs (Pappagianis, et al., 1982). The deskilling of 
teachers would increase the number of people available to become teachers and could 
serve to attract people to the profession who would work better under a scientific 
management model. Deskilling teachers, as defined by the principles of scientific 
management, meant that as much thought as possible was removed from their work, and 
that thought was reduced to policies and procedures (Braverman, 1998). Thus, employing 
scientific management techniques served to deskill educators in the process of creating 
labor divisions. 
The principles of scientific management could help explain the move toward 
implementing state and national curricula and standardized testing. For example, in 
Central State, there were 52 pages of high school social studies standards and 150 
standards each in math and science in addition to standards in every other core subject 
area that students had to master prior to graduation (CSDE, 2011). This, combined with 
standardized testing as part of NCLB, served to standardize education content across 
Central State. This standardization limited the need for teachers to decide what to teach in 
their courses, and enabled teachers and students to move from one district to another 
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more freely. This allowed for school choice on the part of students and increased 
competition on the part of teachers and school districts. 
The result of these innovations served to devalue teachers. For example, the use 
of prepackaged curriculums with almost complete specification of a teacher's every move 
in the classroom de-skilled the teacher in terms of curriculum and pedagogy. This 
allowed the teacher to be re-skilled into a less autonomous classroom manager, using 
techniques of behavioral modification (Pappagianis, et al., 1982). The de-skilling of 
teachers would lead to paying teachers less, thus reducing the cost of education 
(Pappagianis, et al., 1982). 
 There were several factors that could have encouraged a move to deskill teachers. 
One, ironically, was that as people became more educated the gap between professionals 
and the general public decreased, resulting in a public sector that was more likely to 
question the authority of professionals (Friedson, 1986). A second factor was that 
professionals tended to be employed in bureaucracies that became subject to strict 
controls that routinized and de-skilled work (Friedson, 1986). School systems were a 
prime example of this because they had bureaucratic characteristics because they were 
large, public, and accountable to state and federal mandates (Friedson, 1986). Despite the 
need to adhere to a curriculum and fulfill a specialized role, teachers experienced 
considerable autonomy in the classroom until recently, and more reforms were aimed at 
removing the autonomy that remained. 
 One such example was the Purple COW. In 2004, the Austin, Texas-based firm, 
Ignite Learning, founded by Neil Bush (brother to former Texas Governor and U.S. 
President George W. Bush), launched the Purple COW initiative in Texas public schools 
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(Ignite Learning, 2012). COW stands for Curriculum on Wheels and was designed to 
provide whole class learning via a purple COW shaped like a cow (Ignite Learning, 
2012). The COW featured a variety of instructional videos in math and science that the 
COW would play on its own projector (Ignite Learning, 2012). The teacher only had to 
plug in the COW and push play (Ignite Learning, 2012). 
 The Houston Independent School District accepted a $115,000 donation from 
Ignite-related donors with the requirement that the money be used to purchase COW 
technology and curriculum (Garza, 2006, March 23). The Houston district put COWs in 
each of its classrooms, but the donation only covered half of the cost. In another case of 
“making the right donations,” former First Lady, Barbara Bush made a donation of an 
undisclosed amount to the Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund with the requirement that the 
money be used to buy COWs for students in New Orleans, Louisiana schools (Garza, 
2006, March 23). 
 Since the launch of the Purple COW, Ignite Learning (2012) has launched many 
other similar products including Ingite!Science, Ingnite!Math, Ignite!Special Education, 
Ignite!Class, and Sparkito, a Spanish heritage English language learner program just to 
name a few. At the time of this research, Ignite Learning (2012) technology was widely 
used throughout Texas public schools. 
 Arguably, technology and programs like the Purple COW served to deskill 
teachers by limiting the how their pedagogical knowledge was able to enter the 
classroom. It could be perceived that if a teacher was only required to plug in a device 
and press “play” to teach content, the required skills of the teacher then became lessened 
in the area of content and greater in the area of student behavior management. I have 
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worked with hundreds of teachers in my education career, interviewed hundreds more, 
and have reviewed the credentials of thousands. Never once had any of them stated that 
they pursued a career in education to have policing student behavior as the focus of their 
practice. As this type of reform expands, I believe that the type of individual seeking a 
career in public education will be significantly different from what it was at the time of 
this research. 
 
Policy as a Pre-fabricated Solution 
A social problem is an ambiguously stated issue that is used to further a group’s 
ideology by solving it with a pet policy or legal initiative (Edelman, 1988). Defining an 
issue as a social problem induced an audience to support measures they may have 
otherwise found painful, unwise, or irrelevant (Edelman, 1998). According to Edelman 
(1988), the point of constructing a social problem then was not to solve it, but rather to 
signify who was virtuous and useful and who was dangerous and inadequate by virtue of 
the problem. This could be done by discussing how a problem originated. Put differently, 
and particularly in political discourse, a specific leader or political party’s “problems” 
were a summation of its opponents and the most favorable ways to cast them as 
incompetent or worse.  
Important considerations when choosing which group to target via a pre-
fabricated solution to a social problem included the size and diversity of the group 
targeted (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989) and the amount of power the group held 
(Edelman, 1988). Smaller groups that were more easily isolated and defined generally 
made better targets (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989). It was also important that the target 
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group did not have the power to effectively fight against being labeled the cause of the 
problem (Edelman, 1988). 
When a policy was created as a simple solution to a complex problem, using tools 
such as social problems and effective discourse helped the chance of achieving rhetorical 
success (Edelman, 1988). Typically, the policy used to “solve” a social problem was 
developed first, and then a social problem that seemed to fit within the aims of the policy 
was attached to it (Edelman, 1988). The most common course of action to solve a 
problem was a gesture such as enacting a law that promised to solve or lessen a problem, 
even if there was little chance it would do so because conflicting interests usually resulted 
in perpetuation or intensification of the problem (Edelman, 1988).  
This was evidenced in the many education reforms passed since the 1980s and the 
persistence of the perceived student achievement problem. For instance, neoconservatives 
and neoliberals likely wanted to privatize education before defining student achievement 
as a problem and engaging in rhetoric to promote policies that would address this 
problem. In Central State, teachers were a much smaller group than the general 
population of the state. Additionally, they were a highly definable group that was easily 
controlled through policy as they were state employees. This made them an appropriate 
target group for a policy solution to the student achievement problem. However, despite 
years of rhetoric and additional legislation aimed at solving the problem, the problem 
persisted. 
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Leadership 101 
 Being able to effectively navigate the political waters of education reform 
initiatives was arguably an important part of the work of local school district leaders. 
Despite having numerous demands on their time and energies, effective leaders must pay 
attention to all aspects of leadership of an organization (Bolman & Deal, 2008). In one of 
the most commonly used texts in school administration and MBA coursework, Bolman 
and Deal (2008) divided these aspects of leadership into four frameworks: structural, 
human resource, political, and symbolic. The structural framework included the structure 
of an organization and its strategic mission (Bolman & Deal, 2008). A leader who 
operated in the structural framework would be focused on implementing the strategy, 
experimenting with organizational structures, and adapting the organization to meet 
future needs. The human resource framework was focused on aspects of the organization 
relating to people (Bolman & Deal, 2008). A leader who functioned in the human 
resource framework would most likely have had a servant leadership style and would pay 
attention to advocating for and empowering workers (Bolman & Deal, 2008). This leader 
would have been visible throughout the organization and accessible to others and would 
have used collaborative decision-making strategies. The leadership style used in the 
political framework was one of advocacy and coalition building and these leaders were 
able to build connections between stakeholders (Bolman & Deal, 2008). The political 
framework viewed organizations as arenas and also involved the leader’s use of 
persuasion, negotiation, and coercion when necessary (Bolman & Deal, 2008). The leader 
who was operating in a symbolic framework would be inspiring (Bolman & Deal, 2008). 
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The symbolic framework involved using symbols to gain attention, sharing experiences 
and impressions, and communicating vision (Bolman & Deal, 2008). 
 Bolman and Deal (2008) argued that effective leaders had to be skilled in all four 
frames. To operate in less than all four frames would have meant that the leader was 
ignoring one or more important aspects of the organization. Additionally, effective 
leaders needed to not only know their organization, but all of the organizations with 
which the leader’s organization interacted (Bolman & Deal, 2008). Bolman & Deal 
(2008) contended that leaders often misread situations because they were not able to 
understand the situation from all four frameworks and from the perspectives of others. 
Therefore, being able to operate from all four frameworks from a variety of perspectives 
was essential for an effective leader. 
 Along complimentary lines, Northouse (2009) ascribed the following 
characteristics to leadership. It: (a) produces change and movement; (b) establishes 
direction by creating a vision, clarifying the big picture, and setting strategies; (c) aligns 
people by communicating goals, seeking commitment, and building teams and coalitions; 
(d) motivates and inspires by energizing people, empowering subordinates, and meeting 
unmet needs. Another way to look at leadership is as a transactional process between the 
leader and others through which the leaders tries to influence the others toward achieving 
a common goal (Northouse, 2009). Leadership involved influence and groups. According 
to Northouse (2009) leadership must occur in a group setting because influence is a 
critical component of leadership. Leaders must get followers to work toward a common 
goal. 
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Northouse (2009) explained the importance of being able to attend to both tasks 
and relationships. Effective leaders not only attended to the tasks associated with leading 
an organization, but could also cultivate the relationships necessary to a successful 
organization (Northouse, 2009). This attention to relationships helped the leader to get 
members of the organization collectively focused on common organizational goals rather 
than primarily on members’ individual goals (Northouse, 2009). The ability to be able to 
get teachers, administrators, and school board members working toward the same goal of 
implementing MAST even though each of these groups sometimes held different views 
of MAST, was critical in effectively implementing MAST at the local level. In short, 
leadership was an important aspect of moving the four districts in this study through the 
MAST process. 
Additionally, Northouse (2009) noted that effective leaders needed to be 
visionary, as well as attentive of administrative tasks and conceptual ideas while having 
strong interpersonal skills. The truly effective leader would demonstrate all of these 
characteristics and behaviors. 
With the increased demands on local school district superintendents, this type of 
effective leadership became increasingly difficult in Central State as local school districts 
reduced their budgets by limiting the amount of administrators and administrative support 
available. However, this type of effective leadership was exactly what was needed to 
successfully lead a district through adopting and implementing MAST. 
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Summary of Analytic Theory As Applied to This Research 
 The rise of global capitalism, the deskilling of teachers, using policy as a pre-
fabricated solution to solve a social problem, and the importance of effective leadership 
were all factors that influenced the implementation of MAST in Central State. There was 
a perception that globalization expanded the competition for jobs for U.S. workers and 
that public schools needed to do more in terms of educating future skilled workers to 
keep jobs in the U.S. It could be argued that the push for more school choice and the 
drive to keep the costs of public education low, that curriculum could be standardized, 
thus eliminating the level of skill required for teachers to develop their own curriculum 
and increasing competition between schools for students and between teachers for jobs. It 
was likely that MAST was created as a pre-fabricated solution to improve student 
achievement through the weakening of teachers’ unions. Additionally, the impact of local 
leadership was important to MAST implementation. 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 
 
Theoretical Traditions 
 
Grounded Theory 
 Grounded Theory was a flexible but systemic methodology used to collect and 
analyze data in a way that allowed the theory to arise from the data itself (Charmaz, 
2006). It could be used in either qualitative or quantitative research, but it was used more 
frequently in qualitative studies (Charmaz, 2006). Although most qualitative research 
methodologies allowed researchers to decide what data to gather as they proceed, 
Grounded Theory also allowed researchers to determine how to collect and analyze the 
data (Charmaz, 2006). In this study, I began with data and some opening questions, but 
did not have a specific theory to prove, or disprove, making Grounded Theory an 
appropriate methodological choice so that the data gathered could direct the analysis. 
 Using Grounded Theory, I was able to: (a) collect and analyze data during the 
same time frame, constantly comparing new data with that which was previously 
collected; (b) construct codes as themes emerged in the data; (c) develop and adjust 
theories as data was collected; (d) define relationships between districts and identify areas 
where additional data was needed; and (e) use an ideal type sampling method to develop 
a theoretical framework. Grounded Theory would have allowed me to develop the 
literature review after gathering and analyzing data (Charmaz, 2006); however, I found it 
more useful to draft the literature review and revise it as necessary to include relevant 
research as determined by the emerging theories developed as a result of the study data. 
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 The process of this study began by gathering data from public sphere discourse 
from multiple sources that included newspapers, magazines, transcripts from public 
appearances, and stakeholder websites. I then interviewed participants from four school 
districts in Central State between 2008 and 2011, although all interviews in each 
individual district were completed in a one-year period with the exception of Blue Lake. 
Participants from Blue Lake were reluctant to participate, and it became necessary to 
locate and interview participants who were no longer employed by the district in order to 
obtain a clearer picture of the data for that district. Interviews with politicians took place 
in 2011. Information regarding the viewpoints of private organizations and philanthropies 
was gathered through their websites. This process of inquiry followed Dewey’s method 
of gathering data and reflecting on that data through consideration of multiple viewpoints 
(Dewey, 1944). This type of consideration was essential in any educational study where 
there were so many stakeholders with varied interests. 
 
Exemplar for Case Study Model 
This study analyzed to what extent MAST, one policy in a much broader scope of 
education reforms, was likely to change public education and to determine the 
implications of that change. Wirt, Mitchell, and Marshall (1988) used critical policy 
analysis, a methodology that incorporates multiple perspectives on policies, to analyze 
how the political histories of two states influenced their education statutes based on four 
values—choice, efficiency, equity, and quality. The two states were chosen because of 
their close geographical proximity, but strong contrast in education statutes (Wirt, et al., 
1988), essentially using a form of ideal typology. This study used their research as a case 
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study exemplar, but diverged from this research in the method of analysis. Whereas Wirt, 
et al. (1988) used Critical Policy Analysis as an analytical framework, this research used 
Grounded Theory.  
Discourse theory helped to analyze contradictions. There was no shortage of 
contradictions in political discourse regarding education reform. Marx, Lincoln, and 
Edelman were theorists who supplied a theoretical background to this analysis, while 
Freidman and Freidman, Apple, and Chubb and Moe provided a more issue-specific lens. 
Some researchers, such as Ainsworth and Hardy (2004) combined discourse theory with 
critical theory to form critical discourse analysis and compared that data against data 
systematically analyzed through other theoretical lenses. This type of multi-lens analysis 
helped to add validity and reliability to the results (Ainsworth & Hardy, 2004). In fashion 
with other discourse analysis studies, e.g. Lincoln (1989), this study attempted to 
synthesize the discourse of the constituents rather than promote a single, core theory. 
 
Data Collection 
 
Multi-case Research Using Ideal Typology 
 Ideal typology was a method of case subject selection whereby characteristics of 
subjects were categorized and divided into representative types of the phenomenon 
studied (Becker, 1998). Ideal types accentuated characteristics of phenomena for the 
purpose of dividing those characteristics for study. The early history of this method for 
selecting variations within case data is often associated with Max Weber’s work. Weber 
was one of the first proponents of the ideal type methodology. He used it to determine 
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primary differences between Protestants and Catholics in Germany in relation to their 
ownership of capital (Weber & Kalberg, 2002). 
 By sorting subjects into these types, Weber was able to determine a relationship 
between people’s religious beliefs and their views on capitalism to explain why 
Protestants owned significantly more capital than Catholics (Weber & Kalberg, 2002). 
Wirt et al. (1988) used ideal types in their multi-case research to select states for their 
study regarding the role of cultural values in state education policymaking. Additionally, 
Berliner (2000, November-December) used ideal typology to study teacher proficiency. 
Teachers were divided into four categories as follows: one teacher weak in subject and 
pedagogical knowledge, one teacher weak in subject knowledge but strong in 
pedagogical knowledge, one teacher strong in subject knowledge but weak in 
pedagogical knowledge, and one teacher strong in subject and pedagogical knowledge 
(Berliner 2000, November-December). 
Sociologists selected cases they believed to be typical in a certain area of study 
(Becker, 1998). Studies that looked at programs, organizations, society, or culture 
typically used some sort of case study format (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). This study 
focused on a program (MAST) within multiple organizations (school districts) that were 
part of a larger organization (public education) that was engrained as part of our society 
and culture (expectations for a “free” K-12 education for all). Because there was a long 
tradition of using a case research format to study this type of phenomenon, using a case 
approach gave validity to the research. Because there were differences between the types 
of school districts that implement MAST, looking at multiple cases helped to determine 
what, if any, factors were present that motivated some districts to be early adopters and 
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others to resist, and to learn about the life expectancy of MAST. Using a multi-case 
format allowed for the possibility of finding a negative case—a case that went against 
expectations (Becker, 1998). Additionally, since school districts had a variety of 
characteristics that may have impacted their decision to implement or not implement 
MAST, it was necessary to use a multiple case format.  
 I used ideal typology as a method for selecting case districts in choosing four 
school districts. Two of these were suburban districts with student populations greater 
than 6,500 students; one that had and active MAST program at the time of the study and 
one that did not. I also chose two regional center districts with student populations less 
than 4,500 students; one that had and active MAST program at the time of the study and 
one that did not.  
By sorting school districts into ideal types, I was able to establish a relationship 
between characteristics of districts that successfully adopted MAST and the impact of 
MAST in that district while controlling for differences in school size and type. This ideal 
typography was the basis of my research here. 
Blue Lake and Pine Springs were two school districts located in regional centers 
in Central state. Both districts had fewer than 4,500 students, which was typical for this 
type of school district. Blue Lake was not implementing MAST at the time of this 
research, but Pine Springs had an active MAST program. 
Conversely, Cotton Grove and Winter Valley were both suburban school districts 
with student populations above 6500 students, which was a typical size for suburban 
school districts in Central State. At the time of this research, Cotton Grove was not 
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implementing MAST, but Winter Valley had what participants defined as an effective 
MAST program (See Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1. District Participants Based on Ideal Typology 
 
 
District: Cotton Grove 
Suburban 
Student Population > 6,500 
No Currently Active MAST Program 
 
 
District: Winter Valley 
Suburban 
Student Population > 6,500 
Currently Active MAST Program  
 
 
District: Blue Lake 
Regional Center 
Student Population < 4,500 
No Currently Active MAST Program 
 
 
District: Pine Springs 
Regional Center 
Student Population < 4,500 
Currently Active MAST Program 
 
MAST Implementation 
No                                                                             Yes 
 
Sources 
Sources for data collection included historical research, information disseminated 
through formal communication channels, and interviews of stakeholders. Data sources 
incorporated viewpoints of multiple groups of stakeholders including the following: (a) 
non-partisan foundations, (b) policy makers, (c) political insiders, (d) elected political 
officials, (e) district administrators, (f) school administrators, (g) school board members, 
(h) school finance officers, (i) teachers, and (j) union representatives. The various data 
sources collected from these stakeholders were gathered via the methods described 
below. 
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Historical Research 
In this study, formal communication sources provided insight into the position, 
strategy, and rhetoric of stakeholders, especially the views of non-partisan foundations, 
policy makers, national union representatives, and elected political officials. These 
formal communication sources included official collateral material and websites of 
organizations that were stakeholders in performance-based compensation for teachers. 
These websites included but were not limited to those sponsored by CSDE, state and 
national teachers’ unions, Central State government, Milken Foundation, Chartwell 
Foundation, TAP Foundation, Broad Foundation, National Center for Education 
Accountability, and Public Agenda Foundation. Local, state, and national newspapers, 
and education and policy journals helped to determine strategies and rhetoric specific to 
MAST. A review of legislative session tapes helped to establish the rhetoric used and 
how the compromised merit pay model called MAST was passed into law. This 
information was public domain data and available to anyone wishing to see it.  
Other studies have used historical analysis to analyze discourse. Wirt et al. (1988) 
found that analyzing state statutes based on the four cultural values they studied helped 
them identify contrasts between the two states studied and enabled them to determine 
relationships between the states’ political histories and the values present in their 
education statutes. Analyzing the discourse carried out in the public sphere helped to 
determine whether mystification or manipulation of public opinion existed and to what 
extent (Wirt et al., 1988). 
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Politician Interviews 
Three politicians, one Republican senator and two Democratic congresspersons, 
were interviewed in order to gain insight into the origin of MAST and policy creation in 
one state and to ascertain their impressions on the adoption patterns of MAST. Interviews 
began with open-ended questions such as “Tell me about your relationship to the 
development of the MAST Policy” and “How do you envision MAST affecting public 
education?” The answers to these open-ended questions led to follow-up questions based 
on the information provided.  
 
School Data 
This study tracked public domain school data to further determine what if any 
changes in the district were attributable to MAST implementation. This type of data 
included financial data, aggregate student achievement data, teacher attendance data, and 
teacher salary data.  
 
District Administrator, Teacher, Union Representative, and School Board Member 
Interviews 
Interviews of school district administrators, teachers, union representatives, and 
school board members were conducted in order to gain insight into how the district went 
about implementing, not implementing, or implementing and dropping MAST. Initial 
interviews were approximately 45 minutes in length and began with open-ended 
questions such as “How was the decision made to implement MAST in your 
district/school?” “How has MAST implementation affected your district/school?” and 
Pay-for-Performance Page 101 of 299 
“How will your district evaluate the effectiveness of MAST as a program locally?” The 
answers to these open-ended questions led to follow-up questions based on the 
information provided.  
As the study proceeded, additional questions arose based on data collected and 
changing conditions for MAST implementation within school districts. Therefore, an 
additional interview with district personnel was scheduled toward the end of the data 
collection. Each of these interviews was approximately 30 minutes in length. They began 
with open-ended questions like “Since our last interview, how has your district/school 
changed as a result of MAST implementation?” and “What has your district learned 
regarding MAST implementation since our last interview?” and included other open-
ended questions based on trends in the data gathered, gaps in data, and the responses to 
the initial interview questions. 
 
District Finance Officer Interviews 
School finance officers were interviewed to validate the public domain financial 
data gathered and to determine the financial impact of MAST implementation on the 
district. Initial 45-minute interviews were scheduled with school finance officers at the 
beginning of the study. Interview questions included items such as “How was the 
decision to implement MAST made?” “How has MAST implementation affected the 
district financially?” and “How has the public supported the local tax burden as a result 
of MAST implementation?” and other open-ended questions based on the responses 
given to these initial questions. 
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As the study proceeded, additional questions arose based on data collected, and 
changes to the districts’ financial pictures. Therefore, school finance officers were 
interviewed a second time toward the end of the study as needed and based on 
participants willingness to participate. These follow-up interviews were scheduled to last 
approximately 30 minutes and included questions like “Since our last interview, how has 
your district’s financial picture changed as a result of MAST implementation?” and 
“What new knowledge has been gained as a result of MAST implementation as it relates 
to school district finances?” and other open-ended questions based on the data collected 
and the responses to the initial interview questions. 
 
Modes of Data Analysis 
 
Grounded Theory 
 Initial Grounded Theory-based coding was based on early data gathered from 
historical research and interviews and entered into NVivo, an electronic tool designed to 
aid qualitative data collection. The data was summarized and categorized in order to 
simplify retrieval and enhance analysis following the data analysis steps of Grounded 
Theory: defining data, analyzing the meaning of data, and categorizing it (Charmaz, 
2006). 
 
Single- and Multi-case Analysis 
Data was gathered during a three-year period from 2008-2011. Analysis of the 
data began as soon as initial data was collected and continued as it became available until 
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all data was collected and analyzed. Data was analyzed using a constructivist and critical 
theoretical lens. Coding of data was initially based on trends found in relevant literature, 
but evolved to encompass data trends found in the participant interview data collected in 
this study. As new codes were identified, all previous transcripts and data were reviewed 
to look for evidence of the newly identified code. Additional follow-up interviews were 
conducted prior to the conclusion of the data-gathering phase to gain additional data 
regarding new themes that emerged in the data. 
Data was analyzed both at the local level within a single district to attempt to 
reconcile the data gathered for each district as well as comparatively among all of the 
districts studied to determine what if any relationships existed to develop a conceptual 
framework based on the emerging themes present in the data. 
At the conclusion of the data-gathering phase, all data was re-read, proofreading 
for coding additions or errors. Data was entered into NVivo, a computer program 
designed to sort data by themes. Themes emerging from various perspectives were 
compared, looking at trends, patterns, similarities, and differences. 
 
Content Analysis 
The content analysis phase began with the start of the study as historical data was 
collected and continued through the end of the study as new information became 
available on this topic. This historical research was reviewed for emerging trends in the 
data and to clarify the perspectives of stakeholder views relevant to the data gathered. 
This data was also used to help determine the public and political discourse trends 
regarding MAST and its role within public education policy. 
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Multi-modal Analysis 
The multi-modal analysis phase began as data from local districts became 
available and continued through the end of the study. In the multi-modal analysis phase, I 
compared the data gathered from the single-case, multi-case, and historical research 
phases. I attempted to use this information to build a logical chain of events depicting the 
local implementation of this educational policy and develop a coherent theory regarding 
the policy’s early adoption patterns from this data. 
 
Validity 
 
Researcher Bias 
I did my best to present the data and research in a fair and balanced manner. I do 
not currently have a vested interest in whether districts choose to implement MAST or 
not. At the beginning of the study, I was not sure whether or not the implementation of 
MAST would benefit public education. As the study progressed, I began to form an 
opinion, but tried to not let that interfere with the data-gathering or analysis. I did not try 
to interfere with or influence any district’s decision regarding MAST implementation. 
Additionally, when reviewing communication and public discourse, I was sure to include 
all perspectives in the MAST debate. 
 
Reactivity 
In order to minimize reactivity, I constructed open-ended interview questions that 
minimized the risk of leading the interviewee to believe that there was a desired answer. 
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Additionally, I asked questions in a variety of ways to look for consistency in the data 
gathered. As with minimizing researcher bias, when reviewing communication and public 
discourse, I included all perspectives in the MAST debate. When observing participants 
at meetings and other events, I remained as unobtrusive as possible, but was aware of the 
possibility that participants may have been putting on a show for my benefit so they 
would look more favorable in the research. However, because the debate was public and 
my presence was not a major factor in the discussion, reactivity did not appear to be a 
factor. 
 
Involvement and Data 
By following school districts for one year, I hoped to achieve a long-term 
involvement that not only minimized reactivity to my presence, but would also provide 
rich and varied data for analysis and deeper understanding of the data. However, I found 
that in each case MAST was either running smoothly and not a topic of discussion at 
public meetings or that MAST was not implemented and not discussed in the district. As 
a result, several participants felt that the situation in their district had not changed and 
that they had nothing new to add, so the second interviews in these instances were short 
and added only minimal additional data. Additionally, as districts and politicians reacted 
to legislative and financial changes, I thought that their situations regarding MAST might 
have changed as well, especially for the districts that were not actively participating in 
MAST at the time of this research. However, this was not the case. Nonetheless, 
following the districts for a period of time did provide a better sense of their culture and 
leadership and how it may have impacted MAST implementation at a local level. 
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Respondent Validation 
I recorded all interviews and observations via note taking. After completing 
interviews and observations, transcriptions were shown to participants for their input and 
feedback on the validity of the evidence. 
 
Discrepant Evidence and Negative Cases and Comparison 
At the time of this study there were two school districts in the state that adopted, 
and then rejected, MAST. Including one of these districts provided data on a negative 
case where the pay-for-performance model did not work as a long-term teacher 
compensation model for that district. Using ideal typology as a basis for case selection 
provided a variety of data to either confirm or reject emerging theories through a process 
of comparison. 
 
Triangulation 
By conducting interviews with politicians, teachers, union representatives, 
administrators, and school board members, a variety of perspectives were included. 
Observing politicians, teachers, and administrators also gave a good variety of 
perspectives regarding implementation of MAST at a local level. Incorporating historical 
research and official discourse also provided a broader, balanced, and reliable insight into 
policy development and implementation. 
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Generalizability 
 Since this study used a multi-case format based on ideal typology selection, there 
were probably many districts in the state that would share some traits with one or more of 
the four districts included in this study. School districts may use this study to help them 
decide whether or not to implement MAST, and other state officials may use this data to 
decide whether and/or how to implement their own merit-based teacher compensation 
model. However, it was still early in the life cycle of MAST and generalizations 
regarding its long-term future and sustainability were premature. Additionally, there was 
not sufficient data to compare MAST to other education reform policies and make 
generalizations about the implementation and early adoption of other educational 
policies. In addition, this mostly qualitative cross-comparison of MAST districts by 
logical type was not intended to be broadly generalizable; this was certainly true beyond 
the state in which the research was conducted. 
 
Ethics and Confidentiality 
All participating districts and individual participants remained anonymous. School 
data was presented in aggregate so that no individual or district was identifiable in the 
study. Reference citations that included the names of individuals, schools, districts, or the 
state studied were altered to reflect the pseudonyms used in this document and to further 
protect participant anonymity. Since Central State was the only state implementing a 
statewide teacher pay for performance program at the beginning of the study and the only 
one implementing MAST, anonymity cannot be guaranteed to the governor or state 
agencies. However, this study sought information that was already a matter of public 
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record. In order for others to replicate or build from this study, the names of relevant 
foundations that have participated in the creation or promotion of performance-based 
teacher pay were included in this study. However, it was important to remember that all 
information contained in this study regarding these organizations was public information 
provided by the organization themselves or through published media and was part of the 
public domain. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: POLICY DISCOURSE ON MAST 
 
There were many stakeholders involved in MAST implementation from its 
inception to implementation at the local level. This chapter provides background 
information about the MAST phenomenon, the stakeholders, and the discourse involved. 
 
MAST as First Introduced 
 Governor Sam King, a rising star in the Republican Party strongly supported the 
neoconservative position favoring school choice, raised academic standards, mandated 
teacher and student competencies, state-wide common curriculum, standardized testing, 
and schools meeting the  perceived needs of business. Governor King promoted the idea 
that public education in its current state was a danger to children and the future of the 
U.S., but the problem of inadequate student achievement could be solved through the 
implementation of policies that included school choice initiatives and MAST,  (Johnson, 
2005).  
Success for Central State in a global economy also demands that we develop the 
potential of all of our citizens. Disparities in graduation rates and academic 
performance between white students and students of color continue to be a moral, 
social, and economic crisis… Ninety-three percent of the students at Johnson 
Charter School [(a school students can attend by choice)] are disadvantaged and 
come from homes where English is not the first language. Last year the school 
joined the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) and it’s now part of MAST. 
Teachers are paid for performance, meaningful professional development is 
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provided for staff, and rigorous evaluation of instruction is conducted. The results 
are remarkable. In just over one year, the students have improved on every 
measurement. The number of students passing the Basic Skills Test went from 
38% to 62% (King, 2006). 
Through rhetoric like this, King identified the social problem as inadequate student 
achievement and teachers as the cause of that problem. However, King attributed the 
increase of students’ scores on one standardized test to an increase in meaningful student 
achievement based on the school’s participation in two pay-for-performance programs for 
one year each without regard to whether or not the test adequately measured student 
achievement or if TAP and MAST caused the increase in test scores or if there were other 
factors that may have attributed to the increase in test scores. Additionally, the 2009 
evaluation of MAST by Hezel Associates found that MAST’s impact on student 
achievement was inconclusive because MAST had not been implemented long enough. 
However, these details did not seem to derail the implementation of school choice and 
MAST initiatives in Central State. 
Governor King also implied that teachers and their unions were the biggest 
problem in public education, thus establishing their position as the villain and a justifiable 
target in the student achievement policy solution. 
The number one school related factor of how our children are going to do in 
school is the quality, preparedness, and effectiveness of their teachers…. The 
quality of our teachers has eroded to the point where we should all be quite 
concerned about it. And the factors that go into it are these: our colleges of 
education in the United States of America are not nearly sufficient and rigorous 
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and relevant to the subject matter mastery that our teachers have to have. Number 
two, we are not attracting the quality people that we need into teaching for a 
variety of reasons. Once they arrive into teaching as new teachers we are not 
sufficiently developing, supporting, and training them particularly in the first five 
years… We need to move to a system where we pay for performance. We have 
done this in Central State. It is controversial. Does anyone who works outside of 
government get paid just for seniority? No one. The world has moved on. Eighty-
five percent of all the money that goes into schools goes into what? Salaries and 
benefits and operating budget and you know what? And do you know what it’s 
aligned to? Seniority. And do you know what the correlation is between seniority 
and the effectiveness of the teacher and student learning? Almost zero…. [The 
main strategic objective of schools] isn’t whether we all feel good about it. It’s 
whether students are learning, what they’re learning, and how fast they’re 
learning. We need to have some part of the increased funding for schools, as 
much as possible in my view, aligned to whether that strategic objective is being 
met in measurable and accountable ways (King, 2011). 
 
Again, this rhetoric ignored some relevant research. The relevant research in this 
case was that which showed that socio-economic status was the most important factor in 
determining student achievement (Holland, 2007; Lee & Burkam, 2002). Arguably, 
teachers were a much smaller and less diverse group than parents, so teachers made a 
better target group than parents for a policy solution. This fact was not lost on Governor 
King as he addressed the Central State Association of School Administrators in 2006. 
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We can't legislate good parents so we've got to focus on other stuff.  We were the 
first state to implement PSEO, so who better to lead the nation in reform.  Let's 
regain the mantle of education innovation in Central State (King, 2006, August 
15).   
 
His early rhetoric on MAST demonstrated a belief that incompetent and lazy 
teachers were seemingly everywhere and immune to termination through union 
protection. Governor King’s plan was to “fix” public education through increased 
competition and the weakening of the teachers’ union (Weber, 2008). At this point, 
inadequate student achievement was labeled as the social problem that was the result of 
poor teaching done by incompetent and lazy teachers that were protected by their unions 
(Johnson, 2005). It could be argued that this labeling served to name teachers and their 
unions as the “villains” and the neoconservatives, including Governor King, who were 
going to stop this practice as the “heroes.” The student achievement problem needed to 
be solved and getting rid of ineffective teachers and their unions was the pre-fabricated 
solution to the problem as described by Edelman (1988). Arguably, the “fix” to this social 
problem had no research to support that eliminating or weakening teachers’ unions would 
improve student achievement. 
With student achievement labeled as a problem and teachers and their unions as 
the cause of the problem, the Central State Governor and sympathetic legislators were 
able to propose multiple legislative initiatives including MAST that were aimed at 
weakening teachers’ unions. These legislative initiatives also included allowing 
alternative pathways to teacher and administrative licensure that would have allowed 
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business professionals to obtain their teaching and administrative licensure with little or 
no training in education. The pay-for-performance rhetoric associated with MAST made 
it appear to be another piece of union-busting legislation to many Central State educators, 
but the rhetoric resonated with much of the general population of Central State.  
Governor King strongly supported the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) 
advanced by the Milken Foundation and worked to bring the concept to Central State on 
a statewide scale. The previous Central State Governor had introduced TAP in the state, 
and in the few years of its existence only a handful of districts had ever used it, and about 
one fourth of them had already dropped the program or were in the process of dropping it 
when Governor King took office. Despite the failure of TAP to gain widespread approval 
in Central State, Governor King introduced MAST, which was based on TAP, during his 
first term as Governor. As a result of the similarity of MAST and TAP and TAP’s dismal 
showing in Central State, MAST appeared to lack research and data that supported its 
potential as a successful performance-based compensation model in Central State. 
During both of his terms as Governor, both the Central State House and Senate 
were controlled by Democrats, but the relationship between the Governor and the 
Legislature during his first term were relatively good. However, in order to get the MAST 
legislation passed, a lot of compromises were made, and the final legislation was 
significantly different from the Governor’s initial vision (M. Voss, personal 
communication, October 24, 2011). When Governor King first proposed MAST, he 
presented it as a way to “professionalize” teacher compensation and as the first state-wide 
teacher pay-for-performance compensation program in the U.S.  
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When the MAST bill was first introduced in the Legislature in March of 2005, by 
a Republican Congresswoman representing an urban area of Central State, the language 
regarding alternative teacher compensation included the following provisions. 
The alternative teacher professional pay system must: …use a professional pay 
system that replaces the lockstep steps and lanes salary system and allows school 
districts and charter schools to compensate teachers for satisfactory service and 
completion of annual performance goals; include performance compensation for 
teachers in districts or charter schools based on, at a minimum: (i) student 
achievement gains and school achievement gains…, locally selected standardized 
assessments, or both; and (ii) results of individual teacher evaluations based on 
classroom observations by a locally selected evaluation team (Central State 
House, 2005a). 
The Republican Senator from the same urban legislative district introduced an identical 
“companion bill,” four days later team (Central State Senate, 2005a).  
As initially introduced, the legislative language provided only $150 per student in 
funding for the program, required the elimination of the traditional step and lane salary 
schedule and tied all of the salary increase teachers would receive to student achievement 
and their performance evaluation. As first introduced, MAST very closely resembled how 
salary increases in the private sector worked. Both bills also required that MAST salary 
compensation plans be developed by regular local school districts and become part of an 
adopted collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of understanding between the 
school district and teachers’ union, or some other legally binding agreement.  
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Arguably, the Governor and these legislators overestimated the desperation of 
local public school teachers for a salary increase and the willingness of teachers to 
abandon their traditional compensation model. He likely thought that the rhetoric of 
“professionalizing” teacher compensation would serve to pressure teachers’ unions to 
adopt MAST. After all, teachers would want to be seen as professionals and parents 
would want their children taught by professionals. Additionally, as school districts were 
claiming to be desperately in need of additional funding, the MAST carrot held financial 
incentives as well. 
 
Mast Metamorphosis 
As is almost always the case, MAST legislation was not signed into law in the 
same form as it was introduced. At the time MAST was introduced, both the House and 
Senate were controlled by the Democrats and compromises had to be made in order for 
MAST legislation to pass. During the legislative process, various stakeholders lobbied 
legislators to alter or eliminate the legislation. As a result, compromises were made and 
MAST legislation was revised (Central State House, 2005a; Central State Senate, 2005a; 
Central State Statute, 2005). This process of compromise was similar to the process 
described by Edelman (1988) where competing interests forced compromises to the 
policy solution. 
The Senate version of the MAST legislation was referred to the Education 
Committee where it died (Central State Senate Education Committee, 2005; Central State 
Senate, 2005b). The House version was referred to the Education Committee where it 
passed with amendments adding school-wide achievement gains to the list of criteria for 
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teachers to meet in order to receive MAST compensation (Central State House Education 
Committee, 2005; Central State House, 2005b). The House then amended the bill to 
increase the amount of compensation to $260 per student (Central State House, 2005b). 
However, the amendment was referred back to the House Education Committee where it 
too died (Central State House Education Committee, 2005). The regular legislative 
session ended, and the MAST bill was not passed in either the House or Senate (Central 
State House, 2005b; Central State Senate, 2005b).  
Other legislative work was not completed, and the Governor called a special 
legislative session (Central State Legislative Reference Library, 2012). The Governor and 
the Republicans were determined to pass MAST, and it was resurrected in July of 2005 as 
part of the education omnibus bill (Central State House, 2005c; Central State Senate, 
2005c). The education omnibus bill was a bill that typically contained numerous smaller 
bills that were largely non-controversial in nature and were all acted upon as one bill 
(Central State House, 2005c; Central State Senate, 2005c). However, because of a variety 
of factors related to omnibus bills including their large size, their presentation at the end 
of the legislative session (when legislators are tired) and their typically innocuous 
language, at least some legislators reported that they did not read these bills carefully (M. 
Wilson, personal communication, January 18, 2011; M. Voss, personal communication, 
October 24, 2011; C. Sampson, personal communication, February 9, 2011). This may 
have made it easier to pass MAST.    
When MAST was presented in the omnibus bill, it had undergone some 
significant changes to the language regarding teacher compensation. 
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The alternative teacher professional pay system agreement must:… reform the 
“steps and lanes” salary schedule, prevent any teacher’s compensation paid 
before implementing the pay system from being reduced as a result of 
participating in this system, and base at least 60 percent of any compensation 
increase on teacher performance using: (i) school-wide student achievement 
gains …or locally selected standardized assessment outcomes, or both; (ii) 
measures of student achievement; and (iii) an objective evaluation program 
(Central State Statute, 2005). 
 
 In this version of MAST legislation, the MAST funding to school districts 
remained at $260 per student, but the state only would provide all of the funding the first 
year. The second year, a portion of the funding would come from local property tax 
levies. The steps and lanes no longer needed to be eliminated, just reformed. The amount 
of MAST compensation tied to student achievement, standardized test scores, and teacher 
evaluation was reduced from 100% to a minimum of 60%. The legislative language did 
not describe to what extent the steps and lanes had to be reformed or what percentage of 
teacher compensation had to be tied to student achievement versus teacher evaluation. As 
a result, this vagueness led to a great deal of debate after MAST became law. 
During the special session, there was a motion to remove MAST from the 
omnibus bill, because it was not historically the type of bill that would be included in the 
larger omnibus bill due to its more controversial nature. However, interestingly, the 
House and Senate floor debates about MAST were not always reflective of the latest 
revision that was included in the omnibus bill. On both floors, legislators debated the bill 
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in terms of 60% to all of a teacher’s total compensation being tied to student achievement 
with no mention of the possibility of a good portion of that being tied to teacher 
evaluation by other measures. In the House, the discussion was not in terms of how much 
of a teacher’s salary should be tied to student achievement, but whether or not tying 
teachers’ compensation to performance was a good idea at all.  Representatives talked as 
if all of teachers’ compensation, not just MAST compensation, would be based on 
performance as could have been interpreted from the initial version of the legislation. 
When MAST was discussed in the Senate, the discussion went much the same way as it 
did in the House until one senator clarified that under MAST only 30% of a teacher’s 
salary would be tied to performance. However, this clarification was also inaccurate as 
the legislation did not tie any specific percentage of the MAST increase to student 
achievement versus teacher performance. Further, MAST legislation had no impact on 
tying non-MAST compensation to teachers’ performance in any way.  
 Ultimately, when the motion to remove MAST from the omnibus bill was up for a 
vote in the Senate it failed in a tie vote. The omnibus bill passed the House and Senate 
and was signed into law with MAST legislation intact, although I was not sure that the 
legislators really knew exactly what they had just passed. 
 Thus far, the legislative process fit precisely with Edelman’s (1988) work in so far 
as the competing interests of the legislators and the constituents they represented served 
to modify MAST legislation, making the legislative “solution” ambiguous and 
contradictory. It also seemed to have left all of the stakeholder groups at least somewhat 
dissatisfied. The legislation as a pre-fabricated solution sought to weaken teachers’ 
unions, but allowed for voluntary participation and union approval at the local school 
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district level, thus limiting its effectiveness in that regard. Local teachers were not likely 
to adopt a plan that they believed would not be of benefit to them. The legislative 
language was also vague and left the definition of “reform” as it applied to teacher 
compensation subject to a variety of interpretations. A third area of vagueness in the 
legislative language was the extent of teachers’ compensation that was actually tied to 
student achievement. With the minimum of 60% of MAST compensation tied to a teacher 
evaluation combined with local student achievement measures or state standardized test 
scores, no set amount was required to be tied to test scores. As a result, districts in 
Central State attached very little of the MAST compensation to test score criteria. I have 
seen ranges from one to five percent of MAST compensation tied to state standardized 
test scores, although it is possible that some districts in Central State attached 
 a greater percentage of MAST compensation to this measure. 
 The three legislators who participated in this research shared their thoughts on 
MAST legislation. Senator Mary Voss was a Republican who represented a legislative 
district that encompassed both small, rural towns and outer-ring suburbs of a large 
metropolitan area. Cotton Grove, one of the case districts in this research, was included in 
her legislative district. Her professional background was in small businesses. She served 
on the K-12 Education Finance Committee when MAST was passed into law and served 
on the Higher Education Committee and as Chair of the State Finance Committee. She 
has served in the Senate since 1997. Throughout the interview process, she strongly 
echoed the sentiments of Governor King and his neoconservative approach to education 
policy, with her strongest support of MAST being in its original legislative version prior 
to the compromises made in order to get the legislation passed. 
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Representative Max Wilson was a Democrat who represented a regional center, 
small towns, and rural areas in southern Central State. He had been a state representative 
since 2006. Although he had not served on any K-12 education-related committees, he 
did have work experience as a college professor, and was familiar with K-12 education. 
His views on education appeared to lean toward the neoliberal point of view of the 
education policy debate, but were not entirely consistent with the neoliberal education 
policy agenda. 
 Claudia Sampson had been a state representative since 1992. She was a Democrat 
who represented a wealthy suburban area. Prior to her election as a state representative, 
she served on the board of her local school district. As a state representative, Sampson 
chaired the House K-12 Education Finance Committee, and was an author of the New 
Central State Salvation legislation, legislation designed to adequately fund K-12 public 
education in Central State based on the original Central State Salvation legislation from 
1971. At the time of this research, the New Central State Salvation legislation had been 
brought before the House several times, but never passed. Although Representative 
Sampson believed that performance-based compensation was a good thing, she thought 
that the larger issue impacting student achievement was a general lack of funding for 
public schools, representing more of a traditional philosophical stance among Democrats 
in Central State. 
There was little consensus among these three legislators about what the important 
components of MAST were, and even if the program should continue. The only 
component of MAST that all three legislators interviewed agreed upon was that a very 
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important component of the MAST plan was the voluntary participation on the part of 
school districts.  
 Although Representative Wilson thought that there were important components of 
MAST, he would prefer that MAST was discontinued. 
If it were up to me, I’d eliminate MAST in favor of the National Board of 
Teaching approach. It’s the same model that I think Stanford, the University of 
Minnesota, and the Bush Foundation use for pay increases. It puts more 
responsibility on the teacher to do a good job and not just collect a paycheck no 
matter how good of a job they do. That’s why the voluntary nature of MAST is so 
important to me. I don’t think we can force a compensation model on a school 
district when we know there are better models out there…The local levy funding 
is important for two reasons. One, we could never afford to pay all of it, and, two, 
there has to be some buy in from the local district that they are committed to it. If 
they have to pay for some of it, they’ll be more likely to follow through (M. 
Wilson, personal communication, January 18, 2011). 
 
Representative Sampson (personal communication, February 9, 2011) thought 
that career advancement, performance-based compensation, professional development, 
state funding, teacher observations, and voluntary participation were all very important 
parts of MAST, but again, reiterated that the overall lack of reliable, consistent, and 
adequate funding was a much more significant issue. 
Senator Voss (personal communication, October 24, 2011) thought that the only 
very important part of the MAST plan was its voluntary nature. She noted that the 
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voluntary nature was important because the data from MAST was inconclusive as to its 
effectiveness regarding student achievement. However, she also rated local levy funding, 
performance-based compensation, and teacher observation as important. The local-levy 
funding and performance-based compensation fit tightly with the neoconservative 
position of Governor King. These two components of MAST served the neoconservative 
view that unions harbored poor performers and served to decrease allocation of state 
resources to local programs. Like Representative Wilson, she believed that the local levy 
was important to show that districts “buy-in to the MAST plan and aren’t just going 
along with it to get some additional money from the state” (M. Voss, personal 
communication, October 24, 2011). 
Senator Voss was a supporter of the original legislative language and was greatly 
disappointed with the compromised version of MAST that ultimately became law. 
There was a lot of compromising done to get this [MAST] passed. It was very 
political. Governor King had a plan, the Democrats (in the Senate in particular) 
had their plan. The union [CSEA] had a lot of influence in the program. It was 
softened to the point where I’m not sure it’s worthwhile. If we had to do more 
budget cuts, I would be willing to freeze participation for a few years and see how 
we’re doing. I’m not advocating for eliminating it though. I’m not sure we can get 
better results without changing the program. Its purpose was to get teachers off 
steps and lanes, but it never did that. I want performance-based compensation for 
teachers, but not in its present form—not watered down. We need to strengthen 
the compensation system. It was really intended to get rid of steps and lanes. We 
won’t ever get it if unions [local teachers’ unions] get to approve the plan. They 
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might like the outcome, but they don’t want to give up control (M. Voss, personal 
communication, October 24, 2011).  
Senator Voss’s statement seemed to confirm MAST as a pre-fabricated solution as 
promoted by Edelman (1988) to the extent that MAST’s purpose, as explained by Senator 
Voss, was really about getting rid of traditional step and lane teacher compensation and 
implementing performance-based pay rather than increasing student achievement. 
 One of the results of compromise and the extensive lobbying done to secure that 
compromise was that no one got everything they wanted. Senator Voss’s sentiment could 
have mirrored that of the Governor regarding the version of MAST that was passed based 
on what followed during the initial implementation phase of MAST. In fact, Senator Voss 
seemed to have gotten little of what she wanted out of the MAST legislation, but a 
compromised version of the legislation appeared to be a greater political “win” than a 
failure of the legislation to pass at all. The legislative metamorphosis of MAST also 
echoed Edelman (1988) in describing why the legislation that was ultimately passed had 
little hope of solving the problem it was intended to fix as a result of the competing 
interests and resulting compromises made. The MAST legislation passed, but retained 
little power to do what it was intended to do. 
 
MAST Implementation Debate: Reform versus Elimination 
 In MAST’s implementation, there was a great deal of debate about the meaning of 
“reform” and “alternative” in the teacher pay system. The lack of a clear definition of 
these terms in the legislation left stakeholders to develop their own definitions. As a 
result, the definitions between stakeholders varied. The differing viewpoints of various 
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stakeholders and their lack of ability to reach consensus on the definitions caused 
dissatisfaction for multiple stakeholders as they discovered that MAST implementation 
differed from their vision of what it would be like.  
 The actual MAST legislation did not tie any specific portion of the MAST dollars 
a teacher was able to receive solely to student achievement. However, 60% of MAST 
compensation was tied to teacher performance, and student performance was one 
measure of teacher performance. In implementation one effect of this ambiguity was that 
the amount of compensation tied to standardized test scores varied by district. MAST 
legislation did not impact other compensation teachers received from districts except that 
districts were required to develop a reformed alternative teacher professional pay system. 
MAST legislation did not freeze a teacher’s salary, but could deny the teacher any 
additional compensation through MAST. Additionally, the way MAST was interpreted 
by most districts meant that teachers could earn 40% of the MAST dollars without 
meeting any performance goals. Similar to Edelman’s (1988) research, this ambiguity 
fueled an intense debate between local school districts and CSDE, with multiple districts 
actually suing CSDE over its interpretation of the legislation (Owen, 2006; FindLaw, 
2007). 
 
Governor King 
When MAST was signed into law in 2005, Governor King promoted MAST as a 
“grass-roots” initiative that would come from the teachers themselves. In a sense, MAST 
had to come from teachers because a district could not adopt MAST without local 
teachers’ union approval. Governor King predicted that teachers of half of the students in 
Central State would come into the program during the first two years; the other half 
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would participate by 2009. At first it looked like that might happen. It was argued that 
overtly informing districts that only half would receive funding for the program may have 
briefly sparked a shortage mentality among districts and the majority quickly sent non-
binding letters of intent to participate in MAST to CSDE (CSDE, 2010). This echoed the 
free-market principals of supply and demand advanced by Freidman and Smith, and 
seemed to be effective in the early days of MAST. The Governor was energized and 
spoke as if this version of MAST was the program he’d hoped for, with no signs of how 
much he had compromised to get it passed (M. Voss, personal communication, October 
24, 2011). Although the Governor remained enthusiastic about MAST, local school 
district interest diminished quickly (CSDE, 2010). 
When Governor King talked about MAST during the first few years of its 
implementation, he talked about how MAST would professionalize teacher compensation 
and pay high-performing teachers for their performance while freezing the pay of low-
performing teachers, ultimately driving them out of the profession (Weber, 2008). He 
talked about how MAST awarded teachers raises based on their performance and student 
achievement instead of longevity (Weber, 2008), and was quick to point out that MAST 
caused the improvement in student achievement in Metropolis (“Governor Delivers,” 
2006). However, in an interview for Education Week, the superintendent of Metropolis 
attributed the gain to new professional development initiatives implemented in the district 
during the same time period and not to MAST (McNiel, 2006). 
In the end, MAST floundered. Teachers did not rise up and demand that their 
district participate in MAST like the Governor predicted. In fact, relatively few districts 
actually implemented the program. Six years after MAST was unveiled only 12% of 
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Central State school districts encompassing 30% of the students were using MAST. 
MAST seemed to be suffering the same fate as the TAP program that came before it in 
Central State (CSDE, 2010). 
   
CSDE 
MAST was floundering, and was not turning out to be what the Governor 
originally wanted. However, all was not lost for the Governor’s pet education project. In 
Central State, the State Education Commissioner was appointed by the Governor, 
essentially making CSDE an education policy implementation extension of the 
Governor’s office. The SCDE championed MAST and its implementation. CSDE 
published press releases on its website and ensured photo opportunities with the 
Governor and or Commissioner of Education handing the involved district an oversized 
check contributing to the political spectacle as described by Edelman (1988). Each press 
release contained general information about the district’s MAST plan and about how 
excited the district was to be participating in MAST (CSDE, 2006, 2007). Each press 
release listed all of the districts that had signed on to participate in MAST (that were still 
participating at the time of the press release) (CSDE, 2006, 2007). It was reminiscent of 
advertisers using peer pressure techniques to get people to buy products, and seemed to 
be a strategy as described by Spector and Kitsuse (1977) to get the audience, in this case 
local school districts, to act. 
 CSDE also helped to spread the Governor’s pay-for-performance rhetoric. Both 
the Governor and CSDE used words like “professional” and “modern” to describe the 
compensation method in MAST (CSDE, 2006, 2007; King, 2006). This language served 
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to convey the message that the traditional steps and lanes salary schedule was outdated 
and unprofessional without overtly attacking it. In the early years of MAST, the Central 
State Education Commissioner preached that the public did not support automatic pay 
increases for employees because industries no longer operated in that manner (Hanson, 
2006). CSDE employees, including the Commissioner Mahoney, also helped to paint 
MAST as a successful program because it tied teacher education to student learning, in 
effect, although it was not usually the case, as school districts that had implemented 
MAST did not have substantially different gains in student achievement than those 
districts that did not (Weber, 2009). The early rhetoric from CSDE focused on pay-for-
performance and professionalization of teacher pay so that teacher compensation would 
be aligned with how private sector professionals were compensated.  
 In a 2007 interview with Education Week, Commissioner Mahoney stated the 
following. 
There are not many industries anymore that give employees and automatic pay 
increase just because they worked another year. That's not the way of doing things 
anymore, and the public doesn't support that anymore (Honawar, 2007, January 
17). 
 
In interviews for Central State Public Radio and the Tribune, Commissioner 
Mahoney also noted that teachers and districts were not guaranteed MAST dollars once 
their applications were approved. 
We don't want to send the message that this is something that you can game and 
think you can just pick up $260 per student and have something that's not going 
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to be a very significant change in the way you pay your teachers and the way you 
structure their professional development (Pugmire, 2005). 
 
The legislation says we can take money away if districts are not following 
through with their contracts.  We will have monitors going into the school 
districts to see if they're doing what they're saying (Draper, 2005,1A). 
 
In keeping with the idea of MAST as a pre-fabricated solution, CSDE offered no 
research or data that showed that changing how teachers were compensated would 
increase student achievement. From CSDE’s rhetoric, MAST’s intended purpose seemed 
to be eliminating step and lane compensation and replacing it with performance-based 
compensation. 
After the initial onslaught of letters of intent to apply for MAST, the actual 
applications barely materialized. Commissioner Mahoney accounted for the lack of 
districts participating two years after the launch of the program by explaining that local 
districts were taking time to explore and understand the various aspects of MAST 
(Honawar, 2007 August 1). CSDE was firmly supportive of the Governor’s agenda 
regarding MAST. Having lived in Central State for more than 25 years, including the 
entire time since the inception of MAST through the completion of this research and 
regularly watching, listening, and reading mainstream news, I could not recall nor find in 
the mainstream media any reports of wide-spread public-initiated outrage or even 
concern about how teachers were paid. This statement seemed to me to echo Edelman’s 
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(1988) research regarding using media to establish public opinion by attributing the 
neoconservative education policy agenda to the mainstream population of Central State. 
CSDE also advanced the Governor’s agenda in its oversight of the 
implementation of MAST. The legislation gave responsibilities for oversight of the 
program and approval of individual school districts’ implementation plans to CSDE. 
CSDE essentially ignored the revisions the legislature made to MAST when approving 
applications, especially in the areas of reforming versus eliminating the traditional step 
and lane salary structure and how much of the compensation would be tied to student 
achievement through standardized testing. When districts complained that CSDE’s 
approval requirements were not what were stated in the legislation that passed, CSDE 
claimed that eliminating the traditional salary schedule was the only way to reform it and 
that was what was intended by “reform” (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 
2009).  CSDE also contended that the expectation was that a significant portion of the 
MAST dollars were intended to be paid based on student performance on state 
standardized tests (J. Gleason, personal communication, January 14, 2011). Districts that 
did not meet CSDE’s self-imposed criteria either had their plans rejected or had great 
difficulty getting their plans approved (J. Gleason, personal communication, January 14, 
2011). Some districts sued CSDE over its approval criteria. In one case, the district sued 
over the requirement of having full-time peer coaches (Owen, 2006). The lawsuit was 
settled and the districts’ plans were approved (Owen, 2006). This helped loosen the 
approval criteria somewhat, but this was short-lived. In the other lawsuit, the judge sided 
with CSDE regarding the definition of “reform” and found that CSDE did not overstep its 
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authority to require the step and lane compensation schedule be eliminated (FindLaw, 
2007).   
Another factor that made MAST implementation challenging was that CSDE was 
subject to budget cuts over several years to an even greater extent than local school 
districts. At the time of this research, only approximately 80% of the employees at CSDE 
were state workers. The other 20% were federal employees overseeing state 
implementation of federal programs (D. Gomez, personal communication, August 9, 
2011). CSDE was plagued by years of staff reductions through hiring freezes. When an 
employee resigned, the position was not filled and the work was divided among 
remaining employees. This made responsibility for staffing and overseeing the various 
programs fluid (D. Gomez, personal communication, August 9, 2011). It created an 
atmosphere where employees were over-worked and not always knowledgeable of the 
programs they oversaw (D. Gomez, personal communication, August 9, 2011). New 
programs like MAST were added to the workload of employees who did not necessarily 
have the time, and possibly the desire, to learn about and oversee another new program 
(D. Gomez, personal communication, August 9, 2011). This helped to create an 
environment where responses to district questions about MAST varied widely based on 
which CSDE employee answered the question (J. Frodo, personal communication, 
January 5, 2009). 
In addition to the program’s tepid support among educators and vague language, 
the MAST application process was oppressive. It included a forbidding application form 
(CDSE, 2012c), advice that changed depending on which person at CSDE answered the 
question (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009), and a culture at CSDE that 
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required revision on every application as reported by the CSDE employee who presented 
at the 2006 MAST workshop. The application needed input from the local teachers’ 
union, administration, and the school board, which required hundreds of man-hours spent 
in each district writing a plan that districts were uncertain would be accepted (G. 
Camden, October 1, 2009). As was expected with new legislation, those drafting plans to 
implement MAST in their districts had questions about what was needed in their plans 
and how the legislation was being interpreted by CSDE. 
At a 2006 CSDE-sponsored workshop I attended that was held to answer district 
questions about implementing MAST, the presenter told us not to be disheartened when 
our application was rejected or required revision. She added that Commissioner Mahoney 
felt that CSDE employees were not doing their jobs if they let applications through 
easily, so all plans would be returned for revision at least once. 
 The bureaucratic approval process arguably had a chilling effect on the number of 
letters of intent that turned into actual districts that implemented MAST. The first year, 
there were only a handful of districts that implemented MAST, and some of them had 
special encouragement to participate (CSDE, 2007; J. Frodo, personal communication, 
January 5, 2009; Metropolis Superintendent, personal communication, March 2, 2011). 
The hard-driving MAST rhetoric was not attracting customers. The Governor’s pet 
educational project and his hopes of moving on to a national stage were fading. Thus a 
new strategy was implemented. 
CSDE and Governor King wanted districts to participate, so in some cases, the 
Governor’s agenda and even the legislation was compromised to get districts to try 
MAST. The hope was that more districts would join the list of MAST participants, 
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thereby causing more districts to be motivated by these districts joining the program. 
Despite language stating that all aspects of the MAST program needed to be implemented 
by October 1 of the year the district implemented MAST, Blue Lake (one of the districts 
that participated in this study) submitted a MAST plan to CSDE that did not have any 
adjustments made to its traditional step and lane salary schedule. Nevertheless, CSDE 
approved Blue Lake’s plan, waiving the October 1 full implementation requirement and 
giving Blue Lake one year to get rid of its traditional salary schedule (B. Adams, personal 
communication, September 23, 2008). Ultimately, Blue Lake was not able to reach an 
internal agreement between the teachers’ union and the district on a new or revised salary 
schedule, so Blue Lake’s MAST program had to be discontinued after its first year (B. 
Adams, personal communication, September 23, 2008).  
 Pine Springs (another participating district in this study) submitted a MAST 
application that did not get rid of its traditional step and lane salary schedule, but rather 
added MAST dollars on top of it. Pine Springs contended that the legislation required that 
the salary schedule be altered, not eliminated (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 
5, 2009). Pine Springs argued that adding career ladder compensation, MAST dollars to 
all teachers’ salary if the district as a whole made AYP targets, and piece-rate based 
MAST dollars for completing professional development tasks amounted to altering the 
district’s salary schedule because it did not previously have those items (J. Frodo, 
personal communication, January 5, 2009). This was certainly one way to interpret the 
MAST legislative call for “reforming” teacher compensation.  
A battle of wills ensued between CSDE and the district. Still, the Governor’s 
fishing opener was in Pine Springs that year, and he and CSDE wanted the photo 
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opportunity with the Governor, the district, and the over-sized check. Therefore, Pine 
Springs’ MAST plan was approved just in time for the fishing opener photo with the 
salary schedule as Pine Springs submitted it intact (J. Frodo, personal communication, 
January 5, 2009). 
 A few years later, the Pine Springs’ superintendent gained responsibility for a 
second school district, Bear Creek. Bear Creek was a regional center located about 120 
miles southeast of Pine Springs. Dr. Frodo worked with staff at Bear Creek to adapt the 
Pine Springs’ MAST plan to the new district. CSDE rejected the plan with the salary 
schedule being a major factor in the rejection, and Bear Creek ended its pursuit of MAST 
dollars (J. Frodo, personal communication, October 16, 2009). It appeared that CSDE 
was still attempting to enforce its interpretation of the MAST legislative language. 
 Although not participating in this research, the superintendent of Metropolis, an 
urban school district in Central State that had several schools participating in MAST, and 
I were talking during a break from a meeting we attended in 2010. We were talking about 
the subjects of our dissertations. When I told her that mine was about MAST, she 
lamented that when it was first passed they had legislators and people from CSDE 
coming to the district every day trying to get them on board. She quipped that the district 
had to adopt MAST just so the people lobbying them to adopt MAST would go away and 
the district could go back to getting some work done. Interestingly, this school district 
was represented in state government by the two original authors of the MAST legislation. 
 Conversely, some felt that their districts were unfairly excluded and that CSDE 
did not provide them with any assistance or encouragement to participate.  Representative 
Sampson viewed MAST both through the point of view of a legislator and from the 
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perspective of a local school district when describing what she would change about 
MAST. 
The law changed and we had the feeling that it was partisan [regarding] who got 
[MAST] and who didn’t. At the beginning there were accusations about 
applications not being fair. Some school districts [that] sent in the same 
application as another district got rejected. Center City [the district where 
Representative Sampson was a school board member and still represents 
legislatively] was represented by all Democrats and was turned down [for not 
meeting required timelines]. We brought documentation that we met deadlines 
and then we were approved. Small, rural schools didn’t have administrators who 
had time and couldn’t put forth the plans, so it was mostly metro districts that got 
it (C. Sampson, personal communication, February 9, 2011).  
Representative Sampson’s statement combined with the experiences of Pine Springs, 
Bear Creek, Blue Lake, and Winter Valley seemed to support her view that MAST 
applications may not have been impartially reviewed. 
 
Legislators 
 The Central State Legislature was less enthusiastic about MAST than the 
Governor. The legislature preferred to spend the state’s limited budget to fund financially 
strapped school districts in general than to expand MAST (Honawar, 2007, January 17). 
It capped state MAST funding at $86 million, enough to cover only half of the teachers in 
the state. In addition, since MAST initially was signed into law the state portion of 
funding steadily decreased from being fully funded (when the legislation was passed) to 
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being increasingly funded through local property taxes. In 2008, the state only picked up 
the tab for $171 per student of the $260 per student tab. This is similar to the financial 
path of other pay-for-performance initiatives that had come and gone before MAST. 
Additionally, legislators were not seeing the overwhelming increase in student 
achievement they thought that they would see due to MAST. They wondered if state 
funds were being well spent on the program or if MAST was just a ploy to get more 
money for teachers and a debate about whether or not the state should continue to fund 
MAST ensued (M. Wilson, personal communication, January 18, 2011).  
 I found it interesting that legislators considered that MAST might be a ploy on the 
part of teachers’ unions and some Democrats to get more money for teachers. MAST was 
introduced by neoconservative Republicans in the House and Senate, promoted by a 
neoconservative governor, and opposed by state and local teachers’ unions. One possible 
explanation was that through continued social interaction as promoted by Berger and 
Luckmann (1966), neoconservatives were viewed as a group that did not support 
providing additional education funding and teachers’ unions and Democrats were viewed 
as groups that lobbied for education funding. Legislators interviewed for this study did 
not seem to consider the possibility that MAST was a failed attempt at weakening the 
teachers’ unions and changing how teachers in Central State were paid. However, at the 
time MAST was passed, overt legislative attacks on teachers’ unions and teachers’ 
compensation were rare. Because overt attacks on teachers’ unions and teachers’ 
compensation were rare at the time of this research, this type of social interaction may not 
have occurred or occurred so infrequently in Central State that the legislators may not 
have recognized this aspect of MAST. This is because, according to Edelman (1988), the 
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series of social interactions between the Legislature and teachers’ unions that needed to 
happen for this meaning to be considered had not happened. That could have been why 
legislative participants did not consider that MAST was a failed neoconservative 
initiative. 
 Although Senator Voss and Representative Wilson supported the movement to the 
local levy aspect of MAST, Representative Sampson disagreed. 
When we first started talking about MAST, it was initially all state money, but 
that has changed. I don’t think it was even all state money by the time it got all 
the way through the Legislature. It’s become increasingly funded through local 
dollars though. It’s a really good program, but I think it should be funded by the 
state. I think education in general should be funded by the state (C. Sampson, 
personal communication, February 9, 2011). 
 
As part of the debate, legislators threatened to cut MAST funding. So CSDE hired 
a firm to conduct an evaluation of the impact of MAST on student achievement. The 
evaluation results stated that MAST might have a small impact on student achievement, 
but the results were inconclusive (Hezel, 2009). The researchers stated that due to the 
many different initiatives being concurrently implemented across Central State including 
in MAST districts, it was impossible to tell what impact MAST had on student 
achievement versus the other initiatives that were also implemented during the study 
period. Despite the actual study results, the Governor, CSDE, and many legislators 
publicly stated that the study was conducted and that MAST participation improved 
student achievement (Mindeman, 2009). There were some legislators like Representative 
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Sampson (personal communication, February 9, 2011) who accurately reported that the 
study results were inconclusive, but their voices seemed to go unnoticed in the public 
sphere and on their respective legislative floors, based on my observation of legislative 
tapes of these sessions. This could have also been a type of mystification of the data on 
the part of these neoconservatives in order to continue the implementation of their policy 
agenda. 
Whether or not MAST actually resulted in better student achievement was 
important to the three legislators who participated in this study and would impact their 
decisions on whether or not to continue funding for the program as it existed at the time 
of this research. 
I would also want to make sure that student achievement is measured properly. I 
don’t know if I’m happy with it the way it’s measured now. There should be a 
standard way of doing it. It may not matter though. Soon we’ll put a lot of it into 
law with no funding if districts don’t participate [in MAST] (M. Voss, personal 
communication, October 24, 2011). 
Even when asked directly to comment on the student achievement aspects of MAST, 
Senator Voss continued to emphasize the pay-for-performance aspects of MAST. Her 
commitment to the pay-for-performance and teacher evaluation aspects of MAST 
resonated strongly with the neoconservative agenda regarding public education at the 
time of this research. 
Representative Wilson thought that MAST compensation was significantly 
different than what he thought it would be, making student achievement irrelevant to 
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MAST. However, student achievement was very important to Representative Wilson, so 
he preferred to discontinue MAST. 
I like many of the concepts, but not the implementation…. I think it has merit and 
accountability. There were also local levy dollars so it wasn’t seen as a gift from 
the state, but MAST really doesn’t compensate based on student achievement or 
teacher performance. If the school makes the goal, the teachers get paid whether 
or not they had anything to do with achieving the goal. Some may have to show a 
portfolio of what they did during the year at the end of the school year, but they 
all get paid too. It really doesn’t change anything. I did expect that it would 
simply be a “more compensation” tool that utilizes local property tax, but it was 
primarily presented as merit pay. It didn’t work out that way. It was just a way to 
bring more money to the compensation pool (M. Wilson, personal 
communication, January 18, 2011). 
Representative Wilson seemed to be able to intuitively identify some of the negative 
aspects of pay-for-performance models. These included the difficulty in measuring 
achievement and performance, and the unintended consequence of rewarding poor 
teachers for the work of their higher performing peers through the use of group rewards. 
Representative Sampson thought that MAST was working pretty much the way 
she envisioned it, with the exception of funding.  
I never thought we would have state funding forever. I thought by now it would 
all be local levy. I’m surprised it’s hung on for as long as it has. For late comers, 
it will be all local money. That’s not what I thought it would be at all. It should be 
all state dollars. Everything about education funding should be state dollars. Local 
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levy dollars are not equalized (C. Sampson, personal communication, February 9, 
2011).  
 
Representative Sampson also echoed sentiment about student achievement and 
the potential of requiring districts to participate. “If the student achievement data is 
favorable, then it should no longer be optional for districts, but if we can’t prove it’s good 
for students and aren’t going to fund it, then we can’t require it” (personal 
communication, February 9, 2011). 
 As a result of the inconclusive evidence relating MAST to student achievement, 
although Central State faced an increasingly dire state budget deficit, the legislature 
continued to fund MAST without definitive evidence that MAST was working. However, 
the debate continued about whether or not MAST should be reformed or discontinued. At 
the time of this research, several legislators, including Representative Wilson, were 
calling for an end to state funding for MAST and new legislation requiring districts to 
participate in the performance-based aspects of MAST.  
When asked how MAST implementation differed from their vision of how it 
would be when the Legislature approved it, the answers were again varied. Senator Voss 
was a strong supporter of the original legislative language and was the most disappointed 
with the compromised version of MAST that ultimately became law. “It hasn’t worked 
out the way I wanted it to. All of them [MAST components] are disappointing” (M. Voss, 
personal communication, October 24, 2011). 
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 All of the legislators had ideas of what they would do differently with MAST. 
Similarly to the neoliberal stance, Representative Wilson would have eliminated MAST 
altogether.  
In Wheatfield [the largest city Wilson represented], we have National Board 
certification. I think it has better merit and accountability. I would do a NBTC 
[National Board of Teaching Certification] approach for “merit” pay and 
implement the Teacher Performance Assessment for new teachers (M Wilson, 
personal communication, January 18, 2011). 
  
Senator Voss would keep the current MAST components, but strengthen the 
requirements in each area.  
I like the evaluation/observation requirement and the requirement for increased 
student achievement, but they’re not as strong as I’d like them. I like the 
performance-based compensation, but it’s not strong enough. The steps and lanes 
have to go. I guess I don’t mind the steps so much, but the lane thing really gets 
me. Teachers get paid more just because they take a class or get an advanced 
degree. It doesn’t even have to relate to what they’re teaching. I would also not let 
the unions vote to approve the plan; or if they have to vote, not allow more than a 
50% plus one vote. Right now they’re [local unions] requiring 67% and 75% 
votes to approve the plan (M. Voss, personal communication, October 24, 2011).  
Again, Senator Voss was clearly promoting the rhetoric of the neoconservative education 
agenda. 
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With the exception of Representative Wilson, the legislators thought that MAST 
had some positive points. For example, Senator Voss (personal communication, October 
24, 2011) believed that the greatest impact MAST had on education was professional 
development. “The staff development has been the best. Staff development should, in 
theory, relate to increased student achievement. The teacher mentoring can also help.” 
Representative Sampson also shared her thoughts on what was good about 
MAST. She included its voluntary nature and encouragement of tinkering with the 
relationship between teacher professional development and pay. 
Having it [MAST] be voluntary at the beginning was a good thing. There was not 
enough money to fund it for everyone, so why not have the ones who want it do 
it. Then we could build data to prove it’s a good thing. Then other school districts 
will want to do it. There’s also something to be said for professionalizing 
teaching, and it seems it wouldn’t harm students. I hope the greatest impact of 
MAST is student achievement and how teachers love the professionalization of 
teaching with peers giving advice and peers helping peers. It’s not threatening; 
it’s being able to help others. Sometimes I think Governor King liked the test 
scores piece best, but test scores aren’t the be-all end-all or even the biggest 
measure. It started out as being a feared measure passed by legislators, but they 
[legislators] aligned with teachers’ unions, and now they [teachers] want it. They 
[teachers] feel it’s an injustice that they don’t have it. It could have been uprooted 
if Governor King wasn’t so passionate about it. Governor Ritchell [current 
Central State Democratic Governor] would be a goat if he tried to get rid of it 
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now, but four years ago, he would have been a hero (C. Sampson, personal 
communication, February 9, 2011). 
That most people would probably no longer have referred to Governor Ritchell as a hero 
for ending MAST was not because people were starting to get excited about the benefits 
of MAST. It was more of a case that people had largely stopped talking about MAST and 
moved on to focusing on other issues. Additionally, Representative Sampson and Senator 
Voss both seemed to appreciate the unintended outcome of MAST in terms of showing 
promise as an effective professional development model. 
 
Supporting Local School Districts 
Local school districts throughout Central State were financially starved and 
willing to try just about anything to keep their districts viable. This accounted for the 
overwhelming number of districts that submitted a non-binding letter of intent to 
participate in MAST. However, the bureaucracy associated with the approval process, the 
confusing and contradictory information CSDE disseminated, and the need for union 
approval stifled the attempts of many districts to secure additional funding for teacher 
compensation.  
In Central State, state funding of school districts funding had always been 
somewhat unpredictable. State funding increases and decreases were made at the 
discretion of the legislation with the Governor’s approval. At the time of this research, 
there was not enough money or desire on the part of the legislative body to fund school 
districts consistently or adequately. At one House Education Finance Committee meeting 
I attended, the committee chair asked a researcher who was there presenting her findings 
Pay-for-Performance Page 143 of 299 
on public school funding how much the state could cut in K-12 public education funding 
without risking being sued by districts. The researcher responded that the state was in 
danger of being sued now and would most likely lose (Seashore & Alexander, 2010). 
Since then, Central State only reduced funding to school districts one year when that 
funding was supplanted by federal stimulus dollars. However, Central State did use some 
creative borrowing strategies over a period of several years. 
In times of shortages of state cash flow, the state would delay making its 
payments to school districts so that the state would not have to borrow money for cash 
flow purposes. This was different than the shifting of payments to the following year. 
This type of delay was when the state announced to school districts that they would not 
be receiving all or some of the money owed to them that year (Weber, 2010). This forced 
many fiscally responsible school districts to have to borrow money to maintain district 
cash flow. The state would then pay the districts the delayed payments when the state had 
more cash on hand, typically after state income taxes were collected in mid-April. The 
legislature did this in 2010, but prohibited the practice in a special legislative session 
during the summer of 2011 (Central State Statute, 2011). 
Another borrowing strategy used by Central State was to delay state aid payments 
to districts. When Central State was fully paying districts, the state paid districts 90% of 
the funding in the current year and approximately 10% in the following year. This was 
done to allow the state to double check student enrollment for each district to ensure that 
the state was distributing the correct amount of aid to each district. Twice during the time 
of this research, the Central State Legislature voted to shift more of the current year’s aid 
to districts to the following year. The first shift delayed 20% of aid and the second shift 
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delayed 27% of aid. That meant that under the latest shift districts only received 73% of 
what the state was obligated to pay them. Again, this caused some districts to need to 
borrow money to maintain district cash flow (Weber, 2010). 
Districts used to be able to levy more local dollars to off-set the instability of state 
funding. However, beginning in the 2002-2003 school year, Central State made a promise 
to districts to more fully fund public education. In doing so, the amount of funds districts 
could levy locally was reduced and the amount of state funding increased. Since then, 
when adjusted for inflation, the per-student state funding for each of the case districts I 
studied decreased every year with the exception of Cotton Grove in the 2006-2007 school 
year (CSDE, 2008b, 2009l; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). That year Cotton Grove 
moved a special education program into the district that had served by a special education 
co-operative. The related increase in high needs students in the district thus increased the 
district’s per student state revenue that year. However, during all other years, Cotton 
Grove’s per-student inflation-adjusted state funding decreased similarly to each of the 
other three districts.  
In addition to a lack of stable and sufficient funding, districts themselves were 
also important in the success or failure of MAST implementation. Having strong, 
effective district leadership and a positive relationship between the teachers’ union and 
district administration were important factors for MAST implementation in districts. 
However, in the face of diminishing funds, districts often cut administrative and 
administrative support positions, trying to keep budget cuts from impacting classrooms. 
This resulted in over-worked administrators who were focused on tasks to be 
accomplished with little or no time left to attend to the cultural and symbolic leadership 
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frames necessary for implementing initiatives like MAST that would impact the culture 
of a district. 
 John Fitzgerald, an education policy fellow with Central State 2020, a non-
partisan educational think tank, succinctly summarized public school districts’ financial 
position on the organization’s website.  
Schools are in the worst financial shape they have been in decades. Many 
Minnesota districts signed on not because they love MAST, but because they can't 
afford not to sign up. State aid accounts for more than 80 percent of districts' 
budgets, yet state aid has dropped an inflation-adjusted 14 percent since 2003. 
This has forced districts to marshal citizen support to run levy elections to support 
schools. The state has also made several large accounting shifts in the past year 
that have forced many districts to borrow money to pay their bills and incur 
interest and fee charges. As a result, class sizes have risen dramatically, programs 
have been cut, teachers have been laid off and the quality of education in Central 
State has dropped (Fitzgerald, 2010). 
Because districts really were motivated to provide students with the best education they 
could, and districts’ budgets were being squeezed by the state, all four districts in this 
study attempted to capture available dollars for their districts. 
School districts and the people who work within them wanted very much to help 
students succeed. In tough economic times with frozen or decreased funding and delays 
in receiving funding, it became increasingly difficult to develop and implement the 
programs needed to effectively teach an increasingly diverse student population. It was 
no secret to education professionals throughout the U.S. that innovative and best-practice 
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education programs took time, personnel, and money to develop and implement. Because 
of this, even though there were strings attached, the allure of needed funding had many 
financially strapped districts turning to alternative funding sources. In Central State 
districts’ most obvious option was to turn to MAST for additional financial support. 
This need for financial support was not lost on local legislators. Central State 
legislators that participated in this research all agreed that the lack of funding of Central 
State’s public schools was a serious issue. Whether Democrat or Republican, legislators 
acknowledged that K-12 public education funding was inadequate. When Representative 
Sampson began her legislative career, Central State was in the process of paying back 
school districts for an earlier funding shift. 
It took us three bienniums to pay it [tax shift] off. Now we owe schools more than 
we ever have. If you factor in CPI [Consumer Price Index inflation rate] and 
factor out special education and building expenses, then funding has been flat 
since ’84. New funding is needed…Any increases in funding schools have 
received has been going to healthcare and special ed. costs. We owe schools $2.5 
billion--$1.4 billion in late payments, $0.5 billion is funding shift, and $600 
million, soon to be $700 million is how much we owe in special ed. cross subsidy 
combined with flat funding since 1984…I represent a property-wealthy district 
and we sometimes feel that we don’t have enough money, so I think about the 
property-poor districts and how they’re doing (C. Sampson, personal 
communication, February 9, 2011).  
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State Senator, Mary Voss agreed. 
Local property tax payers used to pay a higher percent to schools. The burden was 
heavier on the property tax payers. The state’s share was about 60%. Then it went 
up to about 82% during the Ramirez [former Governor of Central State from 
1999-2003] administration, but it’s now sliding back. We’re working to correct it. 
We had many lawsuits because funding wasn’t equitable. Some districts couldn’t 
pass referendums and others were property-poor districts that couldn’t raise much 
money even if they did pass a referendum. In rural communities, ag[ricultural] 
land is exempt from taxes on levies, so that property doesn’t even count at all. 
 
Property-rich districts could raise more [money, but] we had levy caps and then 
caps with an inflationary adjustment. Then we had equalization aid for a while, 
but districts had referendums anyway. I can’t see us ever being able to raise 
enough money to be able to fund all schools to the level of Beachside [a property-
rich suburban district with a large operating levy], but it’s not fair. I live in 
Cranston [a property-poor, rural town 10 miles outside of a suburban area] and a 
$500 per student levy costs us a lot, but in Shoreline [property-rich, suburban, 
neighboring district], that same levy only costs them half of what it costs us. That 
makes it really tough for us to pass referendums (M. Voss, personal 
communication, October 24, 2011). 
 
 MAST did not come close to closing the funding gap, but when districts had a 
“we have to do this to get the money” mentality, participation in new initiatives where 
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there was money attached, became a viable funding option for school districts in Central 
State. MAST was just one example of this phenomenon. 
MAST was one pay-for-performance plan in one state; however, paying teachers 
based on their performance rather than based on education level and years of experience 
was an idea that was catching on across the U.S. The resurgence of performance-based 
pay could be seen in programs like MAST, the Teachers’ Incentive Fund, and Race to the 
Top. What was once a Republican, neoconservative initiative quickly gained bipartisan 
support as our Democratic President was a strong supporter of performance-based pay for 
teachers. The dismal financial picture of school districts had many considering any option 
that would bring additional dollars into the district. To some extent, all four school 
districts studied considered the financial impact an additional $260 per student would 
have on the district when making the decision whether or not to implement MAST (J. 
Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009; B. Adams, personal communication, 
September 23, 2008; J. O’Connor, personal communication, October 1, 2009; A. 
Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 2008).  
 
Implementation Redux 
 The relationship between the legislature and Governor King was more 
challenging during his second term. He was accused by legislators and the media of 
developing a budget that did not match his education goals (Demko, 2009). Even with 
incentives and “unofficial waivers of rules,” districts were not flocking to MAST as he 
had hoped or predicted. The legislature was straining to balance the state’s budget, while 
MAST dollars sat in reserve, unused (C. Sampson, personal communication, February 9, 
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2011). Gradually the Governor softened his use of the pay-for-performance rhetoric and 
began focusing MAST’s success as a professional development initiative for teachers. In 
the early stages of MAST, Governor King rarely spoke of the professional development 
aspects of MAST, focusing on the professional pay aspect instead. However, when 
describing his budget plan for the 2007 legislative session, he described MAST as “the 
MAST performance and professional pay initiative, aimed at encouraging professional 
development and rewarding quality teacher performance” (King, 2007). The softening of 
the rhetoric was subtle, but present. However, the damage of the hard-charging pay-for-
performance rhetoric he used in his first term had already been done. Even with the 
softened rhetoric, most teachers in the state did not want any part of MAST and the 
program remained relatively stagnant in terms of participation. 
 CSDE, to a greater extent than the Governor, changed its rhetoric regarding the 
purpose of MAST. At one superintendents’ conference I attended, Commissioner 
Mahoney went as far as to say that MAST was always about staff development and that it 
had never been about anything else. Although in a less dramatic manner, in a 2009 press 
release Commissioner Mahoney also touted the professional development aspects of 
MAST (CSDE, 2009m). 
MAST will give participating teachers an opportunity to enhance their skills and 
take part in real-time, research-based professional development, which will help 
raise student achievement…MAST is designed to advance the teaching profession 
by providing structured professional development and evaluation, as well as an 
alternative pay schedule that compensates teachers based on performance, not just 
seniority (CSDE, 2009m). 
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However, at the time of this research communication from CSDE was still often 
confusing or conflicting. Josh Gleason was the Acting School Improvement Director for 
CSDE. As part of his duties, he oversaw the MAST program. According to Gleason 
(personal communication, January 14, 2011), “MAST is all about school improvement 
and increasing student achievement.” That seemed like a logical position, based on the 
location of the MAST program within the CSDE hierarchy. However, on the CSDE 
(2010) website, MAST was located under the “teacher support” section. Mr. Gleason 
acknowledged the location of MAST on the CSDE website, but stated that he did not 
know why MAST was in that location on the website. This may have been an intentional 
attempt on the part of the CSDE at using mystification on educators by labeling “school 
improvement” as “teacher support.” 
Despite this softened rhetoric, participants in two of the three case districts that 
had at least at one time implemented a MAST plan stated that they did not think that their 
districts’ plans would be approved if they were initially submitted at the time of this 
research. They said that it was much more difficult for districts that chose to submit 
applications at the time of this research to have their MAST applications approved than 
those that were early adopters. Josh Gleason’s comments seemed to support this view. 
Even in CSDE’s softened rhetorical stance, the pay-for-performance aspect of 
MAST continued to be legislated by CSDE. Although the legislation did not require a 
specific dollar amount or percentage of MAST compensation tied to student performance 
beyond its requirement the 60% of the MAST compensation be tied to a combination of 
student achievement, teacher performance, and peer observation data, CSDE required 
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certain unpublished minimum percentages of the MAST compensation be tied to student 
achievement. 
The average MAST pay is $1200 per teacher, but it ranges from $600-$2,000. 
There is performance pay for meeting a school-wide student achievement goal. 
Districts can set this goal, but CSDE has to approve it. It has to be a reasonable 
goal, not just an increase of one percent. The performance pay needs to be about 
10% of the [MAST pay] MAST (J. Gleason, personal communication, January 
14, 2011). 
Each of the case districts in this study that had MAST plans had goals of increasing 
student achievement by 3.5% or less (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009; 
V. Russell, personal communication, September 30, 2009; A. Mason, personal 
communication, October 5, 2011). Josh Gleason was doubtful that a goal that small 
would be approved if a district were applying for MAST for the first time in 2011. 
However, given the research that showed that the greatest educational impact on students 
was socioeconomic status and that schools only had the ability to make small, 
incremental increases in student achievement, a goal of a 3.5% increase in student 
achievement may likely have been a very reasonable goal. 
Each of the case districts in this study that had MAST plans used MAST dollars 
to pay teachers to serve as peer coaches, participate in professional learning and serve in 
other quasi-administrative roles related to MAST. Each of these positions and the related 
compensation was allowable by law. However, in an effort to advance the Governor’s 
neoconservative agenda, CSDE tried tying this compensation to student achievement as 
well. 
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The individual performance pay is not merit pay for doing extra work like serving 
on a committee or something like that. Performance pay is for the impact an 
individual teacher makes on student growth. For example, a teacher sets a goal 
and measures student achievement on that goal. Performance goals are based on 
baseline data and student growth (J. Gleason, personal communication, January 
14, 2011). 
CSDE’s failure to realize that the “extra work” teachers were doing had a positive impact 
on their job satisfaction and provided learning opportunities for them that may have had a 
positive impact on student achievement may have impeded successful MAST 
implementation for more districts. However, it was not possible to measure the direct 
correlation between these activities and student achievement and this also could have 
been why CSDE did not approve the use of MAST dollars for committee work. 
Additionally, the professional development aspect was the aspect of MAST, in addition 
to the extra dollars, that case districts liked the best, but according to Gleason, CSDE 
seemed to be more focused on the pay-for-performance and student achievement aspects 
of MAST. 
 Had CSDE been able to view MAST from the point of view of the other as 
described by Bolman and Deal (2008), it may have been able to attract more districts to 
MAST by focusing initially on the professional development aspects of the program. 
That CSDE was out of touch with the views of the case districts was also exemplified by 
its stance on what training was needed to have someone qualified to conduct peer 
observations and coaching.  
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The third component is peer observation scores. Teachers are observed by a 
trained observer or coach. This is often the biggest hang up [to teachers agreeing 
to participate in MAST]. They say, “What does he know better than me about 
teaching? I’ve been doing this for x number of years. What does he know?” Well, 
now he’s been trained for a week in observation and coaching so, yes, he’s 
qualified to help. There’s no problem after that. Teachers get on board with it (J. 
Gleason, personal communication, January 14, 2011). 
Gleason’s dismissal of veteran teachers’ concerns about having their compensation tied 
to performance reviews conducted by someone who had a week of training was 
problematic. That this would often be the biggest barrier to teachers voting to approve 
MAST was not surprising to me, based on the manner with which Gleason dismissed the 
concern. That CSDE believed that one week of training would adequately provide a 
teacher the skills necessary to effectively observe and mentor veteran peers and that 
veteran peers would accept the feedback offered was incongruent with my experience, 
especially if the observation and feedback was tied to the observed teacher’s 
compensation. Judging by the reaction of districts across Central State in terms of lack of 
participation in MAST and CSDE’s acknowledgement that districts found this stance 
troubling led me to believe that it probably was. However, in the three case districts that 
tried MAST, all reported that the peer coaching and observation became a part of MAST 
that they really liked once they got used to it. If CSDE used rhetoric that was more in 
touch with the experiences of local school districts, this part of MAST could have been 
one of its greatest selling points rather than one of its greatest barriers. 
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Another significant barrier to district participation in MAST was the application 
paperwork and process. These remained bureaucratic. Most districts were not 
participating in MAST and had no intention of pursuing an application, unless their 
teachers’ unions pushed for it. Additionally, more schools that were participating in 
MAST dropped the program. However, CSDE still appeared to be optimistic about the 
future of MAST and blamed failures on the districts themselves without acknowledging 
any culpability on the part of CSDE. 
All districts must be implementing their plan by October 1st of each year. If 
[MAST] is not working for districts, it’s because they’re not implementing it with 
fidelity. Like with any program, in districts where they are implementing MAST 
as it should be, it is working and very successful for them (J. Gleason, personal 
communication, January 14, 2011). 
CSDE continued to believe that most, if not all, districts would eventually participate in 
MAST, and lauded MAST as a success. One might have thought that since MAST was 
promoted as being all about school improvement and increasing student achievement that 
school improvement and increased student achievement would have been the measures 
that determined the success of the program. However, CSDE gauged the success of 
MAST based on the number of school districts and students that participated in the 
program.  
 CSDE was cautiously optimistic about the longevity of MAST as well, at least in 
the near future. Despite a multi-billion dollar state deficit, Gleason believed that MAST 
would endure for a while. 
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As far as the likelihood of [MAST] funding to continue, I have no inkling as to 
where we’re going with it. It is a state law and it would have to be repealed. That 
would be a big deal. Even if the legislature wanted to repeal it, it would take at 
least two years. This was initially a Republican initiative. We now have a 
Republican majority in the House and Senate. I don’t think it’s going anywhere 
anytime soon (J. Gleason, personal communication, January 14, 2011).  
Gleason was likely correct in regard to the Republican majority and that MAST would 
likely remain in statute. However, at the time of this research district administrators were 
more aware of the costs to the district associated with MAST and were more likely to 
only consider implementing MAST if the district’s teachers wanted to participate in the 
program (S. Barnes, personal communication, October 1, 2009; L. Baker, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009). Although CSDE was beginning to realize that MAST 
was not going to progress as a voluntary pay-for performance measure, at the time of this 
research it still did not acknowledge that the discourse regarding MAST had quieted not 
because districts and teachers were suddenly more willing to participate, but that most 
districts and teachers simply were not interested. 
 
Summation of Stakeholder Interaction 
 Because of the vagueness of the language of MAST, each of the stakeholders 
involved with MAST tried to use it to forward the agenda of their respective group. The 
Governor wanted MAST to eliminate or severely weaken the power of the teachers’ 
unions in Central State by getting rid of the “guaranteed” annual salary increases awarded 
to teachers under a traditional step and lane compensation model. This would have been 
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accomplished by tying more of teachers’ compensation to performance measures that 
could not be negotiated through a collective bargaining agreement.  
By extension, CSDE wanted whatever the Governor wanted. Leaders of CSDE 
were loyal appointees and used the vagueness of the statutory language to further the 
Governor’s agenda rather than simply enforcing the legal mandates established under 
MAST. The inconsistency with which CSDE approved the MAST plans of local districts 
opened the agency to accusations made by legislators and school districts that it was only 
approving MAST plans in school district located in areas represented by Republican 
legislators. However, those claims were never proven. Additionally, the drop off between 
the hundreds of school districts that submitted letters of intent to apply for MAST and the 
handful that actually applied left CSDE pushing districts to participate in MAST 
regardless of the political party status of their local legislators. In order to attract those 
early adopters, CSDE suspended its enforcement of the Governor’s agenda and 
sometimes the actual rules of MAST. The inconsistency between what MAST plans were 
approved and what ones were rejected angered local districts. As more MAST plans were 
approved, districts used them as models for their own applications. Those that were 
rejected screamed, “Foul!” but CSDE contended that each MAST plan had to be unique 
to each district and could not be copied from another district. This led to more claims of 
pay-backs for some districts and punishments of others as well as claims of a CSDE 
secret agenda. However, as CSDE waived rules for school districts like Pine Springs that 
were exclusively represented by Democrats, the claims of favoritism faded. 
Local legislators were split on their support of MAST, but many, and especially 
Republicans, shared the Governor’s view of MAST. Legislators of both the Democratic 
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and Republican parties who wanted their party’s support in a re-election campaign 
needed to tow the party line while they were in office. At the time of this research, the 
Republican Party line in Central State seemed to include teacher accountability and 
performance-based compensation for teachers. MAST was seen as a way to bust the 
union and enforce teacher accountability. However, due to the political nature of MAST, 
when local representatives met with their constituents from local school districts, they 
often codified this message into terms of increasing student achievement and using 
MAST as a vehicle to achieve that.  
The next two chapters share a glimpse into the interaction between the 
stakeholders as MAST was considered in four Central State school districts. MAST was 
deemed to be a success in two of the districts. One tried MAST for one school year then 
the teachers voted to discontinue it. A fourth district had a CSDE- and local school board-
approved MAST plan, but the teachers did not approve it. At the time of this research, the 
fourth district had not implemented MAST. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: TWO ENDURING MAST DISTRICTS 
 Each District had a slightly different implementation structure for MAST, 
although each plan needed to have the following components in order to be approved by 
CSDE: (a) career ladder and career advancement opportunities, (b) job embedded 
professional development, (c) performance-based pay, (d) comprehensive and objective 
teacher observations, and (e) an alternative professional compensation schedule. A brief 
description of each district, its MAST program, and how it was implemented follows. 
 
Pine Springs 
District Background 
 Pine Springs was primarily a blue-collar regional center, and the local school 
district benefitted from tax revenue generated by industry. Although it was the largest 
city in the region, Pine Springs was a geographically isolated, small community with a 
school district that enrolled just under 1300 students (CSDE 2009c). The Pine Springs 
school district’s financial struggles were greater than an average school district in Central 
State, but were similar to those of other small school districts. Its unreserved general fund 
balance was declining prior to MAST implementation (CSDE, 2009d). The average 
school district property tax per home was $195 per year (CSDE, 2009d), indicating that 
Pine Springs was not a property-wealthy district. Additionally, it did not have significant 
operating or bond levies. Since participating in MAST, Pine Springs gained an additional 
$260 per student from MAST funding that had to be used for teacher compensation 
(CSDE, 2009d).  
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At the time of this research, Pine Springs’ students scored as making adequate 
yearly progress (AYP) on the NCLB goals in four of the past seven years (CSDE, 
2009d). In terms of achieving NCLB goals, Pine Springs’ students achieved at the second 
lowest rate of the four districts studied; however, it also had the lowest socioeconomic 
status of the four districts based on the percentage of its students who qualified for free or 
reduced lunch (CSDE, 2009d). 
Pine Springs adopted MAST in 2006 and was still enjoying the benefits of the 
program at the time of this research. The program gained in popularity with teachers, 
administrators, and community members and became an important part of the culture of 
the Pine Springs District. 
Like in much of rural Central State, student enrollment in the district was 
declining. Pine Springs experienced additional enrollment pressures due to competition 
from Central State's Post-secondary Education Options (PSEO) program and online 
learning options. PSEO programs allowed students to enroll in college courses while they 
were a junior or senior in high school and concurrently earn high school and college 
credit. Under this program the college received 88% of the school district’s funding for 
each course hour for every PSEO-enrolled student unless an alternative agreement was 
negotiated with the college. Pine Springs High School was located across the street from 
a local community college and many of its high school students took advantage of the 
PSEO program. Because of its relatively small size and limited budget, elective course 
offerings were somewhat limited for high school students. Many of the students who did 
not enroll in PSEO courses took courses via the Internet. The financial arrangement with 
online course providers was the same as those through the PSEO program. 
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Dr. James Frodo, Superintendent of Pine Springs, was an experienced 
superintendent who was approaching retirement. At the beginning of the study Dr. Frodo 
was employed full-time at Pine Springs. Due to budget constraints, however, Dr. Frodo 
became a part-time superintendent at Pine Springs and a part-time superintendent in Bear 
Creek, another school district approximately 120 miles southeast of Pine Springs. A 
shared or part-time superintendent position was becoming increasingly more common 
among small Central State school districts as these districts struggled to balance their 
shrinking budgets.  
Pine Springs was a proud and independent community, and, like many of the 
smaller communities in Central State, was closely knit with a skeptic’s regard for 
outsiders and the unfamiliar. Teacher and union president, Natalie Rose, summarized this 
mentality well. 
This is my 16th year of teaching. I’m not originally from Pine Springs, so I’m 
kind of an outsider from that perspective. Pine Springs strives to be an exemplary 
school district. It doesn’t accept anything less than what we can be because we are 
small or remote. We are very proud of our district whether you’re a Stallion in 
hockey or a graduate like one we had last year who was accepted to Harvard…. 
We want to be a model of what a good, small school district can be (N. Rose, 
personal communication, October 22, 2009). 
 
 Natalie’s feeling of being an outsider after being a part of the community for 16 
years was also indicative of the long memories of the community members in Pine 
Springs and other communities like it. When asked to describe the core values of the Pine 
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Springs School District, Richard Larson, Building Principal and Assistant 
Superintendent, noted how the District’s history impacted its present core values. 
We want to provide a safe environment, which is conducive to learning for all 
students. We’re looking to provide the best education we can with what we have. 
With MAST, we were looking to make improvements, and it was a way to get the 
district and union working together. We had had two strikes in approximately 15 
years with the latest being in 2001. We were not too far out from the strike in 
2001 when we started MAST. The superintendent and union president worked 
hand in hand to explore it and get it going. It was a great way to bring all of us 
together—a great step and a great opportunity (R. Larson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009). 
 
 The tendency to hold onto the past and reject new people and ideas, especially in 
smaller communities like Pine Springs, also helped to explain the lack of collegiality 
between teachers and administrators at the time of the strikes and  MAST 
implementation. “The staff and administration, although both acceptably performing their 
respective duties, were divided as a district as a result of the strikes” (R. Larson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009).  
On the surface, the culture of the Pine Springs community made it a surprising 
candidate to be an early adopter of MAST. At the time of implementation, the 
relationship between teachers and administrators was strained. Dr. Frodo was new to the 
district and the community. MAST was the brainchild of a Republican Governor from 
another part of the state, and the political make-up of Pine Springs was strongly 
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Democratic. However, the explanation was really quite logical. It was all about the 
money. 
 With K-12 education funding not keeping pace with the rising costs to educate 
students, and Pine Springs’ loss of a significant number of students to the Pine Springs 
Community College through the PSEO program and online instruction, Pine Springs was 
struggling financially. Its fund balance was in decline, making it difficult to grow or even 
maintain the type of educational programming necessary to meet the criteria of the 
district’s core values. When asked about the primary reasons for pursuing MAST, Dr. 
Frodo (personal communication, January 5, 2009) replied, “$426,000” [the amount of 
MAST revenue the district he projected the district would receive]. 
 
The MAST Plan 
 Dr. Frodo and the union president had some serious conversations about the 
district and its future. They really thought that the money available through MAST would 
help move the district in the direction they thought it should go (R. Larson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009) and Pine Springs was willing to do what they had to 
in order to secure those dollars. “The truly substantive and immediate required 
components of the MAST plan— specifically evaluation, professional growth plans, and 
leadership/coaching positions within the faculty (i.e. career ladders) all were viewed 
initially as ‘we have to do it to get the money’” (J. Frodo, personal communication, 
March 22, 2007).  
 In an effort to secure nearly a half million dollars for the district, Pine Springs 
developed an implementation plan for MAST with the following components: career 
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ladders or career advancement opportunities for teachers; integrated, job-embedded, on-
going, site-based, and teacher-led professional development; a minimum of 60% of 
teacher compensation increases within a performance pay system that aligned teacher 
performance measures with student academic achievement and progress; an objective and 
comprehensive teacher evaluation system based on the educational improvement plan, 
the staff development plan, and multiple evaluations of a teacher’s performance 
conducted by a locally selected and trained evaluation team that included classroom 
observations; and an alternative professional pay schedule (J. Frodo, personal 
communication, January 5, 2009).  
 Pine Springs’ career ladder included five positions—mentors, a learning team 
leader, a learning content leader, a professional development team member, and a quality 
oversight team member. In the Pine Springs plan, any teacher who received mentor 
training received an additional $200 in compensation (J. Frodo, personal communication, 
January 5, 2009). In exchange for this compensation, mentors needed to make weekly 
contact with an assigned teacher and document that contact (N. Rose, personal 
communication, October 22, 2009). All other career ladder positions received an 
additional $1500 in compensation (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009). 
The learning team leader had duties including moderating learning team meetings and 
evaluating progress being made by staff members on their professional growth plans (N. 
Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009). The learning content leader was 
responsible for acquiring materials and best-practice information to be used by teachers 
as they worked toward achieving site goals designed to improve student achievement. 
The professional development team member was responsible for developing professional 
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development forms and procedures and verifying that participants met their professional 
growth plans and site goals (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009). The 
quality oversight team member worked within the context of a team to attempt to resolve 
MAST program issues, determine site goal achievement, coordinate professional 
development, oversee MAST expenditures, and aid in establishing future site goals (N. 
Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009). 
 Teacher training and development and achieving specific goals were also essential 
components of Pine Springs’ MAST plan. 
We started a mentor program and developed focused goals that were really 
specific. We looked at one specific piece of math for our goal. We never focused 
on specific goals before. We had general ones. It [MAST] was a way to 
compensate people involved with that (R. Larson, personal communication, 
October 16, 2009). 
 
In Pine Springs professional development teams met. They used a variety of best 
practice methodologies to strengthen teachers’ pedagogical skill including modeling 
instructional strategies, demonstration teaching, team teaching, mentoring, content and 
cognitive coaching, lesson study, and analysis of student work (R. Larson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009). 
The teacher evaluation system included three formal evaluations each year. Peers 
completed two of these evaluations and a building administrator completed one. Teachers 
also conducted four self-evaluations. In addition, probationary staff received three formal 
observations by a building administrator annually (R. Larson, personal communication, 
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October 16, 2009). The district used a method of inter-rater reliability to prevent score 
inflation by having all teachers and administrators trained on the Charlotte Danielson 
evaluation model. The Charlotte Danielson model of teacher evaluation focused on four 
domains of teaching. They were planning and preparation, classroom instruction, 
classroom management, and professional responsibilities. The inter-rater reliability scores 
were achieved through the process of having teachers score their own evaluation, 
comparing their score with that of the formal evaluator, and having all scores available to 
other team members to prevent score inflation (N. Rose, personal communication, 
October 22, 2009).  
The Pine Springs MAST plan had many components that required more of 
teachers in terms of skill and time. This was evident based on Pine Springs’ commitment 
to professional development and the increased hours teachers worked since MAST 
implementation. A common concern amongst teachers in districts that considered MAST 
was whether or not the additional compensation was worth the additional time teachers 
would need to invest to make the MAST program effective in their districts. 
We had things we wanted to do, but it was hard to get them done during the 
school day. I think MAST is supposed to happen during the school day, but let’s 
face it. There are things that have to happen outside of the school day. Whether 
it’s enough compensation or not for that, some people would debate (R. Larson, 
personal communication, October 16, 2009). 
This questioning of whether the adequacy of the additional compensation in a district 
where MAST was successful, was aligned with Honawar’s (2007) research that suggested 
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that the relatively small amount of pay-for-performance compensation did not adequately 
motivate teachers to significantly change their behaviors.  
 
MAST Implementation 
The Crucial Importance of Local Leadership 
 The leadership of the teachers’ union, school board, and the district administration 
and the collaboration between these stakeholders was critical to the successful 
implementation of MAST in Pine Springs. 
After working with him [Dr. Frodo] for a few years, he wanted us to have 
everything we deserved to have. He felt that we were an exemplary faculty and 
should be getting in on MAST. We should be getting the accolades and money to 
go with that. We had a supportive school board, union, and administration. You 
know, we had been on strike a few years earlier. When we started MAST, we 
settled [the teachers’ contract] before school started. We used to usually go past 
the January 15th deadline. We’d seen things beyond settling our contract with 
MAST. We were looking at school improvement. Dr. Frodo said we can do this, 
and he put it to the union leadership. We thought that we should get people 
together on this…Membership trusts the union officers very much. They’re 
respected and trusted. We knew our leadership would never agree to anything that 
would be bad for teachers (N. Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009). 
 
Richard Larson echoed the sentiment that teamwork between the teachers’ union 
and an effective leader were critical to the district’s successful implementation of MAST. 
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Definitely the team approach [was important to our success]. The willingness of 
the superintendent at the time, the board, and union president to work together. If 
this would have come along a few years earlier, our superintendent at that time 
wouldn’t have had the vision. The union wouldn’t have picked up the ball. There 
wasn’t a working together relationship at that time. It was adversarial. Each party 
did their own job; they just didn’t work together (R. Larson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009). 
 
 The trust that Dr. Frodo was able to establish between the school board, the 
teachers, and himself in such a short period of time as an outsider to Pine Springs 
demonstrated that he excelled in the human resource and symbolic aspects of leadership 
as described by Bolman & Deal (2008) and the relationship and interpersonal and 
relational aspects of leadership as presented by Northouse (2009). Additionally, his 
personal involvement in creating and negotiating the district’s MAST plan with internal 
and external stakeholders showed his skill in the political arena as defined by Edelman 
(1988) as well. Dr. Frodo was able to successfully translate “pay-for-performance” to 
“reward teachers” in Pine Springs. His ability to codify the rhetoric of the Governor, 
Legislature, and CSDE into language that was accepted by local stakeholders helped to 
grow the trust Dr. Frodo was building in Pine Springs and aided MAST implantation 
locally. 
Despite the trust and teamwork between the current superintendent and teachers’ 
union, there were still concerns. Laurie Baker (the district’s Business Manager) and 
Richard Larson shared some of the major obstacles from within the district. 
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From the union side, there were ones who were hesitant and those who jumped in 
right away. There have been many programs that have come and gone. There 
were concerns about getting approved and if the program would be approved for 
our district. We were concerned that it would be a lot of work to get the 
application done and approved, and there was no guarantee that after we did all of 
this work it would even be approved. But once we had the idea, we thought, let’s 
see if it is a one- or two-year program. Let’s try it out. We can get out of it if we 
want to, because it takes board and union approval each year. We do a MOU 
[Memorandum of Understanding] format, and we vote on that each year. If either 
side said, for whatever reason, we want to discontinue, we can. It’s not like it’s 
part of the regular contract and that once it’s there, it’s there (R. Larson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009). 
The oppressive application process was certainly a concern for Pine Springs when 
considering applying for MAST. Because Pine Springs was a small district, the hundreds 
of man hours needed to create and submit an application to CSDE was divided over 
fewer people than would be the case in a larger district and therefore was a consideration 
along with the $426,000. 
 Natalie Rose (personal communication, October 22, 2009) noted that there were 
also obstacles to implementation within the district that needed to be overcome. “Number 
one was fear of the salary schedule in the writing of the plan and getting it through. That 
was a barrier as far as getting it approved.”  
From a teacher’s standpoint there was a concern about the salary schedule. 
[Before MAST] teachers were guaranteed the step each year. There was a concern 
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if some would be favored and some would not and how this would affect who 
would get paid (Laurie Baker, personal communication, October 16, 2009). 
 
I remember that it was looked at like it’s the new buzzword. We’ve been down 
that route before. There was a lot of skepticism. Will it work? Will we really get 
the money? Will the board look at MAST in lieu of a salary increase? (L. Baker, 
personal communication, October 16, 2009). 
 
That’s true. There was skepticism, but there have been raises every year since. 
People may wonder if instead of a 1 % raise, would we have gotten 2% if we 
weren’t on MAST (R. Larson, personal communication, October 16, 2009). 
 
 The sentiments shared by Pine Springs participants regarding the salary schedule, 
mirror the concerns shared by participants in other pay-for-performance models that were 
studied by Honawar (2007). Pine Springs’ concerns about not getting the money once 
they had done the work, reflected the experience of teachers studied by Cameron (2005) 
and Harris (2007) who had done the work to earn pay-for-performance compensation, but 
the districts either could not or would not pay the teachers as promised. 
 The teachers’ union, school board, and administration ultimately took the leap of 
faith and worked to implement MAST under the direction of the superintendent. All 
participants at Pine Springs attributed the success of implementation of MAST, at least in 
part, to Dr. Frodo’s leadership. This success points to the importance of being able to lead 
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from all four leadership frameworks and being able to integrate all of the aspects of 
leadership described by Northouse (2009) as well.  
In addition to the normal district responsibilities that Dr. Frodo needed to attend 
to in order to keep the district functioning in the administrative aspect and structural 
framework, he was also able to attend to the human resource, political, and symbolic 
frameworks and attend to the tasks and relationships while promoting a vision that 
teachers were already professional and that MAST was a financial accolade that they 
deserved as well in order for MAST to be implemented in Pine Springs. Dr. Frodo’s 
attention to the human resource frame and relationships helped mend the rift between the 
district’s teachers, administrators, and school board. His praise and reassurance that Pine 
Springs had an “exemplary staff,” for example, helped to ease tensions, build trust, and 
paved the route to be able to work collaboratively.  
The political framework, both as discussed by Bolman & Deal (2008) and 
Edelman (1988), was no less important in this case. Dr. Frodo was not only able to put 
the right stakeholders together and negotiate a successful plan within the district, he was 
also able to negotiate successfully with CSDE. His unwavering view that Pine Springs’ 
MAST compensation plan fit the requirements of the legislation and his refusal to give 
into CSDE’s or Governor’s interpretation of reform was critical to the success of MAST 
on two fronts. One, it reinforced the human resource frame and relationships as 
participants from Pine Springs witnessed their superintendent “taking on” CSDE and the 
Governor on their behalf. Two, it allowed Pine Springs to use a compensation plan they 
felt would work for them. Although there was an emerging culture of trust, it was not a 
culture of blind faith, and the Pine Springs’ teachers were not likely to approve a MAST 
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plan that eliminated the traditional steps and lanes. In addition, it was important that Dr. 
Frodo had considerable experience dealing with CSDE in Central State. He understood 
the need to be aggressive yet reasonable in his attempt to get CSDE to adhere to the 
legislation as passed rather than how it was envisioned by the Governor. 
 Evidence of Dr. Frodo’s work in a visionary manner and in the symbolic frame 
was demonstrated by his ability to lead the cultural change from a district where teachers 
did not work outside of their duty day to one that put students first with teachers working 
extra to ensure that they were performing at their best. He accomplished this through 
vision, inspiration, motivation, and keeping people focused on the district mission and 
purpose and the steps necessary to fulfill them. These were all essential aspects of 
leadership as related by Northouse (2009). 
 
District Costs Associated with MAST Implementation 
Although MAST was seen as a way to get dollars into a district, and it was, the 
money went exclusively to teachers and none of it could be used to cover the 
administrative costs associated with administering the program. As a result, teachers in 
Pine Springs received more money, but the district had to budget money from its general 
fund, the fund that is most stretched in school districts across Central State,  to cover 
administrative costs. 
Really the district doesn’t benefit from [MAST]. It goes right to teachers. It’s not 
treated as a reserved account. It’s undesignated, but we do track it. We do keep 
the money separate. There have been overages in the fund, but we keep that for 
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the teachers and they can use it in a later year (L. Baker, personal communication, 
October 16, 2009). 
 
If anything, it has cost the district money. Administrators are sitting on numerous 
committees, planning in-services. There’s extra work there. Administrators have 
followed the plan too and have gotten an extra stipend for doing those things. It 
can’t come out of MAST so it comes out of the general fund (R. Larson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009).  
 
With the staff development money we had set aside, there was some money for 
developing the plan. There was time spent out of school. There were about a 
dozen people involved—that’s just a rough number. There were people who were 
allowed days or partial days to work on it. On an in-service day we don’t charge 
all of our teachers’ salaries out to staff development, so that has helped the district 
save some money over the years in that fund. If we didn’t have those funds 
available, it would have been a roadblock. If it had been all on your own outside, 
it wouldn’t have happened or at least not be as good as it is (R. Larson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009). 
 
As a result of MAST implementation, Pine Springs also saw a need for more 
professional development time. However, the perceived cost associated with having more 
days where teachers were paid, but students were not in school, was also a concern.  
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Now we saw a need for extra days for professional training, not knowing if the 
board and community would accept more time for teachers not teaching. We were 
concerned about how the public would view this because there is a levy portion 
[of MAST] that the taxpayers pay (R. Larson, personal communication, October 
16, 2009). 
 
 During the initial phase of MAST, districts may not have realized there would be 
an extra cost to the district in terms of MAST plan development and administration. 
According to Pine Springs participants, it was a negative consideration in the decision to 
implement MAST. As the general funds of districts across Central State dwindled, it was 
not surprising that many districts would only consider implementing MAST if the 
teachers approached the district for its support as they learned of the unfunded costs 
associated with MAST. Districts that looked to MAST to help balance their budget could 
have been disappointed in the result. MAST dollars would have been helpful to districts 
that had no money for teacher salary increases and wanted money for that purpose, 
provided the district understood and budgeted for the unfunded administrative costs 
associated with MAST. Although MAST most definitely did not meet the criteria of an 
unfunded mandate at the time of this research, the local administrative costs were 
unfunded. Sometimes when districts applied for grants, a portion of the grant money was 
able to be allocated toward administrative costs, sometimes, as was the case with MAST, 
there was no such provision. Districts pursuing any grant needed to be aware of and 
account for administrative costs for implementation. Additionally, as more of the MAST 
funding was supplied at the local level, districts needed to be aware of the impact on their 
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local taxpayers and the impact that a local MAST levy would have on their ability to pass 
a general operating or bond levy. 
 
Communication between CSDE and Pine Springs 
The trust between local stakeholders was important in getting MAST off the 
ground in Pine Springs, but that same type of trusting relationship based on strong 
communication and understanding was lacking between the district and CSDE. This was 
evident in the approval of Pine Springs’ MAST plan and the bureaucracy related to its 
implementation. 
 
Salary schedule: Augment versus eliminate. 
The debate between Pine Springs and CSDE regarding what “alternative, 
reformed salary schedule” meant provided an excellent example of Edelman’s (1988) 
work regarding how groups with competing interests interact politically. In the Pine 
Springs model, 80% of MAST dollars were awarded for using research-based 
professional standards and completing classroom observations and the professional 
growth plan. The additional 20% was awarded for teacher evaluations relevant to student 
achievement and school-wide student gains (R. Larson, personal communication, October 
16, 2009). The alternative salary schedule used in Pine Springs focused on using MAST 
dollars to augment their existing salary schedule (J. Frodo, personal communication, 
January 5, 2009). However, the definition of an “alternative, reformed salary schedule” in 
terms of MAST legislation was an area of contention between CSDE and local school 
districts throughout Central State.  
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 The focus of this debate was what had to be done with the traditional steps and 
lanes when a district implemented MAST, and Pine Springs was no different. As with all 
of the districts in this study that implemented MAST, along with all others I have 
encountered in my professional career as an educator, all but one expressed a concern 
about abolishing the traditional salary schedule. This concern led Pine Springs to look 
beyond the rhetoric and focus directly on the legislative language. 
The Legislature said that the salary schedule had to be “changed or augmented.” 
CSDE came to lobby to us, and said that we had to get rid of the schedule. [But] 
that’s not what we have (L. Baker, personal communication, October 16, 1009).  
 
At the time of this research, Pine Springs still had the traditional step and lane 
salary schedule and used MAST dollars to compensate teachers for work they did over 
and above what was traditionally compensated. The Governor also wanted Pine Springs 
to eliminate its salary schedule; however, the legislative language was vague enough to 
allow Pine Springs to augment its traditional salary schedule with career ladder and goal-
based compensation rather than replace the steps and lanes (R. Larson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009). 
The Governor wanted us very much to change our salary schedule. [But,] the 
Governor wanted to have his fishing opener in Pine Springs and wanted the photo 
op with Pine Springs and the big check. There may have been some pretty 
significant political pressure to get this done and allow our plan to go through. 
Other plans like ours haven’t been approved since (N. Rose, personal 
communication, October 22, 2009).  
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We’ve been pointed out several times—I think even in legal cases—about how 
we’ve augmented teacher salaries above and beyond steps and lanes [without 
getting rid of them]. We didn’t replace our salary schedule. In our plan, if you 
accomplish your goals, you receive [MAST compensation] (R. Larson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009).  
 
One of the factors we joke about is that MAST is very political and very 
politicized. One of the problems we had was the salary schedule. There was 
debate about whether it had to be changed versus gone. The Legislature said 
“changed or augmented.” CSDE came to lobby to us, and said that we had to get 
rid of the schedule. That’s not what we have [because the legislative language was 
not written that way] (N. Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009). 
 
The salary piece was a big problem. Several people [from CSDE] came up and 
worked with us on the whole plan. If we had to cut the steps and lanes, the union 
would have walked away, and the district would have walked away (R. Larson, 
personal communication, October 16, 2009). 
 
The vagueness of the legislative language on this issue fueled the debate. The 
legislation did not use the terms “eliminate” or “augment;” however, it did not adequately 
define “reform.” The legislation also did not define to what extent the traditional steps 
and lanes had to be reformed. To CSDE and the Governor, reform meant eliminate. To 
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Pine Springs, reform meant augment. Each of these stakeholders had a valid position 
based on their own interpretation of what reform meant. 
Using analysis of how political discourse shaped leaders and policy, I was able to 
analyze how Pine Springs could have such different definitions of “alternative” and 
“reform” than the Governor and CSDE. Because people and groups tended to view things 
based on their experience, their interpretations focused more on what they wanted to see 
in the legislation. The vagueness of the legislation presented itself to these stakeholders 
similarly to a picture on an ink-blot test. The Governor and CSDE wanted to eliminate 
steps and lanes from teacher compensation so that is how they established their 
definition. Pine Springs wanted to retain steps and lanes, but also obtain the MAST 
money for their teachers, so augmenting the salary schedule was how it defined the 
legislative language. Because the relationship between local districts and CSDE was 
more adversarial than cooperative at the time, each of the stakeholder groups was 
determined to hold on to its respective definitions of “alternative” and “reform” rather 
than work together to find common meaning. The collaborative environment that was 
created in Pine Springs could not be replicated among these three stakeholders, so they 
performed the same political dance as they had done for years—local school district 
versus state control. In this particular battle of David versus Goliath, David won, but the 
district had many headaches yet to come as a result of the victory. 
 
Murphy’s Law of implementation. 
 Pine Springs ultimately prevailed on the “augment versus eliminate” 
interpretation debate, but that was not the end of the obstacles Pine Springs faced in 
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implementing its MAST plan. In the words of Dr. Frodo (personal communication, 
January 5, 2009), “Every problem we envisioned was encountered.” The majority of 
obstacles encountered were the result of a lack of experience with MAST implementation 
on both the part of the district and CSDE and a lack of working models from which the 
district could learn. 
There was a presumption that the “MAST model” was a model. In fact the 
“MAST model” was nothing more or less than a description of components and 
was incomplete with the interaction of components completely ignored by the 
“MAST model” (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009). 
 
It [MAST] was a big unknown. There was the plan the state had and forms to fill 
out—the required pieces. There were districts in the process that had things 
accepted. There were districts, and this was just rumor, we didn’t talk directly 
with them, that we heard about who were rejected (R. Larson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009).  
 
With the rush to get MAST implemented quickly, neither CSDE nor Pine Springs 
had much time to research and learn how the list of requirements presented in the MAST 
legislation would work together cohesively to promote student learning and a positive 
district culture. The lack of consistent communication from CSDE to Pine Springs led to 
frustration due to several instances of a “trial and error” implementation model. Pine 
Springs had to make a significant number of changes to its district structure in just over 
four months to meet the October 1 full-implementation deadline, so there was little to no 
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time for reflection during this period. Initial implementation was a daunting task that Pine 
Springs had to accomplish largely on its own. 
If we turn to year one and implementing, we took on a lot. We never had a 
mentorship plan, teams, or PGPs [professional growth plans], or observed each 
other, and we were starting to do that….A lot of other districts going into MAST 
had these components already in place. Pine Springs had none of that, but we 
were confident that we could do it all. The first year I was on the Oversight 
Committee. The Oversight Committee has three teachers and three administrators. 
We had to figure out how do we develop teams, and so forth. The ideas were in 
the written plan, but the nuts and bolts were all in the first year. The Oversight 
Committee was given the authority to implement the plan. We made it work. It 
was important to have the Oversight Committee and know where to go with 
questions. It was also important that it [the Oversight Committee] was balanced 
between teachers and administration. All of the key players were together. 
Without a united faculty and leadership it could fracture (N. Rose, personal 
communication, October 22, 2009). 
Given the natural obstacles of being an early adopter combined with the roadblocks 
established by CSDE and the number of sub-programs embedded within Pine Springs’ 
MAST plan that had to be put in place, it was amazing that a small district like Pine 
Springs was able to accomplish such a large task in a relatively short period of time. 
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Benefit of Hindsight in Plan Improvement 
Although the Oversight Committee was important to the success of the plan, its 
members were not properly trained or prepared for the job they had to do. If Pine Springs 
had to implement its plan again, there were some things it would have done differently 
based on its experience. These included altering the Quality Oversight Committee, being 
more knowledgeable about MAST before writing an implementation plan, and making 
the plan more equitable amongst staff members who qualified for the additional 
compensation. 
We would redefine the role of the Quality Oversight Committee. The Quality 
Oversight Committee is three teachers and three administrators. They are the 
appellate body. We were not adequately trained and the authority was not 
adequately defined. We corrected that for 2008-2009. With the Quality Oversight 
Committee we start treading a fine line with decisions affecting employment and 
compensation and those only affecting classroom and performance. It's a tough 
line to define (J. Frodo, personal communication, January 5, 2009). 
Although, for the most part, Pine Springs had been able to successfully negotiate that 
balance, having teachers’ compensation based in part on observations conducted by 
minimally trained teachers was unsettling at first for the teachers who were observed as 
well as for the ones who were observing.  
 Another thing the district would have changed about MAST was the initial 
decision that non-tenured and part-time teachers would not be eligible to receive the full 
amount of MAST compensation. 
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The only change we made from the plan to the implementation was that new 
teachers wouldn’t have the opportunity to earn the same as a tenured teacher. 
When we got to the end of the year, they were like, “What? We did the same 
amount of work and we get paid less?” We looked at it and said, “Yeah, you’re 
right. If you’re doing the work and going the extra mile, you deserve the same 
compensation.” We immediately changed it that spring so those teachers got the 
same compensation. We also had the same issue with part-time teachers. We had 
it where part time teachers only got part of the money, so if they were working 
half time, they got half the money. But they did the same work and went to the 
same meetings, so we changed it. There are always struggles with personalities 
and issues, but we had a lot of things thought out and in place to deal with it (N. 
Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009). 
Had there been more time to develop the MAST plan, some of these issues could have 
been avoided. 
 
Education Reform Hash 
As with most initiatives in public education, MAST was not the only initiative 
that districts were encouraged to adopt. At the time of MAST implementation in Pine 
Springs and in the years following while they were trying to perfect their MAST plan, the 
district was also charged with implementing other initiatives. 
We get one thing started and then there’s another and another thing. We just got 
MAST going and then we started “Charlotte Danielson,” [a comprehensive 
teacher observation model]. In year two, because of the testing piece, we added 
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NWEA [Northwest Evaluation Association] testing and had to learn about testing 
and data. Now it’s RtI [Response to Intervention] and we have to learn about that. 
There have been so many things that have been thrown at us in the last four years. 
How to do peer observations, mentor a new teacher, form a PLC [professional 
learning community], and now there are other things [we are expected to 
implement]. They’re happening, but not at the level they could be because of how 
much has come at us. We could learn more about PLCs but we’ve got too many 
other things going on (N. Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009). 
 
 As the Charlotte Danielson model was the currently accepted “gold standard” of 
teacher evaluation, the Rick DuFour model of PLCs was the equivalent in the realm of 
professional development. PLCs essentially were groups of staff members coming 
together to solve a professional dilemma, for example increasing student achievement in 
reading. They researched professional literature to learn more about an issue and 
collaborated on ways to solve it. PLCs were the core element of the DuFour version of 
teachers’ professional development. 
We also saw a need for increased in-service days. Before MAST, we typically had 
a few days at the beginning of the year to get ready for the school year, a day at 
semester break to work on grades and do some actual staff development for part 
of it, a day at the end of the year, and a few others scattered through the year. (R. 
Larson, personal communication, October 16, 2009). 
This sentiment made sense: teachers could handle the simultaneous implementation of 
multiple initiatives, but could not achieve a level of mastery as quickly as they would 
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have been able if the district had been able to limit the number of initiatives being 
concurrently implemented. However, implementing the components of MAST often 
required the implementation of other embedded initiatives as well if the district was not 
already implementing those MAST requirements. The need to implement multiple 
initiatives concurrently to satisfy the rules of MAST was experienced by all case districts 
that had adopted MAST plans. 
When districts, including Pine Springs, implemented many reform initiatives at 
once or over a short period of time, staff did not have the time to become fully skilled in 
implementing the new initiative. As more new initiatives were implemented, it was more 
likely that staff would implement them with less fidelity. Ultimately these initiatives 
faced a strong likelihood of failure due to the district’s lack of ability to implement any of 
them well. However, at the time of this research, Pine Springs was committed to 
continuing with implementation of all of these initiatives. 
 
Positive Cultural Impacts of MAST 
Participants from Pine Springs reported that MAST had a positive impact on the 
district culture that would not have happened without MAST. Benefits included the 
enhancement of the emerging collaboration between teachers and administrators and 
promotion of professional growth. 
Having had it [MAST] be part of the contract and settled, having a positive 
relationship with the board, administration, and union working together [was 
important]. The majority of people working on the plan were teachers and were 
from different grade levels and disciplines. We’re a small school with only two 
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buildings, but we had people in all levels who were knowledgeable about what 
went into the plan. That the plan was teacher-driven was important…People get 
money as part of being on the Oversight Committee and coaching. There are no 
teachers pulled out of the classroom [for MAST-related assignments]. No one has 
release time. One thing that was helpful in implementing the plan was that we 
didn’t take our best teachers out of the classroom and make them middle 
managers. Our plan is egalitarian. All had an opportunity to run for positions; they 
are elected. Teachers can take the training and become a mentor teacher. 
Everyone had the opportunity to step up and do the work and get some extra 
compensation (N. Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009). 
 
 Although money was the primary reason Pine Springs pursued MAST, over a 
relatively short period of time the district culture changed so that the money became less 
important than the opportunities for collaboration and professional growth.  
Our school day by contract is an 8:10 a.m.-3:50 p.m. contract day. Before we 
started this effort (and the effort was a District-wide shot), I could drive in the 
parking lot at 7:45 a.m. and shoot a cannon in any direction without fear of 
vehicular damage. Now there are any number of faculty here conducting team 
meetings, working on professional growth projects, and all the etceteras. Same 
way with the 3:50 p.m. experience. The difference this has made in community 
perception of us as a faculty and the District has been huge…At this point there 
has been such a shift from paranoia to a feeling of pride and ‘we needed to do 
this,’ that even if the funding dried up in this session, we would be compelled to 
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find some way to fund the majority of the professional activities we implemented 
this year (J. Frodo, personal communication, March 22, 2007). 
 
 The public in Pine Springs also appreciated the change in culture within the 
district. Laurie Baker, the District’s Business Manager, was working in the private sector 
at the time MAST was implemented in the District and offered perspectives from a 
community member as well as that of a district employee. Baker easily appreciated a pay-
for-performance model.  
From a financial standpoint, I think it’s trying to compensate employees for going 
above and beyond. In the business workplace, people get paid based on 
performance, but teachers automatically move to the next level every year. It’s a 
way for people to get paid for going above and beyond, like for being mentor 
teachers (L. Baker, personal communication, October 16, 2009). 
Although this was how Pine Springs viewed MAST compensation, the Governor, 
Legislature, and CSDE thought that performance-based pay was about student 
performance as measured by standardized test scores. However, this did not seem to 
bother participants in Pine Springs as they had a MAST plan that was working well for 
them. 
 
 Natalie Rose, Teacher and Union President, agreed that the public seemed to 
approve the culture change, but she also acknowledged that the teachers changed too. 
For the first time ever teachers work together on a weekly basis. We never looked 
at test data or curriculum teaching strategies, and we never took the time to meet 
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like we do now. Whether it’s learning from them [other teachers], or ‘they’re in 
the same boat I am’ has really brought us together. Team meetings and 
observations have brought us together as a whole. There’s also collegiality. 
Usually we only have one or two new teachers each year. We’re an isolating 
place. If you’re not from here, it’s hard to be accepted. Mentoring new teachers 
helps them get through with more success. The mentorship program has helped 
them be successful. I think the public has been impressed with the interaction of 
teachers. The public likes to think we’re working hard. They see the cars in the 
parking lot. They see that we have time to do collaboratively what’s best for kids. 
I think the public did. I know the board did. We have a new board now and I think 
they still do (N. Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009).  
 
 The sense of pride and collegiality at Pine Springs was tested during the second 
year of implementation when not every teacher received the additional compensation. 
Pine Springs had some serious conversations about whether MAST was actually a 
divisive program. Ultimately, the teaching staff took responsibility for meeting the 
criteria and holding peers accountable for meeting the established criteria. As a result, a 
higher level of professionalism became more ingrained in the Pine Springs culture. 
“Teachers know that now when we say we’re going to do something, we do it. One of the 
things that is totally unacceptable is lack of professional effort” (J. Frodo, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009).  
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 Significantly, Dr. Frodo went out of his way to point out that the real change in 
Pine Springs was a result of collaboration and staff development—not simply a change in 
the compensation structure. 
 Our goal is to improve schools for kids. MAST is viewed in Pine Springs as 
having a solid chance of doing just that. If “quality compensation" is to mean 
[improving teacher quality], and all we do is change the formula for compensation 
and then assume that [teacher] "quality" will necessarily follow is an argument we 
can't make in Pine Springs (J. Frodo, personal communication, March 22, 2007). 
Based on the lack of data tying compensation to student achievement in general, Dr. 
Frodo’s statement was likely accurate that any correlation between MAST and student 
achievement was probably driven by the professional development and cultural change 
rather than the change in compensation structure. Given the successful implementation of 
MAST in Pine Springs and the positive changes in school culture and perhaps student 
achievement, one would think that CSDE would lessen the amount of reform necessary to 
the salary schedule and embrace the potential of MAST for these positive cultural 
changes and professional development model if it were not concerned with promoting the 
Governor’s agenda. 
 
MAST’s Long-Term Prospects in Pine Springs 
 Despite the positive accolades from all of the Pine Springs study participants and 
Pine Springs’s approval from CSDE to implement the compensation plan as it desired, 
due to pending personnel changes there was some doubt as to whether the program would 
continue in the district. Dr. Frodo retired from Pine Springs in June 2010. He believed 
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that the union president and assistant superintendent would leave the district then also. 
There were many new members on the Pine Springs School Board who did not 
understand and value MAST at the level of those who initially implemented the program. 
I’m not sure how the three bodies [teachers, administration, and school board] are 
going to adhere to the MAST plan we espoused in 2006. The real key whether 
you’re talking MAST or whatever is, “Does it have the potency to survive into the 
next generation?” The next generation of MAST in Pine Springs is going to 
happen in 2011-2012. If Richard [Assistant Superintendent], me, and Natalie, and 
the Board had stayed, it would have kept going—no questions. Although the 
$347,000 is good, it has brought a lot of pride that people hadn’t anticipated (J. 
Frodo, personal communication, October 16, 2009). 
 
 Natalie Rose also shared this concern from a teacher’s perspective. 
We’re going to have 12 teachers retire at the end of this year. The new teachers 
coming in won’t have the background in MAST and what we’ve been through. 
We are going to need some refocusing on what it means to be part of a PLC and 
what a PGP means (N. Rose, personal communication, October 22, 2009). 
 
 Despite his reservations about the longevity of MAST at Pine Springs, Dr. Frodo 
continued to be a champion of the MAST program and was actively pursuing MAST in 
Bear Creek, the district where he also worked part-time for the 2009-2011 school years. 
However, he had concerns about Bear Creek’s plan being accepted due to the debate 
between unions and CSDE about the salary schedule. 
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I don’t know how rigorous the Department [of Education] is going to be on the 
lane/step issue. Bear Creek sent in its letter of intent [to participate in MAST]. My 
hope was that we could just take the Pine Springs’s project and take it to its 
current status, put Bear Creek’s name on it, and get it approved. I was told that 
wouldn’t have a chance. I was told that what we did with our language in Pine 
Springs wouldn’t get approved. For example, our view of the salary schedule is 
[that the levels of union-negotiated compensation is] a minimum, not a maximum. 
Our view of MAST is that it is something above and beyond to augment the 
salary schedule is acceptable. I’ve been told that it’s not acceptable anymore. 
There will be no steps and lanes. If that is going to be the Department’s view for 
new applications or renewing projects, younger projects will dissolve and new 
projects will not come forward. Unless districts are in such dire straits that they 
need the $260 [per student] and that is the only way they can get the money to 
survive—even though it will bastardize the district—they will do it. It was never 
the goal of MAST [as passed by the Legislature] to do that, but that is what is 
happening with the Department of Education. 
 
Now the new ones coming in, they were thinking about this when they were 
broke, now that they are broker, they are thinking about it more. That’s not what 
MAST is about. It’s not my philosophy of it. It’s basically a program to reward 
good teachers for going above and beyond, but they didn’t ask my opinion of it (J. 
Frodo, personal communication, October 16, 2009). 
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 Dr. Frodo seemed to have an accurate position on the likelihood of districts to 
implement MAST going forward; however, he did not seem to be aware that eliminating 
the steps and lanes was the intent of the legislation as initially written. He was correct 
though in that the requirement to eliminate the steps and lanes was not in the legislation 
as passed despite CSDE’s attempts to arbitrarily reinsert it through the application 
approval process. Additionally, despite concerns on the part of the Pine Springs 
participants about MAST continuing in Pine Springs beyond the 2010-2011 school year, 
at the completion of this research (spring 2012) MAST is still in place in Pine Springs. 
 
Winter Valley 
 
District Background 
The Winter Valley School District was located in a suburban area of a large, 
Midwestern city and enrolled just over 8000 students (CSDE, 2009e). Winter Valley was 
primarily a bedroom community with a high residential property value throughout most 
of the district, but with little industry. It was represented by Republicans in both 
legislative bodies at the state level. Winter Valley’s financial struggles were less serious 
than the average school district in Central State, and its unreserved general fund balance 
was increasing prior to MAST implementation (CSDE, 2009f). Winter Valley’s average 
school district property tax per home was $1891, significantly more than Pine Springs, 
and the district gained an additional $260 per student in MAST revenue (CSDE, 2009f). 
Winter Valley was only one of four school districts in Central State and one of 50 in the 
U.S. that had a Moody’s AA1 bond rating (Winter Valley Public Schools, 2008). 
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Its high school was on Newsweek's list of top 500 high schools in the U.S. in 2007. The 
district also received a “Gold” rating from Expansion Magazine and the “What Parents 
Want Award” from SchoolMatch, a corporate relocation service, every year since the 
inception of the award (Winter Valley Public Schools, 2008). Neighboring districts 
generally viewed Winter Valley as the district of excellence that employed great teachers 
and used innovative and effective programming for its students. 
When measuring proficiency using NCLB goals, Winter Valley students 
performed the best out of the four districts studied, making adequate yearly progress on 
the NCLB goals in six of the past seven years (CSDE, 2009f). Its socioeconomic status 
was also the highest among the four districts studied based on the percentage of students 
eligible to receive free or reduced lunch (CSDE, 2009f). Winter Valley adopted MAST in 
2006. The program gained in popularity since it was first implemented and it remained a 
vital part of the district culture at the time of this research. 
Winter Valley’s superintendent since 2001, Dr. Alan Johnson, was a frequent 
author and speaker on innovative educational ideas. Innovative ideas that he championed 
while leading the Winter Valley School District included the International Baccalaureate, 
elementary language immersion schools, and advanced placement programs. The district 
was also honored on a national level for its use of technology in classrooms while under 
Dr. Johnson’s watch. Also, he was once named the Central State Superintendent of the 
Year. 
In Winter Valley, everything the District did related directly to its mission and 
vision statements as echoed by School Board Chair, Victoria Russell.  
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We have a vision statement. At the center is being a world class, child-centered 
district. Everything we work toward comes back to the vision. There are very 
specific things about what we will do, but everything comes back to that vision. I 
really think we have done a very extensive strategic planning process. We started 
in 2002 with 5 key strategies. Now we’re up to 15 or 16. Each one is a key area 
we are focusing on...The vision really drives what we do. That’s the core piece of 
it all (V. Russell, personal communication, September 30, 2009). 
 
Betty Greene, a Winter Valley teacher and teachers’ union representative, 
explained how this vision related to the students. 
If you asked me to describe the core values of the district it’s all about the single 
student learning. It’s about differentiating for individual students. It’s about 
growth targets and we want their dreams to set sail. You know mission statements 
can be kind of kooky, but we want everyone to succeed—we really do. If you 
provide the support for the teachers they can really help those learners grow and 
develop. Everything supports classroom learning (B Greene, personal 
communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
Greg Camden, a building principal in Winter Valley, illustrated the district’s 
dedication to its mission and the time and thought behind its creation with this simple 
statement, “The published mission and vision statements drive student 
achievement…Most districts have a one- or two-page document, Winter Valley’s is 104 
pages” (G. Camden, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
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That all participants from Winter Valley could speak to the district’s mission and 
vision and explain how MAST fit within that mission and vision was evidence that Dr. 
Johnson excelled in visionary leadership and the symbolic frame. 
 
The MAST Plan 
 Like all of the other districts in Central State that implemented MAST, Winter 
Valley had its own unique program.  According to Betty Greene (personal 
communication, October 1, 2009), a Winter Valley teacher and teachers’ union 
representative, Winter Valley created 11 positions to provide career ladder and 
advancement opportunities for teachers. These positions included mentor teachers, a lead 
mentor, teacher instructional coaches, district department chairs, literacy specialists, and 
distinguished teachers. These positions allowed teachers to earn additional stipends of 
between $400 and $5000 per year. The job-embedded professional development plan 
included using data to analyze student performance on the MCA II assessments by 
utilizing professional development teams that met for a minimum of 50 minutes per week 
with five late start/early release days for additional meetings. Winter Valley used a 
combination of group, individual, and piece-rate incentives to meet the MAST 
performance pay requirements, with 10% awarded to individual teachers when the school 
met its achievement goals, 10% awarded to individual teachers if their students met 
identified student achievement goals, and 80% awarded to individual teachers based on 
student growth and the completion of individual teachers’ professional development 
plans. Teachers in Winter Valley were evaluated three times a year using professional 
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teaching standards, and an annual review determined teacher advancement through the 
pay schedule. 
 
Local Leadership 
 Dr. Johnson seemed to be adept at understanding the political nature of MAST 
and effectively led the translation of messages from the Governor, Legislature, and CSDE 
into language that local stakeholders accepted. As Dr. Frodo was able to translate “pay-
for-performance” to “reward teachers” in Pine Springs, Dr. Johnson was able to translate 
the pay-for-performance rhetoric into “supporting teachers,”  “student achievement,” and 
the “culture of excellence” that permeated the culture and mission at Winter Valley. This 
translation was significant in the successful implementation of MAST locally. 
 In terms of Dr. Johnson’s attention to Bolman & Deal’s (2008) four leadership 
frames, Dr. Johnson was highly attentive to the symbolic frame. The district’s imagery-
laden mission statement in which “students’ dreams set sail” provided a backdrop for a 
culture that exuded excellence. Even the district’s 104-page mission was symbolic of the 
district’s desire to be the best at educating students. Each study participant from Winter 
Valley related positively in some way to the symbols of the district that represented its 
quest for excellence. Participants could relate MAST implementation back to the mission, 
even if they did not agree that MAST fit in well with the mission, showed the importance 
of the mission to the district. That everyone shared some form of the symbolic language 
of the district in a positive light indicated that the symbolic leadership of the district was 
effective. This was also evidence that Dr. Johnson also excelled at visionary leadership. 
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 Regarding MAST implementation, leadership in the other three frames appeared 
to be shared or delegated. That this delegation was done effectively demonstrated Dr. 
Johnson’s proficiency in the handling of administrative tasks. In a district the size of 
Winter Valley, it would have been impossible for the superintendent to fully lead all 
initiatives, so it became important to assess the strengths of district team members and 
delegate responsibility for certain aspects of implementation as was appropriate. After 
establishing the key stakeholders that would negotiate the MAST plan, Dr. Johnson led 
the meetings and kept the school board informed of progress, but let stakeholders share 
their ideas freely in a collaborative manner. This not only worked well in the political 
frame, but set up success in the human resource frame as well as showing attention to the 
relationship aspect of leadership. 
 When it was time to actually write the plan, Dr. Johnson turned over the 
leadership of the structural frame to building principals and committee members to meet 
and write their respective parts of the MAST plan. This helped to free Dr. Johnson’s time 
to attend to other district issues and provided a vehicle for other stakeholders to feel 
valued and trusted that they could create a plan that would fit into the culture of 
excellence at Winter Valley. 
 
MAST Implementation 
 Despite being a lighthouse district with very different demographics and district 
structure than Pine Springs, Winter Valley had many similar experiences to Pine Springs 
during MAST implementation. In Winter Valley, the drive to see each student succeed 
was an important consideration in the decision to explore implementing MAST. From the 
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beginning, Dr. Johnson believed MAST would be beneficial to the Winter Valley District 
but not because of any change in the salary schedule. For Dr. Johnson, the promise of 
MAST was as a professional development initiative.  
I believe Winter Valley’s MAST plan holds a lot of promise for continuing to 
raise student achievement in the Winter Valley Schools. Increasing teacher 
collaboration and providing a framework for teachers to coach and mentor 
colleagues holds the greatest potential for increasing student achievement. I think 
we always have a frame of mind that we are always looking for things to help 
support teachers and enhance instruction for students. MAST looked like it would 
do that. We were negotiating even before it became law. Staff development, 
student growth, and staff compensation were three main factors that prompted us 
to implement MAST (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 2008). 
 
 Although not the most important factor, the money Winter Valley would gain 
from participating in MAST was at least a consideration—for some more than others. 
Competition amongst neighboring districts also appeared to be a consideration. 
Obviously the money was there. We wanted to understand what it meant for 
Winter Valley. Any time there is money for Winter Valley, we want to take 
advantage of it. We wanted to learn more about how it could help us implement 
PLCs [Professional Learning Communities]. It’s amazing how much PLCs have 
become part of our culture. We shifted at that time to becoming a very data-driven 
district. That work shifted dramatically as a result of our PLCs. That work and 
those dollars were very beneficial. The dollars weren’t the most important part. 
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The dollars are nice, but if it didn’t do what it needed to do, we wouldn’t do it (V. 
Russell, personal communication, September 30, 2009). 
 
It had to do with compensation levels. I wish I could say it was about student 
achievement, but it really was about trying to capture every dollar possible for the 
district (G. Camden, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
Our neighbor, Bakersville, got into it [MAST] the year before. We were getting 
reports from several levels about them. Our union president heard from their 
union president, I heard from their staff development coordinator. Our 
administrators heard from their administrators. We were hearing positive things, 
and there was a sizeable amount of money that could be used. You really want to 
compensate people for going the extra mile so to speak. All of the metro districts, 
at least in this part, have high parent and student expectations and are high 
performing. This would allow us to have additional compensation for high 
performance (B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
The pressure that Winter Valley felt regarding implementing MAST because a 
neighboring district had implemented the program, was likely the type of reaction CSDE 
was looking for by listing the districts that were participating in MAST on each press 
release. Winter Valley’s knowledge that a neighboring district implemented MAST 
influenced participants’ decision to implement MAST in Winter Valley to at least some 
extent. This influence showed the benefit to CSDE and other state-level MAST 
supporters in using the media to communicate with the audience of school districts in its 
Pay-for-Performance Page 198 of 299 
press releases to induce districts to act by submitting MAST applications in keeping with 
the theories proposed by Edelman (1988). 
Since Winter Valley was a fairly large district, it was not unusual for its 
stakeholders to have differing views about initiatives than in Pine Springs. The 
participants in Winter Valley had somewhat differing interpretations of the district’s 
reasons for choosing to implement MAST—student achievement, staff development, 
compensation, and competition. This may have been caused by the district’s larger size 
and inability of stakeholders to communicate about various issues or initiatives on a daily 
basis as was possible in smaller school districts like Pine Springs. However, in the MAST 
legislation, it was possible to find something that applied to each of these reasons.  
 Like Pine Springs, for Winter Valley a team approach was an essential component 
of developing and implementing the district’s MAST plan. This was echoed by all of the 
study participants from Winter Valley. 
From my standpoint what happed was this. A board member was aware of it. It 
came through PACE [an education-related legislative liaison group]. One woman 
from our board is very active in that organization through the Legislature. Terry 
Smith [another school board member from Winter Valley] and Alan Johnson 
brought it to the board and the board made a decision based on their 
recommendation. It made sense for us to participate. There were also things in 
terms of discussions with staff members and union. Terry, Alan, and Lowell 
Turner, who was the assistant superintendent at the time, did a great job 
communicating with teachers and the union and really educating them on it. It’s 
great if we decide to do it, but if staff wasn’t going to participate, it didn’t matter. 
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A lot of work was done by administration to work with the union (V. Russell, 
personal communication, September 30, 2009). 
 
We did a lot of collaboration with teacher leaders. We didn't want to push it 
administratively. That wouldn't work. We were negotiating the 2005-2007 
contract [at the time]. It took a lot of discussion. We had to deal with contract 
parts like the salary schedule and MAST philosophy (A. Johnson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2008). 
 
A committee was pulled together. It had administrators, teacher union leadership, 
teachers, some people from the district office that work with teachers, and an 
Education Central State representative that our union invited as well. We spent 
several meetings discussing the program, reviewing the statute, and interviewing 
other districts that had MAST or TAP. We reached out to other districts, and we 
found that their feelings were that it was a positive program. Our committee went 
to the next step. Then we got one or more teachers from each level and then began 
to write the application. Each person would go out, and with a group of our 
cohorts, we drafted the sections. Then we reconvened and put the sections 
together. The bottom line is it was a joint union and administrative decision. Dr. 
Johnson would have kept the board apprised of the progress. That’s the beauty of 
the program. You have to get together and get along for it to become a reality (B. 
Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
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 The inclusive nature of the development of the MAST plan and the effective 
delegation of MAST implementation oversight was again a testament to Dr. Johnson’s 
strength in visionary leadership with attention to relationships and interpersonal aspects 
of leadership. It was also a testament to Dr. Johnson’s skill in the human resource and 
symbolic frames. 
 Several factors helped implementation proceed. One of these was teamwork. 
Another was an existing commitment to professional growth and student achievement A 
third was a willingness to consider alternative compensation options. 
The views that the school board, administration, and teacher leaders had about 
professional growth, teacher compensation, and student achievement were already 
strong. The discussion was more about how we work through the details. The 
MAST structure helped. If it had been more [like] how it was presented initially 
(Governor King's initial concept rather than the end result that was modified quite 
a bit from the Governor's initial plan), it probably would not have passed in our 
district (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 2008). 
 
 The district’s views on professional growth, teacher compensation, and student 
achievement helped focus the implementation plan around the development of 
professional learning communities in order to enhance professional development and 
ultimately impact each of these areas through this process. 
There was enthusiasm from beginning. Betty Greene worked through the 
operational piece of it and worked hard to set up PLCs. We set up leadership 
positions to help the PLCs get started. Initially we were more about helping the 
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PLCs get started. We helped them navigate how frequently to meet, when they 
would meet, how they would meet, and helped them establish goals for the 
meeting. There were a lot of things to work out at the beginning (V. Russell, 
personal communication, September 30, 2009). 
 
Communication between CSDE and Winter Valley 
As in Pine Springs, Winter Valley experienced multiple experiences related to 
what Pine Springs participants believed was CSDE over-stepping its bounds regarding 
the components of MAST, especially as it related to the salary schedule, and nightmarish 
bureaucracy related to its implementation. Additionally, Winter Valley also reported 
experiencing a high degree of ineptitude on the part of CSDE. Answers to questions 
varied greatly based on which CSDE employee answered the question. Winter Valley 
participants had the feeling that CSDE employees were making up the rules as they went 
along. This created a feeling of “building the plane while they were flying it” in Winter 
Valley. Among the issues about which Winter Valley scuffled with CSDE were the salary 
schedule, bureaucracy, and the timing of CSDE’s approval of the district’s MAST plan. 
 
 Salary schedule: Augment versus eliminate.  
 Although the preceding factors facilitated the MAST plan’s initial development in 
Winter Valley, implementation was not always easy. Because Winter Valley was an early 
adopter of MAST, the plan was being refined at CSDE even as Winter Valley was trying 
to develop the details of its own plan, causing some concern. “As the plan was being 
developed, CSDE was imposing criteria upon district plans that went beyond the law 
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passed by the Legislature” (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 2008). As 
in Pine Springs, this was largely focused around differences between CSDE’s and the 
district’s interpretation of how or how much the salary schedule had to be reformed. 
 Reforming the salary schedule was a difficult task both at the local level and in 
getting it approved by CSDE. 
 The biggest barrier was teachers themselves. People weren’t trusting of it 
[MAST]. The real problem was that the state required that the salary schedule be 
reviewed and changed to reward performance rather than rewarding people for 
longevity. That was a very scary change for most teachers. This was scarier than, 
“What if the money goes away?” What if the money goes away was easier. If the 
money is gone, then, well, it’s gone (B. Greene, personal communication, October 
1, 2009). 
Winter Valley ultimately acquiesced to the demands of CSDE for salary schedule reform 
and worked to find a solution that was acceptable to both the local teachers and CSDE. 
This was a critical juncture for MAST implementation that required effective local 
leaders’ ability to gain and leverage trust as well as being able to translate the 
neoconservative rhetoric that was disseminated at the state level into language that was 
acceptable locally. 
At the point of revising the salary schedule, the trust between teachers and 
administrators was tested. Not having many districts in existence with a successful 
MAST program that could be used as a model was an obstacle to successful MAST 
implementation in Winter Valley. 
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New changes can be viewed with a discerning and cynical eye at times. Was this 
something teachers would rely on? Would it be used to replace existing salary 
dollars? Was there a hidden agenda? What happens if our side wants out? The 
experience of people involved was lacking. There were not a lot of models to 
draw on, so we couldn’t really look at how it was working somewhere else. There 
was also the question of was this just “window dressing” or would it be around 
for a while. I’d call that “political trust.” That political trust changes with changes 
in leadership (G. Camden, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
Because of CSDE’s insistence on interpreting the legislative language in a way that 
would more effectively promote Governor King’s neoconservative education policy 
agenda, the political trust between Winter Valley and CSDE was lacking. When adding 
the inexperience of CSDE employees whom local school districts relied upon for advice 
on writing and submitting their MAST plans, that trust was further eroded. 
 
 The bureaucratic nightmare. 
 In addition to serious differences of interpretation of the legislation and lack of 
experience with MAST, the philosophy of CSDE to reject each plan at least once 
negatively impacted Winter Valley’s ability to successfully implement MAST. 
It took us three applications to get the plan approved, and took a memo of 
understanding added to the contract [with the teachers’ union]. The school board 
approved it, and the teachers approved it. The first year it passed by 12 votes 
[with a total] of 607 teachers [voting]. The union only required a simple majority 
vote. (B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
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 Winter Valley was unable to begin MAST implementation before receiving 
CSDE approval of their plan and then a union vote approving the CSDE-approved plan, 
so the timing was also a negative factor in MAST implementation. Because it took three 
attempts for CSDE to approve its MAST plan, Winter Valley did not receive approval for 
its MAST plan until late summer of 2006 (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 
16, 2008). The union vote did not occur until the teachers returned for the fall workshop 
the week before classes began. However, according to the legislation, MAST had to be 
fully implemented by October 1st in order for districts to pass review the following spring 
so that [Winter Valley] would not lose [its] MAST funding (B. Greene, personal 
communication, October 1, 2009).  
 This put the district in a serious time constraint to develop plans and select 
teachers to fill various career ladder positions created by the plans, and then hire other 
teachers to take the place of the newly “promoted” teachers in the classrooms. 
We didn't get approval until late summer and teachers didn't vote until after 
school started. Pulling teacher coaches out of their classrooms was an issue for 
teachers and parents. It was also an issue deciding how many peer coaches to 
employ (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 2008). 
 
When we came back in August, we hadn’t heard yet whether our plan had been 
approved by the state or not. We couldn’t move forward until we had a union 
vote, and we couldn’t have the vote until after we had been approved. If we had 
tried to make some contingency plans, we would have lost trust. The union would 
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have thought that we were going to do this anyway regardless of how they voted 
(B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
 As noted in the previous quote, CSDE’s timelines in approving the district’s 
MAST plan obviously hampered Winter Valley’s ability to adequately prepare for the 
2006-2007 school year. Had CSDE not had the informal policy of rejecting MAST plans 
a minimum of one time, Winter Valley may have been better able to implement its 
MAST plan with less disruption to students and families. Additionally, if there was a 
requirement that CSDE needed to inform districts of the status of their MAST application 
status no later than May 1st of each year, districts would have more time to better 
implement MAST plans. Moreover, the implementation timeline created by the delay in 
approval was perhaps even more problematic. Interestingly, CSDE appeared to have 
quietly waived the October 1 full implementation deadline for Winter Valley. 
Had the timeline been different, it would have been better. Districts should know 
in the spring if their plans are approved so they have the summer to prepare. 
When we rolled MAST out, we started PLCs at that time. It really would have 
been nice had we been able to bring Rick DuFour or someone like that to work 
with the whole district. We set about work while we were starting the school year. 
Our instructional goals were being developed as we went. Our instructional 
coaches began in January. It was tough on the community as teachers were pulled 
from the classrooms in the middle of the year. For example, a beloved elementary 
teacher who would also be an excellent instructional coach was pulled out of the 
classroom in January to serve as an instructional coach. Parents and community 
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members didn’t like the disruption of having teachers pulled out of the classroom 
part way through the year. It would have been nice to know in advance so we 
could make personnel decisions over the summer.  
 
DuFour says the best way to learn is by doing. I found a clip on YouTube of guys 
building a plane while flying it. This is what [implementation] felt like for us. The 
first year it was like teachers were doing a prescribed activity, [something we had 
to do, but were not sure why]. “What do we want them to know?” can be one to 
two years of work. We didn’t have any staff development time to build the big 
picture and develop common knowledge. You’re approved and have to be ready 
for the state to come in and determine if you’re compliant. You either have to do 
it or lose it. Truly they came in to evaluate us in March or early April that year, 
and we moved from level one to level two. Imagine the amount of work we did 
that first semester. It was a lot of work (B. Greene, personal communication, 
October 1, 2009). 
 
 Betty Greene personally had to deal with these obstacles when she was chosen to 
lead the MAST implementation for the district. 
I don’t believe we envisioned the implementation during the planning process. 
When it came time for the implementation, we wondered, “How are we going to 
do this?” They said, “Since you’re the staff development coordinator, why don’t 
you be the MAST coordinator?” They let me pare off the new teacher 
development part of my job and half of my job became MAST and half remained 
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staff development. We never imagined what it would be like to roll it out. I wasn’t 
thinking in terms of leading it, although it did make sense when they asked me to 
do it (B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
 Like Pine Springs, Winter Valley struggled with getting the various components 
of MAST to work together in a cohesive manner. 
We could have done more visioning along that line. I’m a very goal and task 
oriented person, but you need to break it down into who needs to do what, when, 
and how. I developed the plan in isolation of other things I was doing. And then I 
brought it together. For example, with the PLCs, I trained people on how to do 
PLCs and then brought them together to lead the PLCs. I just used the skills I 
developed over the years in skill development and program planning (B. Greene, 
personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
This echoed Dr. Frodo’s belief that the MAST model was not really a model, but rather a 
list of components. Figuring out how the components would work together seemed to be 
a task that districts were on their own to complete. 
 Additionally, the program was mired in paperwork. School districts were strapped 
for resources. This meant that fewer employees were doing more work, so districts tried 
to limit activities to those that added value. In yet another interaction between CSDE and 
local school districts where the two groups attached different meanings to the same 
situation, CSDE and Winter Valley personnel disputed the necessity of the reporting and 
paperwork requirements of MAST. Typically, district personnel viewed the paperwork 
requirements associated with many CSDE programs as oppressive. CSDE viewed the 
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paperwork requirements as documentation of school district accountability in 
implementing these programs. 
If there was a way to go from operational to cultural, that would make a huge 
difference. The paperwork to show what’s done is excessive. It feels more like 
being an accountant and not “let’s write a book about how teaching has improved 
and student achievement has increased.” We need to talk about how this will help 
us culturally instead of that a PLC will meet for 52 minutes five days a week… 
From an administrative standpoint, having fewer meetings [would help]. I can 
meet with teachers or school board members about student achievement and have 
a plan of action in 30-60 minutes. With the MAST meetings, we can have a four 
to six hour long meeting and I walk away wondering what was going on there. 
We have about eight of these a year, and I don’t feel it makes an impact. For 
example, we’ve discussed at length whether you can have two people on a PLC or 
if you can have three people on a PLC and still get paid. Most MAST meetings 
are from an accountability lens. At those meetings I feel more like an accountant 
than an educational leader. (G. Camden, personal communication, October 1, 
2009). 
 
After the first year, an analysis was done to evaluate the success. Through the 
analysis, we found that different kinds of groups formed—building level, subject 
specific, and grade level. The information we received through the analysis 
helped us to know what type of PLC was more helpful to the district and we 
guided future groups in those directions, but the reporting mechanism is 
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incredibly laborious. The amount of paper Betty [Greene] has to complete seems 
incredible. I wonder if there couldn’t be goals established that could be reviewed 
from a metric standpoint rather than completing a 50-page document…It would 
reduce the amount of time spent reporting and increase Betty’s time doing. I do 
understand that there has to be some reporting, but she could be analyzing how 
it’s working and recommending improvements instead of spending so much time 
on that paperwork. Time spent reporting is time lost doing (V. Russell, personal 
communication, September 30, 2009). 
 
 In general, Winter Valley was pleased with the success of MAST in the district. 
However, continued legislative support and funding was a concern not only for Winter 
Valley, but for the majority of districts in Central State that considered submitting a 
MAST application. “Many districts were bothered by the uncertainty. That's a very big 
impediment. We took the point of view that it will be there if it's working well. If not, we 
enjoyed it while it was here” (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 2008). 
 A second concern that was related to the funding of the program was the stagnant 
funding to the districts. “One variable is the inflationary factor on the amount available 
for teachers. Teachers won't be happy with the same amount of money every year. They 
need to feel it's improving some” (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 
2008). MAST funding had remained at $260 per student since the program’s inception. 
 Finally, key Winter Valley personnel were critical of the legislative discussion of 
MAST from the beginning. If MAST was to really work, it required structural and 
cultural change in how P-12 schools operated from the ground up. This was not 
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something that could be accomplished without true educational experts working on the 
issue from the start in an even-handed way.  
MAST can be seen as a carrot. While there are times a carrot is helpful, most 
people would move that way anyway when the data is clear. I would love for 
King to be able to say here’s what it [MAST] did. I’m not finding that cultural 
change. [MAST] seems like more of an operational change. Those types of 
changes are not sustainable, but you need to be patient for cultural change. The 
culture needs to focus on student achievement. Legislatively, they can’t change 
the culture in a district. The last time I had a senator in here talking about what the 
Legislature could do for us, I said, “When H1N1 came, they had the best health 
experts in the world working on the problem. They had the Center for Disease 
Control and all of their experts working on it. Yet, because we all share this 
common education experience of having gone to school, you choose to tackle that 
problem yourselves.” 
 
 They’re not qualified to do it. If you haven’t been in a high school in the last five 
years, you don’t know what a high school is like today and what the issues are, 
and legislators don’t have the training or experience to deal with it. That they feel 
they can tackle education themselves without the help of experts in the field is 
like a slap in the face (G. Camden, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
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The (Relatively) Calm Morning after the Nightmare 
 Despite these early challenges, MAST was successful in Winter Valley by all 
accounts. Even though Winter Valley had already been a high-performing district, some 
of the study participants credited MAST with helping the district to become even better. 
MAST helped drive student achievement higher [and] opened doors for teachers 
to watch others teach rather than having traditionally closed doors. We have 
placed more emphasis on specific kinds of staff development, and staff has a more 
comfortable feeling about MAST and other district programs. We have reached a 
place of peace, if you will. (A. Johnson, personal communication, October 16, 
2008). 
 
I don’t think anyone thought we would get as much lift from the staff as we did. I 
thought we’d get more resistance. They love what we’re doing and how it has 
changed education. That’s really gratifying. Seeing something like data that was 
scary for these folks, and seeing that change, we’ve been able to see growth in our 
district. It’s really kind of a model for making change (V. Russell, personal 
communication, September 30, 2009). 
 
We have really become a data-driven district. This was a huge change for 
teachers. That combined with evaluation by peers or principal for success. The 
union was scared about that—the evaluation and data. Both have been 
instrumental in changing the way we do things. For example, say third grade 
reading looks at scores, and the range of data says “this,” what can we do to get 
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“that.” We were able to direct resources to change results. That’s why our district 
is performing at the level it is today. TICS (Teacher Instructional Coaches) 
evaluate others in the classroom. At first it was intimidating, now teachers find it 
to be very beneficial and appreciated. Staff is open to it, sees value, and is 
cooperating (V. Russell, personal communication, September 30, 2009). 
 
 Teachers who were once skeptical of the plan became thrilled with how far they 
had come both as a staff and as a district. They not only saw themselves as teachers in a 
high-performing district, but also as change agents who were advancing education to fit 
the 21st century learner. 
This will sound silly, but we’ve moved from a culture of teaching to a culture of 
learning. We focus on the learner. We’ve changed in so many ways. Our staff 
development goals prior to this time were general. They were not measurable, 
difficult to measure at best. Now we write SMART [simple, measurable, 
achievable, realistic, and time-bound] goals at the site and PLC level. Now they 
are easily measured. We shifted in that way, now our goals are simple and 
effective. They are simple, measurable, achievable, and we have a deadline, like 
we will get this done by this date. Our focus has shifted to the learner. We truly 
ask the question, “What is best for our students?” (B. Greene, personal 
communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
I was a high school teacher before I went into this role. If I’m teaching ninth 
grade history, it’s so much easier if I have a schedule that allows me to end each 
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class at the same spot. It makes life as a teacher easier, but if you are really 
teaching at a student level—if you are learner-centered—when do you ever have 
all students learning at the same level all at the same time? We’ve changed in that 
way. Are we 100% there yet? No. It takes time. We’re starting year four. Some 
experts say it takes three to five years…we are differentiating more for our 
students (B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009).  
 
Another change that is at the heart of what we do is the PLCs, the collaboration, 
common formative and summative assessments, and discussing how are we 
reporting this to parents. We’re looking at how were reporting this information to 
parents. We’re changing that 19th century teaching model and now the reporting 
model doesn’t fit what we do. Learning and students look different. If you look at 
the five components required by statute for the MAST program, there is so much 
wisdom in having those five components. Teacher leadership has been 
phenomenal. Instructional coaches I work with and train, they’re doing 
observations and we’re using an inter-rater reliability scale to do that. We use the 
Danielson domains. Everyone when they were hired in the district is trained in 
Danielson and how we use the domains. Instead of having a principal come in 
once every three years, now people are evaluated three times a year. We have 
most of the district retrained in effective teaching components. We’ve also 
included technology. It’s our district’s own addition to Danielson. We’ve created 
a common language regarding what effective teaching looks like (B. Greene, 
personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
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 Although the focus of Winter Valley’s MAST plan was internal, Dr. Johnson also 
noted support from the public at large. “We had a lot of public support, not just parents, 
but in general. Folks outside of schools think that it should be that way. When 
implemented well, like our plan, folks are pleased with it” (A. Johnson, personal 
communication, October 16, 2008). 
 
Education Reform Stew 
 Although not concurrently implementing as many initiatives as Pine Springs, 
Winter Valley was implementing several other initiatives to improve student achievement 
at the same time it was implementing MAST. Both districts were also committed to 
implementing the Charlotte Danielson method of evaluating teacher performance. 
Implementing MAST and Charlotte Danielson were two major undertakings. 
Implementing both programs at the same time could strap a district’s resources in terms 
of finances, time, and the staff’s willingness to adopt the change. However, school 
districts in Central State could no longer afford the luxury of implementing one program 
at a time and measuring its effectiveness. Districts were increasingly pressured to 
implement multiple programs designed at improving student achievement 
simultaneously, especially if there was money attached to implementation.  
 Often, as in the case of MAST implementation, there were multiple components 
within a program that required the development of “programs within programs.” Both 
Pine Springs and Winter Valley addressed the MAST requirement of achieving job-
embedded professional development through the implementation of professional learning 
communities (PLCs).  
Pay-for-Performance Page 215 of 299 
 The component that Betty Greene was actually most proud of in Winter Valley’s 
MAST plan was the PLCs that lead to increased teacher collaboration and, ultimately, 
increased student achievement. 
PLCs, to me, are the heart of our plan. When we have teachers around a table, we 
use the DuFour model. We ask, “What do we want each student to know?” In 
years past when I was teaching, when the door closed, we were all probably doing 
something different [in our classrooms]. We all got to the same place by the end 
of the term, but that was all we had in common. [The extent of our collaboration 
was that] we shared lessons if we saw something interesting—usually student 
work waiting to be graded, and then asked about it. The other person may have 
shared it if they had something they were really excited about….That’s the part 
I’m most proud of—and the time has been provided for [teachers] to collaborate 
(B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 2009).  
 
MAST’s Impact on Student Achievement 
 Although student achievement was on the rise at Winter Valley, it was honestly 
difficult to determine what if any of that improvement was attributable to MAST. As with 
the other districts studied, there were multiple initiatives being implemented across the 
district during the study period that could have all positively impacted student 
achievement. Therefore, Greg Camden was not certain that there was necessarily a direct 
correlation between MAST and the success of the Winter Valley School District.  
It’s difficult to slice MAST off and say that MAST has done this for us. I wish I 
could say that test scores went up, but they’ve always been up. Since MAST is 
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tied to the PLCs, it may have helped those grow and flourish, but I can’t say 
there’s a one to one correspondence necessarily (G. Camden, personal 
communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
 With all of the focus of the early MAST rhetoric on pay-for-performance and the 
Governor’s and CSDE’s over-focus on the salary schedule component, the Governor, 
CSDE, and the legislative body overlooked the primary benefit of MAST as it was 
actually implemented in school districts across Central State. As implemented by local 
districts, this was its contribution to the professional development of teachers. That in 
turn seemed to have a positive impact on student achievement, although due to the fact 
that districts did not implement any one program in isolation, the impact MAST had on 
student achievement could not be measured. As Dr. Johnson (personal communication, 
October 16, 2008) explained it, “I don't think the Legislature realizes how powerful a tool 
[MAST] has been for raising student achievement.” 
 
MAST’s Long-Term Prospects in Winter Valley 
 Winter Valley did not rest on its laurels and continued to work to improve MAST 
implementation. One improvement—making MAST a cultural phenomenon—would take 
time, but would likely yield important gains due to the ability of teachers and 
administrators to spend more time focused on the learner and less time focused on the 
required paper trail associated with MAST. When a new program became a cultural 
phenomenon, it seemed like the program was always a part of the culture. Its components 
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fit together well and the implementation flowed smoothly. It also coordinated with other 
programs in the district without creating gaps or overlaps in programming. 
 As the MAST program matured, it seemed to be popular with teachers in Winter 
Valley, and at the time of this research, the district had no plans to eliminate the program. 
“This year [2009] when the union did the survey, it was, I believe, in the neighborhood of 
94-95% of the teaching staff in favor of [continuing MAST]” (B. Greene, personal 
communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
Emerging Themes between Pine Springs and Winter Valley 
 
MAST Rhetoric 
Central State’s MAST program had five required components: (a) career 
ladder/advancement options; (b) job-embedded professional development; (c) teacher 
evaluation; (d) performance-based pay; and (e) a reformed, alternative salary schedule. 
The initial objective of MAST as promoted by the Central State Legislature, Governor, 
and Department of Education was to improve student achievement by linking teacher 
compensation to student performance. However, the professional development 
component of MAST, rather than the compensation components of MAST, was the focus 
for increased teacher and student achievement in Pine Springs and Winter Valley. 
Superintendents in Pine Springs and Winter Valley were able to successfully 
translate the neoconservative, state-level rhetoric into rhetoric that was more palatable 
locally. These leaders focused on the professional development, student achievement, and 
additional compensation aspects of MAST and never referred to it as a “pay-for-
Pay-for-Performance Page 218 of 299 
performance” program in any of the interviews I conducted. Further, none of the 
participants in either district reported that district leaders had ever described MAST as a 
pay-for-performance initiative or even linked the compensation aspect to student 
achievement gains.  
However, and in keeping with the neoconservative perspective from which the 
original impetus for MAST was developed by Governor King, proponents of 
performance-based pay outside of the districts attributed the increase in student 
achievement to the way teachers were compensated—performance-based pay and the 
alternative salary schedule. However, both Pine Springs and Winter Valley attributed the 
increase in student performance to the increased focus and time allotted for professional 
development and collaboration for teachers—the job-embedded professional 
development. These differences in what local participants versus state-level 
neoconservative participants viewed as the most promising aspects of MAST effectively 
demonstrated how competing ideologies impacted the political discourse and perceptions 
surrounding MAST. 
That both districts saw increases in student achievement, while only one of the 
districts had a teachers’ salary schedule that conformed to the expectations of CSDE in 
terms of the extent of reform required indicated that the resulting increase in student 
achievement was not likely related to compensation. If there was a relationship between 
MAST and increased student achievement, it had to be connected to the part of the 
program the districts shared in common. That was the professional development to which 
teachers were attracted and eventually included in the cultural assumptions of both 
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districts. These findings were aligned with previous reports by Honawar (2007) that 
showed no correlation between teacher compensation and student achievement. 
 
CSDE 
In the Governor’s, Republican Party’s, and CSDE’s focus on the promotion of 
professional compensation for teachers, they missed the most positive aspect of MAST 
from a local school district perspective. It took several years of data and a change of 
Governor and Commissioner of Education for CSDE to openly admit that improved 
professional development practices was a positive, although unintended, outcome of 
MAST. 
In the interaction between CSDE and these two districts, CSDE assumed the role 
it was accustomed to playing—they heavy-handed enforcer and education annex of the 
Governor’s office. Winter Valley and Pine Springs played their respective roles as 
obedient minions faithfully as well to a point. Winter Valley made the required changes 
to their salary structure, completed the paperwork, and met as many timelines as they 
could due to the late notice it received about the approval of its MAST program. In terms 
of “fidelity of MAST implementation,” as Josh Gleason from CSDE referred to it, Winter 
Valley ranked highest among the four districts studied. 
Typically, political adversaries are individuals or groups that lack the power to 
harm the group that labeled them as the adversary (Edelman, 1988). It could be argued 
that, at the time of this research, the relationship between CSDE and local school districts 
was this type of adversarial relationship. The interaction between the districts and CSDE 
was typical of how political adversaries, as defined by Edelman (1988), related to each 
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other until Pine Springs changed the game. Pine Springs may have caught CSDE off 
guard in how Pine Springs handled its role in the dramaturgy. Pine Springs dutifully 
completed and submitted the MAST application, and, as it was instructed, adapted the 
plan to fit the district. However those adaptations were not aligned with CSDE’s 
expectation of a teacher compensation plan that eliminated the traditional step and lane 
system. In the typical interaction, Pine Springs would have acquiesced and eliminated the 
step and lane salary schedule, but Pine Springs held firm. Perhaps only because of the 
Governor’s Fishing Opener to be held there, CSDE conceded. In addition to the Governor 
wanting the photo opportunity with Pine Springs District personnel and the big check, 
numerous media personnel would be in Pine Springs covering the event. If the media 
knew that Pine Springs refused to change its salary schedule and stood up to CSDE, it 
had the potential to cause negative publicity for MAST and the Governor and perhaps 
inspire more districts to openly question CSDE’s interpretation of the MAST legislation 
and negatively impact CSDE’s and the Governor’s ability to use the media to shape the 
public opinion of MAST. If more local school districts would have stood up to CSDE’s 
MAST requirements that they felt overstepped the bounds of the MAST legislation, it 
could have altered the ability of CSDE and the Governor to safely label local school 
districts as adversaries. Up to that point of MAST implementation, the Governor and 
CSDE had run a highly successful media campaign garnering support from the public and 
enough interest on the part of local school districts to submit letters of intent and garner 
some political success regarding MAST. These aspects were not lost on the savvy veteran 
Pine Springs Superintendent nor likely on Governor King. 
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 Both Pine Springs and Winter Valley had a successful MAST programs for many 
years with successful evaluations conducted by CSDE and earned the privilege of self-
monitoring their programs, a benefit districts get after four years of successful CSDE 
program monitoring and evaluations. Both districts appeared to be relatively satisfied 
with their programs (aside from the paperwork CSDE still requires). CSDE would argue 
that Pine Springs did not implement the salary schedule with fidelity. Nevertheless, and 
despite the counter assumptions of Governor King, CSDE, and the Republican Party in 
Central State, the data indicated that the traditional steps and lanes salary schedule was 
not a factor influencing student achievement in the districts; a finding first stated in the 
official assessment commissioned by the Governor and CSDE (Hezel Associates, 2009). 
 However, when Bear Creek (the district where Dr. Frodo later shared his time) 
submitted a MAST application that was nearly identical to that of Pine Springs, CSDE 
flatly rejected it on the basis that the salary schedule had not been reformed (J. Frodo, 
personal communication, October 16, 2009). Since Pine Springs’ approval was prior to 
CSDE prevailing in the courts regarding the extent of reform they could require and Bear 
Creek’s application came afterward, this may have indicated that changing the traditional 
steps and lanes salary schedule may have been the priority over student achievement on 
the part of CSDE and the neoconservatives whose agenda CSDE attempted to advance. 
 
Financial Persuasion 
The financial carrot extended to both districts incentivized them to explore and 
ultimately participate in MAST, although the financial incentive was greater in Pine 
Springs. The Legislature was probably wise to increase the amount of money districts 
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could receive for participating in MAST from $150 to $260 per student, and it was likely 
still not enough to persuade most teachers in Central State to abandon the traditional steps 
and lanes salary schedule. However, in both districts, the money they received from 
MAST allowed them to pay their teachers more and possibly retain and attract teachers 
because of the increased compensation. It also allowed districts to fund professional 
development activities in a more effective manner. In terms of dollars into the district, 
both districts spent money out of their general funds to support MAST. Therefore, there 
was no financial incentive to districts to pursue MAST or to persuade teachers to pursue 
MAST at the district level. The only financial incentive went to the teachers themselves. 
MAST funding to districts remained at a flat $260 per student since it was passed. 
Participants in both districts expressed concern over the flat funding and the increasing 
amount that was shifting to local taxpayers. There was also an uncertainty regarding how 
much longer the teachers would perform the work associated with MAST without any 
increase in MAST compensation. Neither district wanted to fill yet another funding gap 
from its general fund by using general fund dollars to increase MAST compensation for 
teachers. The other concern was the increasing amount of tax burden to local property 
taxes in the event that either district needed to pass an operating or bond levy because the 
increased tax burden may have caused local taxpayers to reject an even greater tax burden 
through local, voter approved levies like operating and bond levies for schools. 
 
De-unionizing Teachers 
The legislative position on union-busting bills like alternative licensure and 
MAST gave credence to Greg Camden’s (personal communication, October 1, 2009) 
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belief that because people shared a common educational experience of having attended 
school that they were qualified to teach or run a school. Having performed management 
duties in both the business and education sectors, I could attest that they were two very 
different entities. However, as anyone who has taken a number of college courses taught 
by adjunct faculty (as I experienced in MBA courses) could also have understood, being 
a strong business professional did not necessarily make one a strong educator.  
In both districts MAST did not appear to weaken the teachers’ unions. 
Additionally, teachers themselves reported feeling more empowered and in charge of 
their teaching. If anything, MAST created positions in both districts where teachers 
observed and evaluated other teachers, pushing them into what was once considered 
solely an administrative function. 
Additionally, the teachers’ unions in both districts required a 50% plus one vote to 
approve the MAST program. Under the provisions of MAST, teachers’ unions in regular 
public school districts could set their own required margin of victory for passing MAST. 
Rather than serving as a union-busting, or at least weakening tool, MAST seemed to have 
strengthened the teachers’ union in Pine Springs and Winter Valley. From the 
neoconservative point of view, this was likely an unintended negative outcome of MAST 
similar to the unintended negative outcomes of pay-for-performance compensation 
models described by Harris. 
Leadership 
 Although leaders in Pine Springs and Winter Valley had countless other things to 
attend to besides MAST, both made MAST implementation a focus during the initial 
planning and application phase of the program. In Pine Springs, MAST received a mixed 
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reaction on the part of teachers. MAST was initially viewed as one more in a long line of 
state programs that had come and gone. Although not explicitly stated by participants in 
Winter Valley, based on the closeness of the vote in that district, teachers there were 
probably thinking the same thing. The ability of local leaders to understand the political 
nature of MAST and tor translate the messages from the Legislature and CSED into what 
local constituents would accept and the trust established between local stakeholders were 
key factors in developing and implementing the MAST plan in Pine Springs and Winter 
Valley and were aligned with qualities of effective leadership as described by Northouse 
(2009); Bolman & Deal (2008), and Edelman (1988). 
 The trust between teachers and union leadership and the trust between teachers, 
union leadership, and the superintendent was key to developing a culture of trust and 
teamwork that enabled Pine Springs to overcome the obstacles that CSDE placed in its 
way regarding the augmentation of their salary schedule and other implementation 
concerns and allowed full implementation of the District’s MAST plan. The relatively 
small size of the District (with the entire staff housed in two buildings that were right 
next to each other) likely made effective communication easier. This culture of trust 
allowed Pine Springs to experiment with new programs and helped stakeholders 
understand that mistakes would be made in good faith. As a result, Pine Springs was able 
to acknowledge shortcomings of its initial plan and corrected those shortcomings without 
damaging intra-district relationships. 
Winter Valley also attributed the success in developing the district’s MAST plan 
to using a team approach, showing effective leadership in the human resource frame and 
interpersonal and relationship aspects of leadership. Winter Valley was a much larger 
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district than Pine Springs with more stakeholders qualified to lead and shape the MAST 
program. However, the district’s attention to the symbolic frame and visionary leadership 
by attending to its mission, vision, and goals as drivers of district decision-making helped 
members of the application and implementation teams effectively communicate how 
MAST related to the district mission and vision to other stakeholders that were not part of 
those committees. In addition, Winter Valley as a district organization was a model of 
coordination of multiple departments and administrators working toward the same goals. 
That the school board, administration, and teacher leaders were already focused on 
professional growth and student achievement prior to discussing MAST was also a factor 
that helped MAST implementation proceed.  
Being able to effectively lead in the human resource, symbolic, structural, and 
political frames as presented by and the ability to attend to visionary, conceptual, tasks, 
administrative, interpersonal, and relationship aspects of leadership appeared to have 
been important to successful MAST implementation in both districts. In both districts, the 
ability of teachers to see how MAST helped them be successful led to increased support 
for MAST as the districts continued to participate in MAST, emphasizing the importance 
of viewing MAST from the point of view of others. 
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CHAPTER SIX: TWO DISTRICTS WHERE MAST DIDN’T TAKE 
 
Cotton Grove 
 
District Background 
Cotton Grove was a suburban area of a large, Midwestern city. It was primarily a 
bedroom community that had a generally high residential property value, but little to no 
industry. The school district was the largest employer in the community. Like the other 
districts (except for Pine Springs) Cotton Grove was represented by a Republican senator 
and a Republican congressman at the state level. Senator Mary Voss represented Cotton 
Grove and also participated in this research. 
The average school district property tax per home was $1454 (CSDE, 2009g). The 
district was part of a rapidly growing community, but despite that growth found itself 
needing to trim the school district budget by as much as 10% each year for the last three 
years (2006-2009). As part of those budget reductions, teachers were placed on 
unrequested leave and class sizes grew. At the time of this research, the school district 
had an operating levy on the ballot for the past two years and each year the levy failed, 
leaving the district with one new elementary school it could not open and numerous 
reductions in services to its students. On the third attempt to pass the operating levy, the 
levy was divided into two questions. The first question to provide funding to open the 
new elementary school passed, but the second question to provide funding to reduce class 
sizes in the middle and high schools failed. 
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Cotton Grove enrolled just under 7000 students (CSDE, 2009g). Despite being 
one of the fastest growing districts in the U.S., Cotton Grove experienced a declining 
unreserved, undesignated fund balance at the time of this research (CSDE, 2009g). 
Cotton Grove did not implement MAST, but the school district engaged in a two-year 
discussion of whether or not to implement it between 2005 and 2007. Cotton Grove 
students scored as making adequate yearly progress on the NCLB goals in only two of 
the past seven years (CSDE, 2009g). In terms of achieving NCLB goals, Cotton Grove 
students achieved at the lowest rate of the districts studied. 
 In its transition from small town to rapidly growing suburb, Cotton Grove had 
seen perhaps more than its share of cultural change in the past decade. Part of that change 
involved the retirement of a long-time superintendent and the growth of the district office 
staff from essentially a two-person operation to a modern, mid-sized district model with a 
staff of 10 coordinator/director-level personnel. Beginning with his arrival in 2002, Dr. 
Joe O’Connor, the new hard-charging superintendent, directed that transition. This 
transition included increasing the number of district administrators, building five new 
schools and a district office; and remodeling or re-purposing of the rest of the schools in 
the district. Under Dr. O’Connor’s leadership Cotton Grove grew into a respected 
suburban school district.  Dr. O’Connor was lauded as a visionary leader with a strong 
commitment to environmental learning. 
 The change also involved the creation of a comprehensive mission statement for 
the district as well as one for each school. The district mission statement was as follows. 
Our mission as the Cotton Grove School District, is to be the community hub of 
intergenerational learning, is to develop people who enthusiastically engage in 
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purposeful learning, who are critical thinkers fully prepared to excel in everything 
they do, and who are responsible and productive members of an ever-changing 
global society. We will provide: opportunities that constantly challenge our 
learners to discover and enhance their individual skills and talents; a vibrant, 
welcoming environment focused on the needs of the learner; and an innovative 
staff that is fully passionate about teaching and learning (Cotton Grove Public 
School District, 2005). 
 
 This mission statement was accompanied by 14 belief statements, 8 goals, and 10 
strategies to achieve those goals. Additionally, each school within the district had its own 
mission statement that was related to the district mission statement, as well as goals and 
strategies to achieve those goals. The mission and goals of the district were reinforced 
through financial policy. All spending in the district was tied to the goals and strategies of 
the district. Items that were not aligned with the goals were not funded. The financial 
alignment to the district mission and strategic plan gave the district a focus and direction 
for the 21st century that it had not seen before. 
 
MAST Exploration 
As noted earlier, Cotton Grove never initiated a MAST plan, but there was 
discussion about implementing MAST that began in the 2005-2006 school year and 
became quite serious in the 2006-2007 school year. Cotton Grove already had some 
components of MAST in place and filed a non-binding letter of intent to participate in 
MAST with CSDE in October of 2005. The district had many components of MAST 
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already in place when it submitted its letter of intent. There were some opportunities for 
career ladders where teachers were able to assume staff development positions without 
becoming administrators. The district had district-wide and building goals and staff 
development and budgets that were tied to those goals. The district established 
professional learning communities and peer coaching. It also had a goal setting process 
for individual teachers. Additionally, an administrator observed non-tenured teachers 
three times per year. 
If Cotton Grove were to implement MAST, the following items also needed to be 
in place. All faculty members needed to be formally observed three times per year and an 
alternative compensation schedule had to be created. Additionally, the local teachers’ 
union representatives stipulated that the MAST plan had to be approved by a three-
fourths majority in order to pass.  
The district explored MAST extensively. We formed a committee that Logan 
Taylor [Human Resource Director] headed for a year. I served on it too. There 
was a building principal, HR, [School Board Member], and the Union President, 
and [Union Representative] was there too. We worked hard, and spent a year 
working on all of the components (J. O’Connor, personal communication, 
October 1, 2009).  
  
 Jack Sutton, a building principal in the Cotton Grove school district, agreed with 
Dr. O’Connor about the thorough manner in which the district explored the potential of 
MAST implementation. 
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We did have a committee that consisted of teacher representation, union 
leadership, district administrators, building principals, human resources, and the 
school board that did explore in a thorough manner some proposals of 
implementation of MAST (J Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
 Susan Barnes, Business Manager at Cotton Grove, described how the attempt to 
implement MAST proceeded. 
About a year ago, Logan worked with the CGEA [Cotton Grove Education 
Association] President and a committee to see what [MAST] would look like for 
Cotton Grove—staff development, mentor training, all those kinds of things. I 
think last fall, I might have the timing wrong, Candy [Candy Jackson, CGEA 
President] and Logan went to sites to explain the program (S. Barnes, personal 
communication, October 16, 2008).  
 
 Other districts reported tying teacher compensation to observation results as an 
initial barrier, although not as big of a barrier as altering or eliminating the traditional 
salary schedule. However, this was not seen as a barrier in Cotton Grove. At Cotton 
Grove, peer observation was generally regarded as a positive component of the MAST 
plan as described by Charlie Jones, a teacher and union representative in Cotton Grove. 
Having teachers evaluate teachers is always good. Once you get in your box, you 
don’t see anything else. Math teachers seeing math teachers would help us 
collaborate more than we do… Teacher observation was a small component, but 
not as great as in the Bakersville [a nearby school district that implemented 
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MAST] plan. The only problem is if you get evaluated by a teacher who is not in 
your discipline. They can give basics of feedback, but no subject-specific ideas. 
I’ve always enjoyed going into other math teachers’ rooms and other subject area 
teachers’ rooms just to see what other teachers do in terms of classroom 
management (C. Jones, personal communication, September 29, 2009). 
 
 The goal-setting component of MAST was well-received by teachers; however, 
teachers seemed to be more interested in the professional development aspects of MAST 
the most.  
I think the professional development opportunities and the funding for the 
professional development opportunities [were most beneficial]. I think 
specifically within the MAST plan that would be the PLCs. That’s what we were 
planning to do. We were going to create teacher leaders and collaborative teams. 
We have been doing that anyway, but don’t have people being compensated for 
that. I think it would enhance staff development at the building level (J. Sutton, 
personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
 Charlie Jones, a teacher and union representative, repeated the positive attitude 
teachers had for the professional development aspects of MAST. 
Teachers would be able to collaborate with [other] teachers and be compensated 
for the extra work they were doing. The district and teachers felt it would promote 
the mentor program and other programs we think are beneficial (C. Jones, 
personal communication, September 29, 2009). 
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 Even though her position focused on the district’s finances, Barnes saw 
professional development as a significant benefit of implementing MAST. 
You would expect me to say the money [was the most enticing aspect of MAST 
implementation]. There’s definitely a cash incentive, but we can’t just use the 
money any way we want. The biggest benefits would be [professional 
development] training for teachers, and we would hope to increase student 
achievement and improve employee morale. It’s a way to get funding so teachers 
can team together and get paid for it. Without that money we would have to pull it 
from somewhere else (S. Barnes, personal communication, October 16, 2008). 
 
 Despite the teachers’ and other stakeholders’ perspectives about the professional 
development aspect being most beneficial, their view of what was important about 
MAST varied from what Dr. O’Connor thought should be the focus of the MAST 
discussion. 
With the parameters given at the time, the way the discussion needed to go on, in 
my opinion, was for there to be responsibility on the part of the staff person in 
conjunction with their direct supervisor to develop a plan for themselves in terms 
of goals, processes, the weight of each component, and how external versus 
internal factors would be measured…In my opinion, group goals didn’t gain a lot 
of steam in our committee, but joint team level goals and [group] building goals 
would help [MAST be an effective program]. MAST works the best when there is 
a joint effort on the part of staff to reach a goal. The group goal takes out the 
factor of having a [low-achieving] class [for reasons outside of the teacher’s 
Pay-for-Performance Page 233 of 299 
control]. The changing role of leadership and who is a leader is an important part 
[of MAST]. Is a teacher a leader? A principal? What is a leader and how does that 
fit into MAST (J. O’Connor, personal communication, October 1, 2009)? 
The differences between the Dr. O’Connor’s vision of what was important about MAST 
and what other stakeholders believed was most important contributed to the failure of 
MAST implementation. This also demonstrated Dr. O’Connor’s lack of attention to 
interpersonal and relationship aspects of leadership and the human resource frame at least 
in the area of MAST. Whereas the teachers and other administrators were attentive to the 
positive aspects of MAST as a professional development tool, Dr. O’Connor focused 
more on the neoconservative values regarding what was good about MAST. 
 
Derailing the MAST Train 
 Dr. O’Connor’s focus on the pay-for-performance and teacher accountability 
aspects of MAST that were promoted by neoconservatives, served to erode trust between 
teachers and Dr. O’Connor—a component that was critical to successful MAST 
implementation in Pine Springs and Winter Valley. The lack of trust brought on by Dr. 
O’Connor’s frequent use of the neoconservative rhetoric regarding performance-based 
compensation and teacher accountability, along with his general inattentiveness toward 
the MAST discussion led to the derailing of MAST in Cotton Grove. 
 However, MAST did not become a part of the Cotton Grove culture due to a 
number of factors. The two main contributors were leadership and communication. 
CSDE and the local school board approved the district’s plan; however, local teachers did 
not support it to the level required for implementation (a three-fourths majority). Study 
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participants reported that the majority of the stakeholders were on board, but there was a 
large enough minority of teachers who were opposed to the plan that defeated it. 
There was a committee that looked into what [MAST] would look like. It was 
presented to staff as free money. The school board approved it, but teachers voted 
it down. I’m pretty sure the high school said yes and elementary voted it down (C. 
Jones, personal communication, September 29, 2009). 
 
Seventy-five percent of the [CGEA] members had to vote yes. There weren’t that 
many, so it failed. There were more than 50%, if I remember right. The rationale 
is you don’t want 50% because you want a significant majority of the teachers on 
board. Candy and Logan had a positive feeling about the program, but the 
program was too new and we didn’t get a chance to educate teachers enough on 
what it was…More education [was possibly needed]. I don’t know if the district 
has any say [in what would help MAST pass]. Probably a discussion about what 
percentage is needed to pass. I understand needing more than 51%, but what’s the 
appropriate percentage? I think the groundwork and site visits were headed in the 
right direction. We just needed more education (S. Barnes, personal 
communication, October 16, 2008). 
 
 The perceptions of participants from Cotton Grove regarding why MAST did not 
pass demonstrated a realization that communication between stakeholders and MAST 
planners was deficient. One of the drawbacks of pay-for-performance plans like MAST 
was that they could be extremely complicated and difficult for teachers to understand 
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similar to what Harris (2007) found when studying merit-based compensation. Teachers 
may have needed more time to understand Cotton Grove’s MAST plan and perhaps a 
decision to delay the vote until more teachers understood the components of Cotton 
Grove’s MAST plan would have helped it to pass. The lack of accurate knowledge 
regarding the level of understanding the teachers had about the district’s MAST plan was 
an indication of a lack of competence in the human resource frame and interpersonal and, 
perhaps, the conceptual aspects of leadership. 
 The teachers’ union’s requirement of a 75% majority vote in order to pass MAST 
was also a barrier to approving the plan.  
It came to a vote by the board. The board accepted it. The teachers determined 
that they needed to have a super vote, a 75% majority. They had a majority vote, 
but did not have a super majority, so it died (J. O’Connor, personal 
communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
The vote result was that the teachers didn’t vote in favor of it, and it has not 
resurfaced. That was in 2006-2007. I think the school board was ready to move on 
it at that time, but unfortunately it didn’t pass with the teachers (J. Sutton, 
personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
Both of the two case districts that had successfully implemented MAST plans throughout 
this research required only 50% plus one vote to pass MAST. Perhaps this was related to 
the level of trust among stakeholders in the districts as participants in Pine Springs and 
Winter Valley reported strong trust between teachers and administrators whereas Cotton 
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Grove reported that there were some negative issues regarding trust in the district at the 
time of the MAST discussion. 
 
Local Leadership 
Dr. Joe O’Connor was in his third superintendency while he was at Cotton Grove 
at the beginning of this study. His first superintendency was in a small, rural community 
in a Midwestern state where he served for three years. The second was in a small, rural 
community in Central State, where he also served for three years. He was the fifth 
superintendent to serve in the Cotton Grove district in its history. Of the former 
superintendents, one served for 26 years, one for 12, and two for relatively short terms. 
Dr. O’Connor was at the helm of the Cotton Grove school district for six years. He later 
left Cotton Grove and became the superintendent of a school district in a regional center 
in another state. Dr. O’Connor’s departure from Cotton Grove was unrelated to the 
district’s MAST status. He left because he was frustrated when a former employee, 
whom Dr. O’Connor had personally recommended for termination for what Dr. 
O’Connor believed was illegal promotion of religious beliefs in school, was elected to the 
school board.  
 Effective leadership for MAST implementation was lacking at Cotton Grove. 
Participants seemed to agree that something went wrong, but they didn’t agree on what it 
was.  However, participants’ statements all reflected leadership and/or communication 
issues as factors that derailed MAST. 
In the end, it was the vote. It died probably because of leadership issues. I believe 
one of the buildings killed it. I think it was one of the middle schools, but I can’t 
Pay-for-Performance Page 237 of 299 
remember which one. I think there was a lack of trust with the building principal. 
Staff was afraid of how it would be used against them. Union leadership could be 
an issue too [in many such votes against an initiative], but it was not in our case. 
They were with us. Candy and George [another union representative] helped lead 
the process and worked hard. There were employee fears that [teachers] were 
going to be evaluated on factors over which they had no control. Probably, lastly, 
a lot of staff [members] don’t see themselves in a leadership role. They see 
themselves as a classroom teacher. They don’t take that role seriously or 
necessarily want it (J. O’Connor, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
 Dr. O’Connor was accurate in identifying a lack of trust as a barrier to successful 
MAST implementation. However, at the time the plan was being promoted to teachers, 
Dr. O’Connor was focused on the structural aspects of leadership rather than the human 
resource frame and interpersonal and relational aspects of leadership that appeared to be 
necessary to successfully implement MAST. Additionally, his lack of attention in 
successfully remaining informed of MAST’s status in the district once it was delegated to 
others showed ineffectiveness in the task aspect of leadership. 
Dr. O’Connor believed that leadership and a lack of time on his part (to be able to 
leverage the trust and communication he had established with staff and administration) 
were the telling issues in the failure of the MAST effort. At the time MAST was being 
discussed in the district, Cotton Grove was one of the fastest growing school districts in 
the country. This growth put an incredible demand on Dr. O’Connor’s time. 
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My life at Cotton Grove was mostly building buildings. We had five new schools 
in five years. While I was an active part of the [MAST] committee, I made every 
meeting, but Logan [Human Resource Director] led it. It was just because I didn’t 
have the time to do it all. I think it needs a superintendent to be out and 
personable about it. I didn’t know until after the fact that the union was going to 
require a super vote. If I had known, I would have gone to the buildings 
personally. I don’t know if that would have made a difference or not, but a 
superintendent has to be very proactive. You can’t turn it over to someone else 
and say good luck. As a superintendent, you represent the spirit of trust in district. 
If you don’t have that trust, you’re not going to get the vote anyway, but if you do 
have it, you need to use it (J. O’Connor, personal communication, October 1, 
2009). 
  
 Dr. O’Connor’s over-focus on the structural frame was understandable. A focus 
on the building of infrastructure and hiring and leading many new people was required to 
keep the district running, especially when considering the number of building projects 
that occurred during the year the district worked on its MAST plan. However, greater 
attention to the symbolic, political, and human resource leadership frames and visionary, 
relational, interpersonal, task, and conceptual aspects of leadership would likely have 
aided MAST implementation had Dr. O’Connor been able to keep his neoconservative 
rhetoric in check. 
 Dr. O’Connor may have been a strong negotiator in the political frame; however, 
he seemed to be unable to translate the “pay-for-performance” rhetoric of CSDE, the 
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Legislature, and the Governor into language that would be accepted by the teachers at 
Cotton Grove. His inability to codify this rhetoric further eroded the trust between 
teachers and administrators in the district. Dr. O’Connor seemed to lack understanding of 
the political nature of MAST and appeared to accept the state-level MAST rhetoric. I 
think that he believed that Cotton Grove teachers would accept that rhetoric as well. 
However, this was not the case. 
 Additionally, Dr. O’Connor completely delegated the oversight of the 
development of the MAST plan to Logan Taylor (Human Resources Director) and Candy 
Johnson (Union President). Had Dr. O’Connor participated in the development process, 
he might have realized that MAST was more accepted in some schools than in others. He 
also would have known that 75% of teachers had to vote to approve the plan. If he had 
been aware of these issues, he could have spent more time in those schools promoting the 
MAST plan. He would have also known that some schools strongly supported MAST. 
Dr. O’Connor should have also known that MAST did not need to be implemented 
district-wide, but could also be implemented school by school. He could have worked to 
have the MAST plan and vote implemented by school. If one school implemented MAST 
(especially the high school because of its size and the number of teachers who worked in 
it) it probably would not have been long before other schools in the district demanded 
MAST. This was because Cotton Grove already had many MAST components in place, 
but teachers were not getting compensated for the work. It was possible that teachers in 
schools that did not have MAST would resent that they were doing much of the same 
work as the teachers in the school that had MAST, but were not getting paid for that work 
and would request to participate in MAST as well. 
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The district already had a mission statement, goals, and a strategic plan, but 
MAST was never discussed symbolically in terms of how it would help Cotton Grove 
fulfill its mission. This was a failure of symbolic leadership. Cotton Grove could have 
leveraged the idealism that was present in its mission documents to inspire teachers to 
work to fulfill this mission and illustrated how MAST would help accomplish that. 
However, district leadership largely used the mission, goals, and strategic plan as 
financial accountability tools rather than as symbols of pursuing excellence. This 
reinforced the trend of Dr. O’Connor to focus on the structural frame of leadership and be 
inattentive to the other frames as how MAST fit into the district’s mission, strategic plan, 
or goals was not discussed with stakeholders. 
 
Communication between Local Stakeholders 
 The lack of attention to areas outside of the structural framework also manifested 
itself in ineffective communication and contradictory messages showing ineffective 
leadership in the interpersonal and relational aspects of leadership as well. Inattention to 
the human resource and symbolic frames and a lack of clear and consistent 
communication that focused on the benefits of MAST from the teachers’ perspective 
permeated implementation. Teachers wanted to participate in the professional 
development aspects of MAST, and were even receptive to the goal setting component if 
it tied into the goals the district already established through its strategic plan. However, 
much of the superintendent’s communication with stakeholders related to the 
accountability portions of MAST and failed to take into account the perspective of the 
teachers. The perspective Dr. O’Connor promotes was his own which was aligned with 
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that of the Governor, Legislature, and CSDE but was not shared by the Cotton Grove 
teachers. 
 Teachers in Cotton Grove felt like they were doing a good job, but could do better 
if more professional development opportunities were provided that would allow them to 
use what they had learned in the classroom. Teachers were not receptive to changing the 
salary schedule or adding additional accountability measures; however, teachers may 
have accepted these components as the cost of having access to job-embedded 
professional development, if the focus of MAST as communicated to stakeholders was 
professional development rather than increased accountability. 
Within the district, participants cited a lack of trust and communication as key 
reasons why the initiative failed. However, participants had contrasting views about what 
the trust issues were, thus reinforcing the belief that ineffective communication per se 
was also an issue. As mentioned earlier, Dr. O’Connor believed that his own leadership, 
as well as poor leadership on the part of one of the middle school principals, was the 
instrumental to the failure of MAST implementation at Cotton Grove. Charlie Jones also 
saw trust and communication as issues, although he attributed these issues to a different 
source.  
At the high school we had many meetings and were well informed. I think the 
elementary teachers got different information and weren’t as comfortable with it. 
There was fear that teachers would be pitted against each other and it would be 
more competitive versus looking at achievement at the student level. There was 
fear on the teachers’ part that we wouldn’t get as much of a raise if we got MAST 
money. The board said it was two separate issues. I’m not sure that the elementary 
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[schools] got that information (C. Jones, personal communication, September 29, 
2009). 
The fact that different participants attributed trust and communication issues to different 
sources, gave further credence to their belief that trust and communication were issues at 
the time of the MAST discussion.  
Finally, another reason that teachers at Cotton Grove may have considered the 
focus of MAST to be pay-for-performance intended to undermine the union’s legitimacy 
was how Dr. O’Connor presented MAST when he did communicate about it as evidenced 
by his retrospective view of the most important component of MAST. 
Being able to pay for performance [was the most important part of MAST]. What 
I mean by that in particular is being able to recognize financially the staff 
members who are change agents. Putting themselves out there being leaders and 
being competent and beyond with their peers. Also, focus on professional growth 
and development. It’s the “good to great” mentality. We’ve never reached 
perfection. We need to keep improving toward it. This was not a component of 
ours, but I would have found site goal-setting very helpful so that there is a 
common purpose within the building (J. O’Connor, personal communication, 
October 1, 2009). 
 
I think teachers tend to be more skeptical. There needs to be a way to answer that 
skepticism. One question is whether [MAST] would truly result in teacher 
professional development. At least here that was the enticement, but I don’t think 
necessarily there was real belief in that because [the teachers] thought it was 
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something other than that. They thought it was something else in terms of 
evaluation processes (J. Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
 I have noted that Dr. O’Connor’s deficiencies at the time, particularly in regard to 
the symbolic aspects of his job, had a lot to do with MAST’s fate in Cotton Grove. This 
was true, but the problem was deeper than that. Dr. O’Connor was completely unable to 
promote the goals of MAST beyond those of the neoconservative supporters of MAST in 
the Legislature and sympathetic district board members. Thus the Cotton Grove teachers’ 
union’s negative vote on MAST may have been a result of the focus on accountability 
and pay-for-performance aspects of MAST promoted both by Dr. O’Connor and CSDE 
in addition to the key leadership issues at the time as much as it was simply due to his 
inattention to MAST. Perhaps rather than simply the expression of one school’s 
disenfranchisement with its principal, the key block of “no” votes additionally reflected 
unstated “extra” premises attached to the MAST proposal. It was also possible that if Dr. 
O’Connor did actively promote MAST within the district based on his view of its 
important components and not on the teachers’ view of its important components, MAST 
would have failed by a larger margin. 
 
Communication between CSDE and Cotton Grove 
 Teachers at Cotton Grove did not want to spend the time necessary to develop and 
implement a MAST plan only to have the funding go away and have the program cease in 
a couple of years, so they also questioned the longevity of the program. They wanted to 
know, “How long is the state going to fund it and what happens when the money goes 
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away? What happens when the money runs out? Can the district afford to keep it going?” 
(C. Jones, personal communication, September 29, 2009). 
 The district’s business manager, Susan Barnes, also saw trust issues with the state 
in terms of long-term funding of MAST and shifting costs of the program to local 
districts through a property tax levy. 
On the financial side, I would like it if none of the money was from local levy. 
Personally, I think it was a hidden part of the program where the first year it 
seemed like “here’s this great new program and this money,” but the second year 
part of it became local levy. State taxes come from local taxpayers too, but when 
we’re trying to pass local levies, it gets harder. When you tack on the MAST part, 
the impact on local taxpayers is small, but when you’re trying to build, it’s hard. I 
try to keep a close eye on the local levy impact…I don’t think that would change 
implementation. Teachers really don’t care about that. That’s more of a board 
concern. It’s a district choice. Districts can choose to take less revenue by just 
taking the state aid portion and not participating in the local levy. The school 
board could decide to do that. I don’t see that the local levy would stop 
implementation, because the school board can decide whether or not to do that (S. 
Barnes, personal communication, October 16, 2008). 
Barnes’ sensitivity to the tax impact was likely colored by the district’s inability to pass 
operating levies for the past few years. 
 Barnes, also saw CSDE’s scrutiny of plans in regard to altering or eliminating the 
traditional salary schedule as an issue. Cotton Grove had to determine how to restructure 
the traditional compensation grid to the extent CSDE would require it to be reformed. 
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 Now the state is looking at plans more closely. It’s not that [CSDE was] passing 
them easily before, but now they are scrutinizing [MAST plans] more closely to 
see if they are aligned with what the Governor wants. There is also a question 
about ongoing funding. We didn’t get far enough into it, but blending the old 
contract with the new MAST requirements and having teachers trust it could be 
an issue (S. Barnes, personal communication, October 16, 2008). 
 
If it is intended to be a restructuring overhaul of the step and lane schedule, that’s 
not going to fly here…We have a very strong union in that regard, and a very 
strong desire to maintain the status quo in that regard. I think that [MAST] would 
certainly allow for people to see it as I think it could be intended—to be a huge 
boost to professional development. If that were the case, I think people would be 
more apt to adopt it, but it’s been touted as pay for performance, and it can’t lose 
that negative connotation. It can’t lose that connotation unless the structure 
changes. (J. Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
The time period that Cotton Grove attempted to implement MAST was during the 
time period that participants from Pine Springs and Winter Valley in addition to Cotton 
Grove reported CSDE was more critical of approving MAST plans (J. Frodo, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009; B. Greene, personal communication, October 1, 
2009). This was also after CSDE won the lawsuit over their definition of “reform” 
(Findlaw, 2007). This likely enabled CSDE to push toward more closely adhering to the 
Governor’s vision of MAST. 
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 There were also issues of trust with the Legislature and CSDE in terms of MAST 
itself and whether a hidden agenda existed with the program implementation. 
I think not being tied to a particular political agenda would make it [MAST] 
better. I also think a different resource structure [would help too]. I mean if it 
were to be funded differently. For our district that would make it an easier sell. 
There would need to be a level of commitment outside of the Governor for people 
to be willing to do it. There are a lot of people who think this is the Governor’s 
baby and it will only be around as long as the Governor is around. I think it needs 
more champions (J. Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
Jack Sutton’s thought that MAST was something other than what it purported to be 
seemed to be accurate; however, despite the departure of Governor King, MAST was still 
in statute at the time of this research. This was possibly due to the Republican controlled 
House and Senate, although increasingly more Democrats were embracing performance-
based pay for teachers. 
 
Crying over Spilled Milk: Remorse over the MAST Vote 
 Despite the “no” vote for MAST, the majority of stakeholders in Cotton Grove 
were disappointed that MAST would not be implemented. In addition to the post-vote 
finger pointing about which people were responsible for voting it down, there was a real 
sense of loss about the extra money that would have been used to pay teachers, especially 
during the economic downturn and limited school funding facing districts in Central State 
at the time of this research. 
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I say that knowing what was coming to a certain extent —not knowing the extent 
of what we’re in now that we’re in it. [In hindsight] we were foolish not do it 
[implement MAST]. Now we don’t have that funding source. We’re missing out 
on that money, and we can’t do some of the things we would like to do. We 
continue to do the mentor program that was going to be expanded with MAST, 
but we don’t do it to the level that we did even before MAST. We’ve had to scale 
that back due to budget cuts, so every teacher doesn’t get their own mentor. Some 
teachers share a mentor—like two teachers have one mentor. Collaborative teams 
have been reduced because of budget cuts as well, but we still have them to some 
extent. There are only a few that have collaborative time any more. Each year 
there gets to be less and less (J Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 
2009). 
 
 Although some teachers were distrustful of the MAST program, they still felt the 
pain of losing the MAST funding.  
[With MAST] Teachers would be able to collaborate with teachers and be 
compensated for the extra work they were doing. The district and teachers felt it 
would promote the mentor program and other programs we think are beneficial. 
There would also be more money for collaboration. The district still supports 
collaboration through Professional Learning Communities (PLCs), but they’ve 
dropped off in the last couple of years. They’re not as prevalent as they were a 
few years ago. Also, the high school has dropped all MAP [Measures of 
Academic Progress standardized] testing, except for special ed[ucation]. The 
Pay-for-Performance Page 248 of 299 
middle school still uses it to show progress. I wish we still had it. It was really 
valuable, but times are tight and you know about cuts (C. Jones, personal 
communication, September 29, 2009. 
 
MAST’s Long-Term Prospects in Cotton Grove 
 Despite regrets about missing the funding at the time of this research, Cotton 
Grove had no plans to resume talks about MAST. In these tough economic times school 
board members were reluctant to levy an additional tax on taxpayers in order to fund the 
local portion of MAST. “We recently had trouble getting our school board to support a $5 
[per student] lease levy. You know, it was a really small amount, and we had trouble 
getting them to support that” (J. Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
There were also significant issues about trust within the district and between the district 
and the state government that served as barriers to resuming the discussion about MAST. 
They [administrators] need to convince the teachers that it’s [MAST] a good thing 
or have other policies in place that it can’t have anything to do with negotiations. 
Negotiations and MAST have to be two separate things. One thing I really liked 
was the open-endedness of it. Each district could have their [sic] own plan (C. 
Jones, personal communication, September 29, 2009). 
 
 Once the Cotton Grove teachers’ union rejected its MAST proposal, the district 
experienced a number of challenges. In 2008 Dr. O’Connor left Cotton Grove; however, 
much of his legacy remained, but not all of what was good. Since his departure, the 
district faced an inability to pass building bonds and operating levies that led to 
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overcrowded schools, larger class sizes, and devastating cuts to its flagship 
environmental education program, including forfeiture of a $500,000 environmental 
learning grant. 
 Also, many members of the district office staff hired during Dr. O’Connor’s 
tenure left—some voluntarily and some because the positions created during Dr. 
O’Connor’s tenure were eliminated due to the district’s need to reduce its budget. 
Mirroring the recent turbulence within the district, the district’s mission statement also 
changed. The new mission statement for the district was, “Our mission is to educate all 
learners to reach their full potential as contributing, productive community members of 
an ever-changing world. We are innovative, environmentally focused, and wise stewards 
of our resources” (Cotton Grove Public School District, 2009). According to Jack Sutton 
(School Principal) the new mission statement was intentionally more focused and easier 
to connect to the district’s recent difficult times. 
We’ve shortened it considerably. We now have a one-page document. We had a 
different consultant come in, and I think its better. It’s much more succinct than 
our previous one, but it wasn’t the one that was in place when we explored 
MAST. The core values included in the district’s new mission statement include 
partnership, innovation, respect, wise stewardship, accountability, and striving for 
excellence (J. Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
 Charlie Jones reported that the district’s core values were updated to incorporate 
the following components that were reflective of the district’s difficult financial situation. 
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There’s a commitment to rigor, and environmentalism is very important here. The 
district also tries to maintain diversity in choices of courses while maintaining 
class sizes of 23 or more. There is a policy in place now that says you have to 
have 23 students in your class, otherwise the class is cancelled. There is no 
maximum [number of students allowed in a class] (C. Jones, personal 
communication, September 29, 2009). 
Interestingly, this was the first time I had ever heard of an organization change its 
mission and vision statements to reflect its poor financial situation. 
As Central State’s finances deteriorated and its Legislature shifted education 
financing due in the current year to being paid in a future year and withheld aid payments 
to districts in order to preserve its own cash flow, districts in Central State felt the pinch. 
With most teacher unions settling for modest pay increases or no increase at all, it did not 
appear to be enough of an incentive for Cotton Grove teachers to consider MAST 
implementation again. 
We aren’t having to borrow money for cash flow needs at this point yet, but we 
aren’t able to invest as much. The tighter that gets, the more we should have in 
fund balance to help us through those tight cash flow times. And that’s tough 
because how are we supposed to do that with no money? We shared that 
information with the union, but I’m not sure there’s a mutual concern or 
understanding of that. The district always says that, so the union doesn’t 
understand why it’s different now (S. Barnes, personal communication, October 
1, 2009). 
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 Despite the lack of any conversation about MAST for three years at Cotton 
Grove, at least some would not be surprised if the depressed economic situation of the 
district caused the subject to be revisited. However, there was a general feeling among 
the participants in the district that MAST did not have a realistic shot at being 
implemented in Cotton Grove any time soon. 
I haven’t heard it mentioned at all since the vote. I don’t know if either side is 
bringing it up because I haven’t heard anything. At the same time, I wouldn’t be 
surprised if [MAST exploration resurfaced] because that’s the only money out 
there. If teachers want new money, it’s the only way to get it right now. That’s 
why I think we should have jumped on board when we had the chance. I didn’t 
foresee the extent of the economic downturn, but it was a pot of money we could 
have had access to (J. Sutton, personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
 When interviewed in 2008, Barnes reported that she and the new superintendent 
were in fact talking about reviving the MAST discussion in the district; however, in a 
year, that conversation had not gained momentum. 
I think [MAST] might spark a conversation after negotiations. Last time they 
discussed it in between—in the year in between negotiations. I could see that 
happening here. It depends on how negotiations go. I think if it’s brought back up 
again because of the economic times, I think the board will be very sensitive to 
local taxpayers. Last time the board was going to try to access all of the dollars. 
This time I think they’d just access the state dollars to be conscious of the 
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economic times and the local taxpayers while still supporting MAST (S. Barnes, 
personal communication, October 1, 2009). 
 
Right now CGEA feels [MAST is] a dead issue. If it happened again there would 
need to be better communication with teachers. We would need to meet to find 
out what went wrong last time and fix it before moving forward again (C. Jones, 
personal communication, September 29, 2009). 
 
Blue Lake 
 
District Background 
 Blue Lake was a regional center comprised of typical working class families. 
Tourism was the most notable industry in Blue Lake, although there were numerous 
varied manufacturing-type businesses as well. Blue Lake was represented by both a 
Republican congressman and a Republican senator in the state Legislature. Its school 
district was one of the largest employers in the city, and enrolled approximately 3,800 
students (CSDE, 2009b). 
Despite spending less than the state average, Blue Lake had a declining general 
fund balance at the time of this study (CSDE, 2009b). The average school district 
property tax on homes in Blue Lake was $421 (CSDE, 2009b). However, the industrial 
base helped offset Blue Lake’s low revenue generated from residential property taxes. 
While the district was participating in MAST, it also received an additional $260 per 
student (CSDE, 2009b). Blue Lake adopted and implemented MAST in the summer of 
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2005, but abandoned the program prior to the start of the 2006-2007 school year due to 
an inability to reach an agreement with its teachers’ union and CSDE on a reformed 
teacher salary schedule. Blue Lake students scored as making adequate yearly progress 
on the NCLB goals in five of the past seven years, ranking second of the districts that 
participated in this study, just behind Winter Valley (CSDE, 2009a).  
 The Blue Lake School District had a strong set of core values that it used to guide 
district decision-making. These values included acting ethically, respecting diversity, 
preparing learners, developing students’ leadership and problem-solving skills, and being 
accountable as a district. 
 According to Blue Lake Superintendent Ben Adams (personal communication, 
September 23, 2008), Blue Lake also worked toward annual goals to focus its decision-
making. The district’s 2008-09 strategic goals included increasing student literacy, 
improving district infrastructure, and improving communications and access. 
 
Local Leadership 
At the time of this research, Dr. Ben Adams had been with the Blue Lake School 
District for 22 years. At the time Blue Lake adopted MAST, he was the assistant 
superintendent, but worked with local stakeholders to implement MAST. He became the 
superintendent of the Blue Lake School District in 2006, at which time the Blue Lake’s 
teachers’ union voted to discontinue the MAST program. He remained the superintendent 
at Blue Lake for the duration of this research. 
Dr. Adams did not appear to be emotionally or intellectually attached to MAST, 
but rather seemed indifferent to it during both interviews. This could have been because 
Pay-for-Performance Page 254 of 299 
of the costs to the district associated with MAST in terms of administering the program 
and the amount of his time that was devoted to that administration during the year Blue 
Lake implemented MAST as well as the two years that had passed since Blue Lake 
teachers voted to discontinue MAST. Additionally, although Dr. Adams spoke mostly 
about MAST in terms of professional development and student achievement, he also 
referred to it as a “pay-for-performance” program on occasion. However, Dr. Adams’ 
comments regarding the pay-for-performance aspects of MAST were much more 
subdued than those of Dr. O’Connor at Cotton Grove. It appeared that Dr. Adams was 
largely able to translate the neoconservative MAST rhetoric promoted at the state level 
into language that was accepted locally; however, local teachers may have just not been 
willing to dramatically change their compensation method. 
Trust and collaboration were key leadership elements that helped secure the local 
approval of the initial MAST plan. This was similar to the experiences of Pine Springs 
and Winter Valley. That Dr. Adams was able to develop the level of trust and 
collaboration necessary to lead the district through its rapid application and 
implementation process, showed his strength in the relational and interpersonal aspects of 
leadership as well as his ability to operate successfully in the human resource and 
political frames. That Blue Lake teachers did not approve the MAST plan with a 
reformed salary schedule was probably more of a reflection of that particular component 
of MAST rather than a reflection of Dr. Adam’s leadership. 
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Education Reform Hash 
Like the other districts that implemented MAST, Blue Lake did not implement 
MAST in isolation. As part of its job-embedded professional development, Blue Lake 
also implemented several other initiatives promoted as tools to increase student 
achievement.  
While we were working on MAST, we were also trying to start a lot of other 
things. We did SMART goal setting, lesson study, tuning protocol, common 
assessments, Marzano’s instructional strategies, Understanding by Design, 
literacy training, differentiated instruction, at-risk programming, inquiry based 
science, and understanding and using student standardized test data in instruction. 
I think that’s all of them. (A. Mason, personal communication, October 5, 2011). 
With all of these initiatives being implemented at approximately the same time, it was 
extremely difficult to determine what impact, if any, any one initiative had on student 
achievement as was true with the other case districts that implemented MAST. 
 
MAST Plan 
Amy Mason was a teacher in the Blue Lake district at the time of its MAST 
implementation, but was working at CSDE at the time of this research. She shared the 
components of Blue Lake’s MAST plan. That plan had all of the required components 
similarly to the other case districts with the exception of a reformed salary schedule. Blue 
Lake’s MAST application included career ladders, job-embedded professional 
development, a comprehensive evaluation system, and alternative teacher compensation 
that linked 40% of the MAST-funded compensation to individual teachers’ students’ 
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assessment performance and 60% to school board approved site goals. These items were 
already in place when Blue Lake submitted its application to CSDE. According to CSDE, 
an alternative teacher compensation schedule for the non-MAST funded teacher 
compensation was also a required part of the application; however, in order to get more 
school districts involved with the MAST program quickly, Blue Lake was allowed to 
begin its participation in MAST without this aspect completed with the understanding 
that the district would develop and implement this portion prior to the following school 
year (A. Mason, personal communication, October 5, 2011). 
Otherwise, Blue Lake’s MAST plan was much like those of the other case 
districts that implemented MAST. Its career ladder included the following five rungs: 
resource teacher, career teacher, site leader, instructional assessment coach, and mentor 
coordinator. All of these positions included an additional stipend with the exception of 
resource teachers (A. Mason, personal communication, October 5, 2011). 
The comprehensive evaluation plan involved rubrics aligned with Central State’s 
standards of effective practices and course content assessments, and everyone that 
participated in MAST had to develop and follow an individual growth plan (A. Mason, 
personal communication, October 5, 2011). In order to be able to do this, Blue Lake 
principals, peer coaches, and teachers were trained in coaching and developing and using 
instructional frameworks (A. Mason, personal communication, October 5, 2011). 
Performance pay compensation was awarded with 40% of the MAST dollars 
being awarded based on individual teachers’ instructional assessments and 60% based on 
school board approved school site goals. The alternative teacher professional pay 
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schedule was not in place at the time Blue Lake began the MAST program, but there was 
a provision for it in the district’s MAST application. 
Blue Lake planned to implement an alternative teacher professional pay schedule 
that included expanded use of learning resource teachers, leadership pay 
opportunities, revised responsibility pay, teacher board certified awards, and a 
modified salary schedule. Blue Lake didn’t have this in place, but it is common 
for districts to have their applications approved without having all of the 
components in place…Blue Lake did have a memorandum of understanding 
covering all of the components mentioned above with the exception of the 
modified salary schedule. In their MAST application, Blue Lake stated that this 
would be in place by July 1, 2006 (A. Mason, personal communication, October 
5, 2011). 
With CSDE’s insistence on districts radically changing their traditional step and lane 
salary schedule, it seemed strange that Blue Lake’s MAST plan would be approved with 
essentially a promissory note in this area. However, that CSDE regularly approved 
MAST plans without having all of the components in place seemed to be accurate based 
on the experiences of Pine Springs and Winter Valley. This practice could have also 
fueled the rumors that CSDE approved plans on a partisan basis. 
 
MAST Implementation 
 For Blue Lake, like the other case districts, money was an important consideration 
in pursuing MAST, especially since the district had some of the required components 
already in place. 
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There was a twofold opportunity for implementing MAST. Money was a strong 
consideration. We had a number of things already in place for MAST—building 
goals, teacher goals, collaboration, and a targeted professional development 
program that we could build upon. We were heavily into peer coaches already (B. 
Adams, personal communication, September 23, 2008). 
Having at least some of the required MAST components already in place seemed to be an 
incentive for districts to pursue MAST, probably because this was perceived to make 
implementation easier and teachers could receive compensation for something that they 
were already doing for free.  
 At Blue Lake, as with the other districts studied that implemented MAST, there 
was a collaborative effort between teachers, administrators, and the school board. This 
was necessary for implementation as Blue Lake experienced a challenging time frame to 
put a plan together in order to be accepted by CSDE for implementation at the beginning 
of the following school year. 
There was a tight time frame between [teacher contract] negotiations and the 
MAST deadline so MAST became part of [teacher contract] negotiations. This 
was from July to September. There was a strong relationship between the [union] 
and administration, and we worked collaboratively (B. Adams, personal 
communication, September 23, 2008).  
 
 As Blue Lake progressed through its year of MAST, it found that teachers 
improved their ability to set and work toward goals as site-based teams. 
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We got better at building individual and site goals.  We learned a lot about 
creating goals that were measurable.  We didn’t realize at the beginning it would 
be so difficult to develop measurable goals (B. Adams, personal communication, 
September 23, 2008). 
That implementing the MAST components was more difficult than expected was also a 
common experience among the districts that had implemented MAST. 
 Like the other districts that implemented MAST, Blue Lake found that as a result 
of implementation, collaboration between teachers improved, as well as their ability to 
effectively use data. According to John Murphy, Blue Lake Business Manager (personal 
communication, December 10, 2009), “It gave the teachers more insight on how to 
improve their instruction, which in turn would improve academic achievement.” 
Dr. Adams also echoed this sentiment. 
Since implementing MAST, we’ve improved at developing building goals using 
data and tying professional development goals to building goals.  We are much 
better at collaboration and teamwork for instructional purposes…Our building 
goals were more measurable, our staff development is tied to building goals; 
individual goals are tied to professional evaluations. We have teacher leadership 
and building leadership teams focused on how we get better at what we do. 
Teachers work with principals on building goals; communication; and in some 
cases, hiring.  We feel good about our peer coaches and the support they provide. 
(B. Adams, personal communication, September 23, 2008).  
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 Two factors affecting the continuation of MAST in Blue Lake included the 
requirement of a super-majority vote to continue MAST and employee turnover in key 
leadership areas. Blue Lake’s teacher’s union required 70% of union members to vote in 
favor of changing the salary schedule and continuing the MAST program. Like in Cotton 
Grove, the majority of Blue Lake’s teachers voted in favor of the MAST plan, but the 
majority was not large enough for MAST to pass. In addition to needing a super-majority 
vote, there was staff turnover in the union leadership and in the superintendent and  
assistant superintendent positions areas that impacted continued MAST implementation 
at Blue Lake. 
We had to get an alternative salary schedule by the state’s timeframe.  Maybe by 
spring of 2007 we had to start getting it done.  We had new union and district 
leadership.  We got together over two days to put together a plan.  We shored up 
areas that needed improvement in our first plan, including the alternative salary 
schedule and less paperwork.  We needed a 70% majority for passing the plan.  
The plan passed 55%-45%, but didn’t pass by 70%, so it failed… If we had 
completed the salary schedule up front, there’s a chance MAST could have 
survived in our district (B. Adams, personal communication, September 23, 
2008). 
However, there was also the possibility that the Blue Lake teachers were simply not 
supportive of the idea of the reformed salary schedule to the extent CSDE required. 
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Communication between CSDE and Blue Lake 
As with most of the other case districts, Blue Lake experienced confusion and 
frustration related to CSDE over-stepping its bounds regarding the components of 
MAST, especially as it related to the salary schedule, the timing of its implementation, 
and MAST bureaucracy. 
 
 Salary schedule bypass and roadblock. 
 The collaborative effort between administrators and teachers enabled Blue Lake 
to put together a MAST plan that was tentatively approved by CSDE in the fall of 2005. 
However, the plan was not complete, because it did not address the teachers’ salary 
schedule at all. Blue Lake, like other districts, struggled with the newness of MAST that 
resulted in a lack of models to draw from, and a lack of expertise on the part of CSDE 
staff. This was problematic because the district relied upon CSDE staff for assistance in 
developing its MAST plan. 
We came together as a district to begin implementation and developing our plan.  
We were meeting frequently to resolve challenges.  We got better at using data at 
the district and the building level because of our MAST experience…Barriers 
included the fast track with the October MAST deadline.  The Central State 
Department of Education was implementing the program as they were designing 
it, so it was difficult to get consistent answers from them. The district’s MAST 
program was tentatively approved without an alternative salary schedule.  
Ultimately this became a barrier (B. Adams, personal communication, September 
23, 2008). 
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Had CSDE been able to properly train its employees in MAST prior to its implementation 
in local school districts, the inconsistent answers to district questions about MAST could 
have been avoided. However, this would not have addressed CSDE’s insistence on 
eliminating step and lane compensation from the teachers’ salary schedule. 
 When participants were asked what would have made MAST implementation 
better at Blue Lake, the idea of having a clearer idea at the state level of what MAST was 
and what plans needed to have in order to be approved and successful, as well as 
accepting only completed plans for approval, were common themes. 
I wish we would have been asked to meet the criteria of the alternative salary 
schedule up front.  I’m not sure that our starting point would have been different.  
The timeframe was too tight.  CSDE should have put their plan together for 
another year first because of the inconsistent messages they were sending us…If 
there was a consistent message from CSDE, we wouldn’t have had to backtrack as 
we were designing the plan (B. Adams, personal communication, September 23, 
2008). 
This frustration was common on the part of all case districts. 
 Still, because it was not clear that teachers would have signed on for the “pay-for-
performance” overtones of MAST, if CSDE had required Blue Lake to reform its 
teachers’ salary schedule prior to approval, the MAST vote might not have been 
different. However, if CSDE had required the salary schedule to be reformed prior to 
approving Blue Lake’s MAST plan, it would have saved Blue Lake a lot of time and 
energy on a one-year program. That said, the district improved its professional 
development practices due to its MAST planning and implementation. This is an area of 
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district activity that Blue Lake kept in place as much as possible through the duration of 
this research. 
 Because MAST was not gaining popularity as the Governor predicted, CSDE was 
under pressure to work with districts to get them participating in MAST so that the 
Governor’s cornerstone education program would not be viewed as a major failure. Since 
Blue Lake was a regional center and showed early interest in MAST, CSDE worked hard 
to ensure that Blue Lake was added to the short list of districts participating in MAST. 
CSDE even waived the deadline for a complete proposal in order to get Blue Lake to 
participate that first year of MAST (B. Adams, personal communication, September 23, 
2008).  
 Interestingly, while Blue Lake was participating in MAST, it was listed as one of 
the districts that had implemented MAST on every CSDE press release about the 
program, and Blue Lake’s MAST plan was included on CSDE’s website. However, after 
Blue Lake discontinued MAST, its name was removed from the press releases, its plan 
removed from CSDE’s website, and all press releases regarding Blue Lake’s adoption of 
MAST removed from the public CSDE archive. These items were still available by 
request through CSDE; however, the first two times I asked for these documents, my 
request was denied. On the third try they were only provided reluctantly after I reminded 
the CSDE employee that they were public documents. It seemed as though CSDE was 
trying to erase Blue Lake’s brief participation in MAST from the public consciousness. 
This could have been another attempt at mystification of other school districts and the 
public on the part of CSDE by giving the illusion that all of the districts with approved 
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MAST plans were still successfully implementing them, thus inflating the perception of 
MAST as a successful program.  
 
 The bureaucratic traffic jam. 
 Blue Lake, like the other districts studied, found that the MAST paperwork was 
burdensome, and the initial implementation process was daunting. 
In our first round with MAST, there was too much paperwork.  It was a 
frustration.  We were more focused on doing paperwork than talking about 
coaching (B. Adams, personal communication, September 23, 2008). 
Dr. Adams and Mr. Murphy both felt that the reporting requirements with MAST 
negatively impacted the time Blue Lake had to actually implement MAST and its focus 
on improving teaching and learning. This was similar to the experiences of Pine Springs 
and Winter Valley as well. 
 Amy Mason concurred. She attempted to email me a PDF file of Blue Lake’s 
original MAST application; however, the file was too big. She had to divide the 
document into three sections and email each section separately (personal communication, 
October 5, 2011). Upon reading the documents, I found them to be tedious and repetitive 
and that the same or very similar information appeared in multiple sections on the 
application. 
 
MAST through the Rearview Mirror 
 The vote to discontinue MAST was a surprise and disappointment to many of the 
Blue Lake stakeholders because for the most part they were finding its professional 
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development qualities helpful. But, the district still had an obligation to its students, so 
life at Blue Lake moved on. 
There was disappointment from the school board because they believed in pay-
for-performance and put a lot of time into it.  There was initial surprise and 
limited emotion, and then we got back to the business of getting better at what we 
do.  We felt good about our plan, but support wasn’t there (B. Adams, personal 
communication, September 23, 2008). 
 
 John Murphy believed that MAST was successful the year it was implemented, 
but that issues related to the requirement of reforming the salary schedule caused the 
collapse of MAST at Blue Lake. 
[MAST] maybe was successful for a very short time and then for whatever 
reason, they abandoned it…The inability to agree on an alternative salary 
schedule was ultimately the major cause of the downfall of MAST in Blue Lake. 
We would still have it if the teachers hadn’t voted it out…It would have been 
helpful to have the salary schedule revised at the forefront instead of trying to 
revise it after we got going. That was a real challenge. It was perceived that there 
was a lot of work on the staff part because of the goals and that. Staff is still doing 
that, but now they’re just not getting compensated for it (J. Murphy, personal 
communication, December 10, 2009). 
It seemed that in Blue Lake, the professional development components were successful 
as they were in Pine Springs and Winter Valley. From participants’ descriptions of the 
demise of MAST in Blue Lake, it seemed that if Blue Lake had received approval for the 
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same salary schedule that was approved in Pine Springs that Blue Lake may well have 
still been participating in MAST at the time of this research and CSDE would not have 
had to mask its brief participation in MAST. However, that would not have done 
anything to advance the Governor’s agenda regarding eliminating the traditional step and 
lane salary schedule. 
 Without the continued availability of the MAST dollars, Blue Lake had to 
prioritize its programming and make some decisions on how to fund the parts of the 
MAST program the district wanted to keep. “We had to decide how to reallocate dollars 
to continue these programs… It affects people because of pay.  It took away some 
professional development money” (B. Adams, personal communication, September 23, 
2008).  John Murphy (personal communication, December 10, 2009) echoed that 
sentiment, “One of the successes was teachers having coaches to help them improve. 
We’re no longer doing that part.” 
 
 A lesser factor, but still significant in the decision to discontinue MAST, was the 
increasing shift of fiscal responsibility for the program from the state to local tax levy. 
As we were leaving the program, a growing concern was the shift from state to 
local funding. More veteran teachers were more wary of funding disappearing and 
the shift of financially supporting the program becoming increasingly local (B. 
Adams, personal communication, September 23, 2008). 
During the time of this research, Blue Lake passed a successful referendum to build a 
new high school. Dr. Adam’s attention to the local taxpayer may have been an indication 
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of his ability to view an issue from other perspectives and to successfully navigate the 
political frame of leadership. 
 Since stopping MAST participation, Blue Lake continued many of the 
components of MAST, but had to reallocate dollars to fund those initiatives. 
Our building goals were more measurable, our staff development is tied to 
building goals; individual goals are tied to professional evaluations. We have 
teacher leadership and building leadership teams focused on how we get better at 
what we do. Teachers work with principals on building goals; communication; 
and in some cases, hiring. We feel good about our peer coaches and the support 
they provide. We had to decide how to reallocate dollars to continue these 
programs (B. Adams, personal communication, September 23, 2008). 
One of those tough decisions was the decision to eliminate peer coaches due to a lack of 
funding. 
  
MAST’s Long-Term Prospects in Blue Lake 
  Blue Lake continued to operate an exemplary staff development program and 
provided students with the best education it could within its means. Since dropping 
MAST, there was no formal discussion of re-entering the program (B. Adams, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009). At the time of this research, despite the trying 
economic situation in which districts were immersed with the state delaying its payment 
of a significant portion of districts’ budgetary allocations for a year, there was only a dim 
chance that the conversation about MAST implementation would resurface (B. Adams, 
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personal communication, October 16, 2009). However, some components of MAST 
survived without the related funding. 
There were things that were created like building leadership teams, our coaching 
model, collaboration, and more attention given to data results and achievement. I 
think those things have sustained themselves over that time (B. Adams, personal 
communication, October 16, 2009). 
 
 Whether or not discussion about MAST would continue would likely depend 
upon factors outside of the district. “I guess it [revisiting MAST] would all depend on 
state finances. If it were the only way to get additional dollars—that may be the only 
thing” (J. Murphy, personal communication, December 10, 2009). 
 The state finances continued to deteriorate, and Blue Lake experienced the 
impact. 
It [tax shift] will cause us to borrow and to use aid anticipation certificates to 
cover cash flow. We’ll use a combination of borrowing and drawing on fund 
balance to maintain cash flow. We’ll lose earned interest and spend more on 
interest on borrowed dollars and use money from fund balance. It impacts the 
bottom line on the budget (B. Adams, personal communication, October 15, 
2009). 
 
 The funding freeze and tax shift were a part of the teacher negotiations picture, as 
were state and district finances in every negotiation year. 
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It’s part of the background information we use as we go through with 
negotiations. It’s part of the economic times. That and the tax shift is all 
information that is out there. We use the problem-solving model for negotiations. 
It’s part of the understanding of what the lay of the land is and understanding the 
data that’s out there. It’s part of understanding the economic landscape and 
planning cycle we use to build the budget every year. We always do that and 
that’s how we go through negotiations too (B. Adams, personal communication, 
October 15, 2009). 
 
 Despite the rough economic times, the great majority of school districts in Central 
State settled for at least a continuing contract at existing compensation levels with their 
teachers’ unions. Very few districts were able to freeze teacher salaries completely. Blue 
Lake was aligned with the majority of districts in not settling for a “hard freeze.” 
We’re not going to have a hard freeze here, so we’re not in that scenario. I don’t 
know if it [state and district economic climate] will spark renewed interest or not. 
I don’t know if there’s an interest in it [MAST]. It has to originate out of teachers’ 
union. We’re prepared for that conversation from a school board point of view but 
we don’t know if it’s going to come or not. There have been no formal 
conversations about it since it was discontinued (B. Adams, personal 
communication, October 15, 2009). 
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Emerging Themes in Cotton Grove and Blue Lake 
 
MAST Rhetoric 
 In both Cotton Grove and Blue Lake both superintendents referred to MAST as a 
pay-for-performance model, although to a much greater extent in Cotton Grove during 
their interviews. The external pay-for performance rhetoric was similar to what was 
experienced in Pine Springs and Winter Valley with board members and community 
members openly referring to MAST as a pay-for-performance plan. This external rhetoric 
was similar all four case districts.  
Dr. O’Connor seemed to be oblivious to how local teachers received the state-
level neoconservative pay-for-performance rhetoric. In Cotton Grove, where MAST was 
not implemented at all, Dr. O’Connor consistently cited paying teachers based on their 
performance as a key component of MAST. The pay-for-performance rhetoric use in 
Cotton Grove could was understood by teachers to mean that Dr. O’Connor did not 
believe that teachers were performing at a desired level. This interpretation led to a lack 
of trust between teachers and Dr. O’Connor. However, Dr. O’Connor did not appear to 
even realize that this was an issue; a clear failure of “taking the point of view of the 
other.” That made symbolic leadership nearly impossible.  
This was contrasted by Blue Lake where the administrators (at least Dr. Adams) 
did not promote CSDE’s neoconservative line to the same extent. Dr. Adams only 
mentioned MAST as a pay-for-performance program once while referring to what the 
Blue Lake School Board liked about MAST and in one other instance. During interviews, 
Dr. Adams seemed to be most pleased with the professional development aspects of 
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MAST—the aspects Blue Lake did its best to maintain after it no longer received MAST 
funding. This translation of the neo-conservative rhetoric likely aided MAST’s early 
implementation in Blue Lake. Additionally, the district culture in Blue Lake seemed to be 
more cohesive than that of Cotton Grove, possibly a result of the level of trust among 
local stakeholders. 
 Both districts did implement professional development components of MAST. 
Blue Lake implemented them formally through its one-year trial of MAST and retained 
those that it could afford after it discontinued MAST. Cotton Grove implemented them 
without MAST funding at all. During the time of this research, both districts saw modest 
gains in their student achievement as measured by state-wide standardized testing. 
Neither district implemented a reformed salary schedule. This added further evidence that 
MAST’s pay-for-performance component most likely was not the driver of increased 
student achievement. 
 
CSDE 
 CSDE’s attempted manipulation of the legislation had a role in MAST 
implementation in Blue Lake. Although district participants said that they might have still 
had MAST at the time of this research if CSDE had required them to submit the salary 
schedule up front, the District and the teachers’ union were unable to reach an agreement 
on a reformed salary schedule in the year that followed their initial approval. I had a 
difficult time believing that Blue Lake would have reached a salary schedule agreement if 
it had a shorter time frame to do so. It seemed to me that Blue Lake would have been 
more likely to keep MAST and develop a reformed salary schedule as a condition of 
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keeping a high-quality professional development program. The “blame CSDE” response 
could have been a result of continued social interactions with CSDE that led district 
participants to view CSDE as bureaucratic, inefficient, and perhaps inept. Additionally, 
blaming CSDE allowed the district stakeholders to maintain their cohesiveness by not 
blaming each other. However, in Cotton Grove, the blame seemed to be directed at both 
CSDE and local district stakeholders. 
 Although CSDE required Cotton Grove to revise their plan once before approving 
it, in keeping with CSDE’s unofficial policy of requiring at least one revision, it did not 
seem to upset any of the participants at Cotton Grove. They simply made the revisions, 
all of which were minor, and re-submitted the plan. Similarly, Blue Lake had no major 
concerns about the plan revisions. The major issue by far at Blue Lake was the 
requirement of the reformed salary schedule. 
However, all four case districts shared a concern, although to varying degrees, 
that the funding and future of MAST was uncertain. Many pay-for-performance programs 
before MAST had come and gone—largely due to a lack of funding and difficulty and 
expense of administering the program. The concern about the longevity of MAST was 
also voiced by participants in Cotton Grove and Blue Lake. Blue Lake also shared 
concerns about the costs to administer the program that were not covered by MAST 
funding.  Cotton Grove participants did not list the administrative costs of MAST as a 
concern. Perhaps since they had not implemented MAST, they were not fully aware of 
this obstacle.  
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Financial Persuasion 
 As in Pine Springs and Winter Valley, the financial incentive for MAST 
participation was the benefit to teachers. Districts would have had money to pay teachers 
more and provide job-embedded professional development, but would have incurred 
costs to administer the program. In terms of providing high quality professional 
development and empowering teachers, this may have been money well spent; however, 
the teachers in these two districts did not buy into MAST. 
 Since Blue Lake was trying to pass a building bond and Cotton Grove was trying 
to pass a building bond and operating levy, the increasing burden of MAST funding that 
was shifted to local taxpayers, was a concern for both of these districts. If the teachers’ 
unions in these districts had chosen to pursue MAST again, it was unlikely that these 
school districts would have accepted the local levy portion of MAST. This would have 
placed the financial needs of the district ahead of the financial desires of the teachers and 
left fewer dollars available for MAST compensation. As Central State shifted more of the 
MAST funding burden to local taxpayers, it was likely that more districts would 
discontinue MAST or at least stop accepting the local levy portion of MAST funding. If 
MAST funding were to shift entirely to local taxpayers, increasingly districts would drop 
MAST as they needed to pass bonds and operating levies to keep their districts 
functioning. 
 
The Importance of Trust 
 Trust among case district internal stakeholders and between the Cotton Grove and 
Blue Lake districts and CSDE seemed to be important aspects of planning and 
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implementing MAST successfully. The teachers’ unions of both school districts may 
have been distrustful of  CSDE, MAST, and to a varying extent, district leaders, which 
may have spurred the requirement for more than a 50% plus one majority vote 
requirement to approve MAST. The Blue Lake teachers’ union required a 70% vote to 
pass MAST, and Cotton Grove required a 75% vote to pass MAST. Nothing in MAST 
legislation established a level at which public schools were required to pass MAST. In 
districts where perhaps the union leadership was more skeptical of MAST, the leadership 
could have established a required percentage of “yes” votes that would have made MAST 
adoption unlikely. Unions could have also misinterpreted the legislative language and 
believed that a 70% “yes” vote was required for public school districts to participate in 
MAST (This was only a requirement for charter schools at the time of this research). At 
any rate, both districts had a majority of teachers who voted in favor of MAST, but did 
not have the extra votes necessary to implement the program.  
Likely because administrators in Blue Lake did not promote the neoconservative 
components of MAST, but rather focused on the professional development aspects of the 
program, trust amongst internal stakeholders was never raised as an issue, despite the 
difficulty teachers’ union and district representatives had in settling the contract. The 
trust issues in Blue Lake seemed to center around the “pay-for-performance” rhetoric and 
the “reformed” salary schedule required by CSDE. 
However, in Cotton Grove, a lack of trust and effective communication were 
mentioned frequently by participants. At Cotton Grove there appeared to be strong 
communication between the members of the MAST exploratory team, and all Cotton 
Grove participants reported that all members of the exploratory team worked hard, 
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worked well together, and that there was a culture of trust between them. However 
participants pointed to a lack of time to effectively educate teachers about MAST to the 
degree necessary to have at least 75% of union members vote “yes” on the district’s 
MAST proposal. Additionally, Dr. O’Connor did not know that the Cotton Grove 
teachers’ union required a 75% “yes” vote. Although if he was attending to MAST 
effectively, he should have known, especially since Dr. O’Connor reported that he had 
attended, but had just not led, all of the MAST meetings.  
Being unable to effectively communicate with teachers about the benefits of 
MAST for the Cotton Grove District raised issues of trust and questions about whether a 
hidden agenda existed within the program. In Cotton Grove a lack of understanding about 
the program raised fears that teachers would be more focused on competing with each 
other for dollars than focusing on student achievement. There was also concern about 
MAST dollars being used to replace regular salary increases. Study participants reported 
feeling like they received correct and adequate information, but that they did not believe 
that that information was disseminated thoroughly throughout the district, as participants 
reported being uncertain that various groups received correct information about MAST. It 
was also interesting to note that as participants reported on the group that did not receive 
correct information, the group identified varied among participants. 
In the Cotton Grove District the human resources director and the union president 
went to individual schools to explain to teachers the MAST program the district hoped to 
implement. Perhaps with a longer time frame between developing the plan and 
implementation, there would have been more time to have multiple meetings with 
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teachers so that development team representatives could have been able to answer more 
questions and established a greater feeling of trust in regard to the MAST program. 
Dr. O'Connor pointed to a lack of trust between one of the building principals and 
the teachers in the school he led. His failure to address this trust issue prior to the MAST 
vote allowed rumors about MAST to spread faster than the factual information about the 
district’s MAST program. He also failed to acknowledge that his own hard-charging 
rhetoric may have had anything to do with the failure of MAST implementation at Cotton 
Grove. Had Dr. O’Connor been able to understand the political nature of MAST and lead 
effectively from the human resource and political frames and leverage the relational, 
interpersonal, and conceptual aspects of leadership regarding MAST, Cotton Grove may 
have had a different result in its attempt to implement MAST. 
 Additionally, at the time of this research, the MAST discussion in both districts 
was dead unless the teachers’ union in its respective district chose to pursue MAST 
again. This position put the power of implementation squarely with the teachers’ unions. 
This was most likely another unintended consequence of MAST, but rather than 
dissolving or weakening teachers’ unions, MAST appeared to strengthen them as the 
legislation clearly gave the local teachers’ unions the power to block MAST locally. 
 
Leadership 
 At Blue Lake, the tight time frame between teacher negotiations and the deadline 
to submit their MAST application was only a month and half, but the strong relationship 
between the teachers union in the administration helped provide the collaborative 
atmosphere necessary to mostly meet this deadline. The tight time frame did not allow 
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Blue Lake enough time to tackle the toughest question about MAST implementation for 
their district. The question about how to revise the salary schedule had not been answered 
and ultimately became the main reason that MAST did not survive in Blue Lake. That 
teachers did not favor adopting a reformed salary schedule as dictated by CSDE did not 
appear to be a local leadership issue. 
 However, in Cotton Grove, lack of effective local leadership was one of the main 
reasons MAST implementation failed. Dr. O'Connor also reported being out of the 
communication loop as far as knowing a 75% vote would be required. He attributed this 
to factors external to MAST. The district’s rapid growth and the need to focus on 
facilities to accommodate the growth was an urgent district need at the time that 
consumed much of Dr. O'Connor's time. As a result, he chose to delegate the task of 
communicating the MAST plan to others, a decision, in hindsight, he wished he made 
differently. 
 When Dr. O’Connor did communicate about the MAST program and potential 
plan he overtly promoted the neoconservative pay-for-performance rhetoric used by 
Governor King and CSDE. This was not well-received by teachers and showed a lack of 
ability to be able to frame an issue from the point of view of the teachers, an important 
leadership skill. This ineffective rhetoric combined with a general lack of oversight and 
involvement with MAST led to Cotton Grove’s failure to implement MAST. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
Basic Findings 
The five major findings as a result of this research were: (a) the financial 
starvation of local school districts fostered a greater willingness to try new initiatives if 
there was money attached to them; (b) MAST failed as a pre-fabricated solution to 
improve student achievement by altering teacher compensation, but did prove to be a 
promising professional development model; (c) CSDE attempted to manipulate the 
MAST legislation to promote the Governor’s agenda regarding teacher compensation; (d) 
the rhetoric used by CSDE regarding MAST shifted over time; and (e) local district 
leadership was important to effective MAST implementation. 
The first major finding was that the financial starvation of local school districts 
fostered a greater willingness to try new initiatives if there was money attached to them. 
When first introduced, the majority of school districts in Central State submitted to CSDE 
a non-binding letter of intent to participate in MAST. However, most of those school 
districts did not participate in MAST. With MAST there were additional unfunded costs 
associated with the initiative. These were largely related to the administration of MAST. 
These unfunded costs also likely had some influence on the number of school districts 
that ultimately chose to participate in MAST. When already faced with mounting 
financial pressures, allocating dollars out of the district general fund to administer an 
additional program was not high on the priority list for local school district administrators 
if the local teachers’ union was not interested in MAST participation. 
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In addition to the unfunded costs, another financial barrier to implementing 
MAST was that the $260 per student local school districts could gain through MAST was 
not likely enough of an incentive for the majority of teachers’ unions in school districts in 
Central State to abandon their traditional step and lane compensation model. 
The second major finding was that the pay-for-performance legislation was aimed 
at unions and at teachers as part of a pre-fabricated solution to the problem of inadequate 
student achievement.  Identifying the teachers and their unions as the “villains” who 
caused the inadequate student achievement paved the way to create legislation designed 
to undermine the power of teachers’ unions in collective bargaining and encourage poor 
teachers to leave the profession. MAST was one example of this type of legislation. 
However, it failed to undermine local teachers’ unions and its impact on student 
achievement was inconclusive. 
MAST did not appear to weaken local teachers’ unions. In fact, MAST legislation 
essentially gave veto power to the teachers’ unions with regard to implementing MAST. 
Without union support, at whatever level the local union leadership deemed appropriate, 
districts were unable to proceed or continue with a MAST plan. In order for MAST to be 
implemented in each district, teachers’ union approval of the local MAST 
implementation plan was required by law.  
Additionally no relationship could be established between how teachers were paid 
and student achievement. All four case districts implemented at least some of the 
professional development aspects of MAST and all four case districts saw increases in 
student achievement at the time of this research. However, only one of the case districts, 
Winter Valley, actually implemented the reformed salary schedule as envisioned by 
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Governor King and administered by CSDE. Since Winter Valley’s increase in student 
achievement was not substantially different from that of the other case districts, a 
relationship between teachers’ compensation and student achievement could not be made. 
MAST did show strong promise as an effective professional development model that may 
have had some correlation to student achievement. However, this was an unintended 
consequence that was seemingly unappreciated by the neoconservatives in Central State 
Government and CSDE. 
The third major finding was that CSDE attempted to manipulate the MAST 
legislation to promote Governor King’s agenda regarding teacher compensation. As 
MAST progressed through the Legislature, it was modified from the original version first 
introduced. However, the legislative language was vague enough to allow for a variety of 
interpretations, especially regarding the requirement to “reform” the traditional step and 
lane salary schedule. CSDE’s interpretation of reform as meaning that the traditional step 
and lane salary schedule needed to be eliminated was aligned with Governor King’s 
initial vision. However, many local school districts construed “reform” to mean to 
change, but not necessarily eliminate the step and lane compensation model.   
These varied interpretations occurred amidst mixed messages from CSDE and 
perceived incompetence on the part of CSDE employees by case district participants. 
Participants in the case districts were angered and frustrated by CSDE imposing its own, 
seemingly arbitrary requirements on MAST through the approval process, along with its 
lack of consistency in the criteria it required for plan approval. From the perspective of 
the case districts, CSDE’s enforcement of MAST requirements varied across local 
districts. Additionally, as case district participants received varied answers to questions 
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depending on which CSDE employee responded to the question, case district participants 
tended to view CSDE employees’ administration of MAST as incompetent. 
The fourth major finding was that the initial rhetoric that focused on MAST’s 
pay-for-performance and reformation of the traditional step and lane salary schedule 
aspects of MAST shifted to a focus on professional development. At first, CSDE’s and 
Governor King’s rhetoric regarding MAST revolved around “pay-for-performance” and 
“professionalizing” teacher pay by eliminating the traditional step and lane 
compensation. CSDE and Governor King failed to realize how this hard-charging rhetoric 
would the impact the decision to participate in MAST at the local level. The majority of 
local teachers’ unions did not bite on the lure of $260 per student in additional 
compensation to eliminate their traditional step and lane salary schedules. This 
necessitated some type of rhetorical shift on the part of those promoting MAST.  
The realization that MAST would not be implemented in most Central State 
school districts with a focus on the “pay-for-performance” and “professionalizing” 
teacher compensation components of MAST came too late to be effective. However, 
CSDE and Governor King realized that school districts that participated in MAST found 
that the professional development aspects of the program were well-received. CSDE and, 
to a lesser extent, Governor King softened their rhetoric around pay-for-performance and 
professionalizing teacher compensation and switched the focus of their rhetoric to MAST 
as an effective professional development model. 
Finally, the fifth major finding was that district leadership was important to 
effective implementation of MAST. As district leaders attended to the many issues that 
demanded their attention, they needed to pay attention to all four leadership frames as 
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discussed by Bolman & Deal (2008) and all aspects of leadership as presented by 
Northouse (2009). The human resource and political frames and the relational, 
interpersonal, and cultural aspects of leadership as well as the ability to “construct the 
political spectacle” differently that how it was promoted at the state level seemed to be 
the most critical leadership areas for successful MAST implementation. If MAST was 
important to the district, leaders needed to attend to the initiative personally and from the 
appropriate leadership frame in order to optimize the chances of MAST’s success in the 
local school district. 
Additionally, MAST rhetoric as it was used by local school district leaders was 
also a factor. In the two districts that had active MAST programs at the conclusion of this 
research, the reformed salary schedule and pay-for-performance aspects of MAST were 
not the focus of the discussion, but rather the focus was on professional development. 
This also appeared to be the case, at least initially, at Blue Lake. However, CSDE’s 
requirement of a reformed salary schedule pushed the issue in that district, ultimately 
leading to the demise of MAST in Blue Lake. In Cotton Grove where the 
Superintendent’s rhetoric was almost exclusively about pay-for-performance, the District 
lacked the trust necessary to approve MAST. 
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
The ideal typology used in this study focused on district size and type and 
whether or not the district was implementing MAST at the time of this research. The 
districts were not selected based on whether they were represented politically by 
Democrats, Republicans, or another party, and three of the four districts were represented 
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by Republican legislators. Given the accusations that CSDE had approved MAST plans 
on a partisan basis, it would be interesting to study districts’ experiences with MAST 
based on their legislative representation to explore this potential aspect of MAST 
implementation. 
Wirt et al. studied the impact of two states’ political histories and their impact on 
education statutes. A similar study could be done comparing the pay-for-performance 
teacher compensation programs between states. This research would serve to give greater 
insight into how political differences between states impact the implementation of teacher 
pay-for-performance initiatives. 
This study only superficially touched on education reform history in Central State. 
Additional research more thoroughly comparing MAST to other education policy in 
Central State could reveal any commonalities or trends that may exist. One such policy 
that may be of particular interest in this comparison is legislation that was recently passed 
in Central State that had not yet gone into effect at the time of this research that would 
require teachers’ compensation to be tied to performance evaluation rather than 
longevity. Additionally MAST could be compared to other past education reforms that 
have been seen as successful in Central State such as open enrollment or post-secondary 
enrollment options, commonly referred to as PSEO. 
This study focused largely on overall MAST implementation at the local level, 
and case district participants reported the majority of individuals eligible for MAST 
compensation in their district, received it. However, there were five major components to 
MAST: (a) career ladder and career advancement opportunities, (b) job embedded 
professional development, (c) performance-based pay, (d) comprehensive and objective 
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teacher observations, and (e) an alternative professional compensation schedule. 
Therefore, it may be beneficial to evaluate the specific components of MAST, especially 
with regard to peer observations, administrator observations, and criteria for receiving 
MAST compensation compared to the expectations of Central State legislators regarding 
performance-based pay. 
. 
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